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The purpose of Future Studies is to allow humans to understand plausible futures, 
and then seek to shape these into desirable futures. These may seem to be both 
invaluable and unachievable goals. Indeed, if we thought that we were good at 
looking into the future, we would spend more time doing it. Almost every univer-
sity in the world has a department of History to help us peer into the past but very 
few have a similar enterprise for surveying the future. This book will show that we 
are better able to address our future than we might think – I think. We should thus 
put far more effort into doing so.
Fortunately, the field of Future Studies has matured to a point where there is 
consensus around several key points and articulation of numerous methods for 
peering into the future. However, there is no consensus around the best methods 
for examining the future, and even less consensus around what we should be doing 
to shape that future. This book will outline a coherent structure for doing both.
This book builds upon the latest thinking in Future Studies. It also builds upon 
my Making Sense of World History (2021), a book that set out to both understand 
and draw lessons from the whole sweep of human history. Future Studies is a self- 
consciously interdisciplinary field, recognizing that the future will be determined 
by how political, economic, social, environmental, technological, and other phe-
nomena interact. This book builds also on my career as a scholar of interdisciplinarity 
and especially my co- authorship of multiple editions of two textbooks about how 
to perform interdisciplinary research. In particular, it applies a systems analysis 
approach based on the observation that the key phenomena studied in different 
disciplines all interact, at least indirectly. (You can anticipate seeing some flowcharts 
in what follows.)
Scholars of Future Studies recognize that we cannot predict the future. They are 
thus justifiably suspicious of anyone who claims to have a clear understanding of 
what the future will look like. Yet they argue that we can identify a set of plausible 
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futures. Then we can identify aspects of those futures that we want to encourage 
or discourage. In doing so, we need to be conscious of the connections between 
different policy goals and ensure that the policies we pursue toward one goal do not 
take us (too far) away from other goals.
Our purpose in this book is foremost to identify a key set of questions that 
we should collectively ask about our future. We will suggest answers to each 
question, but will surely not suggest the best possible answer every time. Human 
understanding advances through conversation – the careful amassing and evaluation 
of argument and evidence – and advances fastest when humans focus on a set of 
important questions that we can usefully investigate together.
Put another way, what we are striving to achieve here is foremost an organ-
izing structure – a handful of stages of analysis with key questions to pursue within 
each – for collectively thinking about our shared future. A structure without con-
tent would be both exceedingly boring and entirely unconvincing, and thus we 
flesh the structure out with many answers to our guiding questions. Readers can 
hopefully appreciate the structure even if they occasionally query some of the 
arguments applied within it. Moreover, that structure remains valid even if the 
future is far different from the present.
We will argue that the future is complex precisely because a large (but finite) set 
of phenomena studied across many disciplines interact with each other. It is thus 
crucial that we provide examples that draw upon many disciplines in answering 
our guiding questions. This book must then necessarily pursue breadth over 
depth: We talk a little about many things, stressing how answers to one question 
interact with answers to other questions, but cannot delve too deeply into any 
one issue. We invite readers to pursue more detailed understandings of issues that 
interest them. Instructors using this book as a text can easily assign a set of short 
research assignments where students are expected to read more widely about any 
of the many issues addressed here. Class discussions around any of these issues can 
strengthen students’ collective understanding of both individual issues and the 
broader structure of the book. These class discussions will best further the project 
of this book if organized so that students seek to understand those they disagree 
with – instructors might even ask students to articulate opposing arguments – 
rather than try to win a debate.
Project? What is the project of this book? It aims to enhance our collective 
ability to move toward desirable futures. It seeks to identify strategies for improving 
the world that can have broad public support. More importantly than any of the 
many strategies suggested in the book, it seeks to formulate a structure for encour-
aging the development of such strategies. This book is thus an exercise in what is 
sometimes termed the “radical middle”: It is not beholden to ideologies of right or 
left but rather seeks bold but sensible policies that can be widely appreciated.
I should confess up front that the book is predicated on a belief that humans 
are capable of engaging in sensible and respectful conversations about both soci-
etal goals and the means to achieve these. I will outline in what follows a set of 
changes in both values and institutions that would encourage such conversations. 
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Nevertheless, readers who doubt human capabilities for rational discourse will find 
many opportunities to doubt the feasibility of some of the strategies I suggest. 
I would challenge them to suggest how we can plot a better future without relying 
on sensible discourse.
My generation has bequeathed to future generations a world that is wonderful 
in some ways (for some people) and deeply problematic in others. I believe whole-
heartedly that we can have the good while minimizing the bad if we act with 
courage and judgement. The next generation may prove better at this task than 
my own. If not – if the young become fearful and complacent as they age like we 
did – a future that is in many ways far worse than the present is easily imagined 
(and will be in  chapters 4 and 5, along with better futures). This is a point in history 
where making sense of the future is critically important. I will provide my own sense 
of the future, but invite readers to deviate from this in making their own sense of 
the future – and determine how they can best shape that future. Nevertheless, I will 
try occasionally to lighten this critical task with some humour, humility, and the 
occasional anecdote: We are best able to cope with fear and injustice if we do not 
take ourselves too seriously.
1.1 Outline of the book
In the next two chapters, we engage in the method of “backcasting.” This is argu-
ably the method most widely pursued within Future Studies. It has two key steps. In 
 chapter 2, we identify a set of characteristics we would like to see in the future: stable 
climate, cultural toleration, peace, and more. We then in  chapter 3 seek to identify 
a set of strategies that can move us toward all of these goals. We draw heavily on 
historical experience throughout. That is, we “backcast” how we can achieve the 
futures we desire.
The world is constantly changing. It thus makes no sense simply to talk about 
how to get from today to our desired future. It would be unforgivably naïve to 
think that our plans for the future will not be buffeted by events. We must imagine 
how the world is likely to unfold over the next decades, and then think of how to 
get from likely futures to our desired futures. Futurists appreciate that we cannot 
predict one future flawlessly (though you can surely find many books in a bookstore 
or online that will claim otherwise), but should rather identify a set of plausible 
futures. These plausible futures may embody certain characteristics of our desired 
futures but deviate from those desired futures in other ways. We will identify plaus-
ible futures in  chapter 4. This will involve asking what present trends are likely to 
continue into the future. We can then investigate how we might nudge these plaus-
ible futures toward desirable futures.
We must also ask a more challenging set of questions about plausible changes in 
the future. That is, we must take a stab at predicting likely “surprises.” The future, 
like the past, will involve key events that were not easily predictable from past 
trends. Predicting surprises is, of course, inherently challenging – they would not be 
surprises if we could easily see them coming – but not quite impossible. This will 
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be the task of  chapter 5. We will be aided by our understanding of how the phe-
nomena studied in different disciplines interact, for surprises are most likely when 
no one group of experts focuses on a particular interaction. We will then discuss 
how societies can both prepare for and react to surprises in a way that moves us 
toward desired futures.
Chapter 6 turns to more practical questions. If we can identify some useful strat-
egies in the preceding chapters, how can we see that these are implemented? In 
particular, how can we guide societies from plausible to desirable futures? Though 
we cannot engage in a full- fledged discussion of policy advocacy, we will find that 
many of our discussions in preceding chapters provide important insights into how 
to put ideas into practice.
Chapter 6 also engages the question of human progress. In what ways have 
human societies experienced historical progress? An appreciation of human pro-
gress in the past can better prepare us to achieve future progress. In particular, we 
can enhance our confidence in our ability to shape the future by knowing how and 
how much progress was achieved in the past.
Figure 1.1 shows how the material of the next five chapters connects. Like any 
flowchart, it simplifies the analysis to follow. Yet it provides a useful overview of how 
we hope to identify plausible futures and work toward desirable futures. We are best 
able to achieve desirable futures if we pursue a broad approach of carefully identi-
fying goals, strategies, and the trends and surprises we need to cope with along the 
way – and understanding how these interact.
Some futurists might have started the book with the analyses in  chapters 4 and 5. 
After all, most of the effort in Future Studies is devoted to positing future trends and 
surprises. The danger of such an approach is we then focus only on certain trends or 

































FIGURE 1.1 Plan of the book.
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trends that are related to the goals that we have identified in  chapter 2. We cannot reach 
our best possible future unless we first have a clear idea of what we would like that 
future to look like. We live in a time of change and it is all too easy to lose a sense of 
direction while reacting to change. We need to carefully articulate our goals – and reflect 
on how these can be achieved – before we can know how best to respond to change. 
One further advantage of the approach of this book is that the reader is rewarded early 
( chapter 3) with a set of strategies for achieving desirable futures, rather than only 
encountering these after multiple chapters that identify problems and challenges.
In each chapter of the book, we will first outline a small set of principles that 
will guide analysis throughout that chapter. It would be a tedious exposition if we 
repeated each principle for each example engaged thereafter. However, it can be a 
useful exercise for students to report on how each principle was (or should have 
been!) applied to particular examples. We will thus early in each chapter detail a set 
of questions for readers to keep in mind as they read the rest of the chapter. These 
questions can form the basis of student assignments. Student assignments or group 
projects around methods employed by futurists are also suggested in boxes 3.7, 4.6, 
5.3, and 6.3 (and briefly in 2.5).
1.2 Important characteristics of this book
Any book with a broad interdisciplinary focus must be jargon- free. We cannot 
assume that readers will be familiar with the jargon of any particular discipline. We 
must thus report insights from many disciplines in a way that will be comprehen-
sible to non- experts. This will mean that we cannot bury our ideas in big words 
but must state every argument of the book simply and directly. Our ideas, that is, 
are thrust into the world naked and alone, subject to critique from all sides. This is 
a good thing, for our purpose is to communicate a structure for understanding and 
shaping the future, and to invite dialogue around key issues.
BOX 1.1: WELL, MAYBE A LITTLE JARGON …
We will use the word “strategy” a lot in this book. It has a very broad meaning, 
of any sort of multifaceted approach to accomplish – or at least move toward – 
one of the goals articulated in the book. A strategy, as we shall see, may include 
a variety of different kinds of efforts. We will use the narrower term “policy” to 
refer only to official acts by a government.
We will also use the word “institution” from time to time. We will follow 
common usage here and define “institution” as any formal rule promulgated by 
an organization that has the power to enforce that rule. Note that an institution 
is only an institution if people can be punished for violating the rule. The most 
common institutions in modern societies are the laws and regulations put in 




institutions. We can distinguish “institutions” from “cultural attitudes” on the 
twin grounds that the latter are less formal and that the punishments for vio-
lating these are likewise informal. One of my pet peeves is that some scholars 
define “institutions” so vaguely as to be indistinguishable from cultural attitudes. 
We will wish to distinguish these and discuss how they interact in what follows.
Particular institutions (say, laws about littering) or values (say, honesty) are 
all “phenomena,” a word that in this book really just means “things that we 
study.” It would have been unclear in places if we just referred to “things.”
There, that wasn’t so bad, was it? Every other word in this book is employed, 
I hope, in a manner that should be familiar. We can engage our future in plain 
English.
Each of the next chapters has a very similar structure. Each chapter begins with a 
discussion of key principles and guiding questions. In  chapter 2 these focus on how 
to identify shared societal goals. In  chapter 3, they specify ways to develop strat-
egies for achieving such goals. In  chapter 4, we ask how to identify trends that are 
likely to continue into the future. In  chapter 5, we ask how to predict surprises. In 
 chapter 6, we identify broad guidelines for policy advocacy.
The bulk of each chapter is then devoted to a broad cross- disciplinary survey: of 
respectively particular goals, strategies, trends, surprises, and strategies for policy 
advocacy. It is important in each chapter that we cast our net widely, for only a 
broad treatment can cope with the inherent complexity of our shared future. Note 
that in  chapters 4 and 5 we re- apply some of our analysis from  chapter 3 as we 
discuss how to move from plausible futures and surprises toward desirable futures.
Each chapter then proceeds to an integrative exercise. Are the goals we have 
identified in  chapter 2 broadly compatible? (Yes, but certain conflicts will not be 
ignored.) Are the strategies identified in  chapter 3 broadly compatible? (Yes again, 
but we must always be cognizant of negative side effects of our strategies.) How do 
the trends identified in  chapter 4 interact? (Sometimes, they reinforce each other 
but other times they conflict.) How might surprises interact? (I will leave that as a 
surprise.) How might strategies for advocacy interact?
BOX 1.2: STEEP
Futurists often stress the acronym STEEP to emphasize the important 
interactions among social, technological, economic, environmental, and pol-
itical phenomena. We embrace this emphasis on interactions, but extend it, 
recognizing that culture, health, population, art, and human nature are also 
important in particular contexts. We will extend our gaze across each of these 
categories of phenomena in the chapters to follow.
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The book covers a lot of ground in a manageable number of pages. We hope to 
provide a structure for studying and shaping the future. We hope to provide enough 
detail on each goal, strategy, and prediction surveyed so that readers can readily 
appreciate how it fits within the broader structure. We hope to prepare readers well 
for more detailed conversations.
We will try to organize the material so that it is easy to remember. This will often 
involve simple organizing devices such as employing SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats) analysis in  chapter 5 or asking the 5W (who, what, where, 
when, why) questions in Chapter 6. We will use bullet points when there is a 
handful of complementary points to be made, or strategies to suggest.
There will be many issues of tangential importance that arise in these chapters 
but do not fit comfortably within the chapter’s organizing structure. We will employ 
in- text boxes to address these issues.
In identifying societal goals in  chapter 2 we seek goals that are (or sometimes 
can potentially become) broadly acceptable. There is no sense in backcasting if we 
cannot first achieve some consensus on goals. Yet the task of identifying broadly 
acceptable goals may seem impossible in a world characterized by political polar-
ization. It is not. We will seek to integrate across seeming dichotomies in goals. We 
will seek to identify Golden Means with respect to some goals, backing away from 
extreme positions that scare or offend wide swathes of the population. Critically, 
we will recognize that people have five different ways of evaluating both goals 
and policies, and seek goals and policies that satisfy most or all of these evaluative 
approaches.
In looking at strategies for achieving these goals, we must look at how we can 
change the way societies make political decisions. That is, we will ask what sort of 
decision- making processes might yield decisions that advance our various goals. 
Yet we will not focus exclusively on formal rules and processes, but recognize that 
our rules work best when supported by our values. We must then talk in  chapter 2 
about desirable values and in  chapter 3 about how to encourage these.
Though we seek in this book to provide clear analysis and advice, we do not 
shy away from appreciating that there is an important role for creativity in many 
places: identifying strategies in  chapter 3, identifying surprises in  chapter 5, and 
encouraging societal change in  chapter 6 (and maybe elsewhere). We give advice in 
each case on how creative processes can be encouraged – which necessarily involves 
debunking a common misconception that creative acts just happen.
In looking at trends and surprises, we do not privilege any single driving force 
in human societies. Our bookstores are full of books that focus on how technology 
or culture or climate change will change our world. Each of these books may con-
tain important insights, but each inevitably fails to appreciate the broader context 
in which the future will unfold. We are much better able to guide our future if we 
can appreciate the full range of forces that interact in driving historical processes.
A book about the future is best written by a scholar who knows a little about a 
lot of things. I bring to the task some expertise in diverse areas such as interdiscip-
linary studies, economics, world history, information science, methodology, policy 
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analysis, and creativity. (I discuss in the Bibliographic reflections how this book 
draws on my previous research, but might stress again here that I am facilitated 
in identifying future trends and surprises by my work in world history, and in 
performing integrative exercises by my research in interdisciplinary studies.) I will 
surely be wrong about many things in what follows – but those who may criticize 
me will be wrong in turn about many things. Hopefully, the general structure of the 
book has value, and we can work toward consensus on the details over time. (These 
are, at least, my excuses for any errors, and I am sticking to them. I thought it useful 
to put them all in one place.)
It is useful to close with a quote I have always liked from Ernst Laszlo: “There 
are no immaculate perceptions.” With perhaps the singular exception of Descartes’ 
cogito (“I think, therefore I am”: We each as individuals know that we must exist 
because we are engaged in thought), there is no statement – whether philosoph-
ical or scientific – that cannot be subjected to some reasoned objection. Even our 
belief that the earth orbits the sun might be queried – though there is now so 
much argument and evidence in favour of that hypothesis that we should safely 
accept that it is true. We as humans cannot strive for perfect arguments, but should 
appreciate that by carefully amassing argument and evidence, we can move toward 
broad consensus on any issue. We should be humble, but not let the recognition of 
counter- arguments numb us into inaction. This simple argument will guide analysis 
in many places in this book. It also guides the structure of the book: I purposely 
provide what I see as the main arguments surrounding each issue that is addressed. 
The reader can appreciate that there are always caveats that we have not pursued. 
This is a flaw not of this book but of the universe.
1.3 A brief survey of Future Studies
Peter C. Bishop and Andy Hines, in Teaching about the Future (2012), provide a useful 
survey of methods employed in Future Studies. The approach of this book chooses 
from these in very simple ways:
• We adopt the method of “backcasting” wholeheartedly.
• We accept that the world is complex, a core premise of Future Studies. We thus 
tend to eschew all the many methods in the field that focus on one change 
agent (such as technology), in favour of an approach that assumes that all phe-
nomena exert an effect on other phenomena. We need, that is, to embrace the 
simple fact that our world is governed by hundreds of interacting phenomena.
• We embrace the idea of modelling visually (and sometimes mathematically) 
these diverse interactions. We engage important mapping strategies that priv-
ilege one type of change (such as the Futures Wheel, which diagrams the direct 
and indirect effects of one change at a time) but try when possible to capture 
multiple interdependent transformations.
• We quite like the “Failure Mode” idea of looking at what might go wrong. We 
need to strive to identify surprises (often termed “wild cards”) that we should 
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be prepared to react to. In addition, we need to look carefully at the possible 
negative side effects of any policies that we might promote. Our goal should 
be to identify policy interventions that serve multiple goals simultaneously, or 
at least pursue one goal without having too negative an impact on other goals.
• We recognize the value of games and simulations that attempt to grapple 
with the unpredictability of the future. We will draw upon the results of such 
exercises as appropriate but will not directly employ these methods. We will, 
though, encourage classroom exercises that employ such methods.
• We also applaud methods for achieving expert consensus on the future. 
However, we worry that expertise focuses almost necessarily on certain nodes 
and links within the complex system of interactions that guide world history, 
and that expert advice may thus be biased.
• We stress methods that are easy to understand and can be applied in a reason-
ably objective manner.
• Systems analysis lies at the heart of Future Studies, and will be employed 
throughout this book.
• Perhaps most importantly, we accept the key premises (first outlined by Roy 
Amara) that the future is not predictable, but nor is it pre- determined, and thus 
it can be shaped by human action.
We should recognize that there is an important minority tradition within the 
field of Future Studies that predicts that humanity is on the verge of a major soci-
etal transformation: Phrases such as “collapse,” “revolution,” and “the end of capit-
alism” are employed in this discourse. These scholars might seem to violate our last 
bullet point, assuming that one future can be confidently predicted. Yet they can 
point to the fact that all previous human civilizations have collapsed (at least if one 
defines collapse in a particular way). Such futurists would think that a book such 
as this, which proposes a wide array of changes to our existing societies, is missing 
the point.
We will not in this book shy away from identifying bleak plausible futures in 
 chapters 4 and 5. There are days when I fear for our collective future. Yet the costs 
of collapse and revolution are so high that I think it prudent to seek to reform the 
societies we inhabit rather than give up now and start planning the next society. 
And even if we are not able to stem societal collapse, it is useful to reflect on what 
kind of society we want to live in so that we are better able to rebuild. It may be 
that I exaggerate the degree to which we can reform our existing societies; readers 
are invited to engage the possibility that more radical reforms may be required as 
they peruse this book.
Such reflection must begin with identifying societal goals. But it must also 
reflect on how we can achieve those goals. I grow tired of books calling for the 
end of capitalism. Most of these give no glimpse of how we would organize an 
economy without markets and firms. Some have the temerity to suggest that a 
series of committees could determine what and how much we produce. This book 
will often indeed suggest various forms of collective decision- making, but let me 
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confess at the start that I have sat through far too many committee meetings in my 
life to want decisions about how much and what kinds of toothpaste to produce to 
be entrusted to a committee when markets can perform that task so well. So this 
book will instead focus on how we can have the benefits of markets while minim-
izing their many negative impacts. We, will, that is, suggest many important reforms 
to our economic system, but not imagine that we can or should get rid of markets 
or firms. I fear that a discourse about the end of capitalism guides us away from 
discussing the advisability and feasibility of reforming capitalism.
In sum, though I think it prudent to prepare for the worst, I think the best atti-
tude at this point in time is constructive optimism. We can, with courage and good-
will, create a far better future.
1.4 Why do this?
We have already admitted that we hope that in better understanding the future we 
will be better able to shape the future toward desirable ends. Yet we should appre-
ciate that there is also a direct advantage of better understanding the future: You 
can be more confident of your own life if you have a basic understanding of the 
world you live in and the broader forces that affect you. You can feel less powerless 
if you have some idea of how to shape that world. Finally, you can better plan your 
individual futures if you comprehend societal futures. We want, in sum, to change 
the way you see the future, and your role in shaping it.
While we focus in this book on broad societal changes, you may find useful 
insights within these pages that can inform your career choices or entrepreneurial 
decisions. Some of you may become social entrepreneurs, forming businesses that 
make money while explicitly furthering societal goals. Of course, providing goods 
and services that people want will always serve at least one societal goal (economic 
prosperity).
The Future Studies literature identifies a set of subsidiary goals to those above. 
Each of these will be encouraged at some point in this book:
• Encouraging thinking that is diverse, open, balanced, and non- biased
• Asking the right questions
• Appreciating the assumptions and mental models of others
• Placing particular issues in a broader context
• Anticipating change and avoiding surprise
• Considering a range of future possibilities
• Producing more creative, broader, and deeper insights
• Identifying a wider range of opportunities and options
• Choosing a preferred future
• Experimenting with strategies and policies





2.1 How to set goals
In a world of change, where we must individually and collectively make very com-
plex decisions, it is absolutely critical that we know where we want to be going. 
Otherwise, we can too easily just be buffeted by events, reacting to one challenge 
after another, and end up feeling that we are not getting anywhere better. Only by 
first reflecting deeply on our goals can we hope to fashion a better future.
We should also recognize the motivational effect of reflecting on our goals. 
There is an important strand of futurist thought that stresses that imagining a 
better future encourages people to work toward achieving that better future. It is 
important to stress, then, that we will identify goals that are feasible in this chapter, 
but each requires effort.
Though our purpose here is to identify a set of goals that each has merit, it is 
important that we ask whether these various goals are compatible. We shall see that 
this is often the case. For example, the goal of strengthening (faith in) democracy 
will be enhanced by policies that achieve a variety of other goals, and these other 
goals are generally easier to achieve with improvements to democratic decision- 
making. Better policies, arrived at democratically, enhance confidence in the 
fairness of the system.
Can we agree on a set of goals? At a time when politics is polarized in many 
countries, consensus on societal goals may seem a distant dream. Yet contentious 
political debate can often mask consensus on deeper issues. The vast majority of 
people are willing to help the less fortunate, but do not want to be taken advan-
tage of by the dishonest or lazy. Debates on social policy often hinge on which side 
of this dichotomy different groups choose to emphasize at a point in time. Clear 
articulation of a shared but complex goal – to help the less fortunate without being 
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duped – can encourage the development of policies that seek to satisfy the vast 
majority of people.
If we wish to satisfy most people, then we need to appreciate that people will 
evaluate societal outcomes in five quite different ways:
1. Most obviously, people will look at consequences. They may do so selfishly: Does 
a particular policy or societal outcome make me better off? They may do so 
more altruistically: Does a particular policy or outcome make the world a better 
place? Either way, they will evaluate particular societal outcomes in terms of 
some set of goals. Note that by making people reflect on their goals we may 
alter their evaluation of the consequences of particular actions. In order to sat-
isfy those who calculate consequences, we will need to evaluate policies and 
outcomes in terms of who benefits and who loses, and seek policies that have 
broad benefits, or for which the winners can compensate the losers.
2. People may instead look at whether a policy or outcome accords with certain 
core beliefs or rules: “People should work,” “Drug abuse is a crime,” “Addiction 
is a disease,” and so on. One oft- cited belief is the Golden Rule whereby we 
should treat others as we would hope for them to treat us if the situation 
were reversed. People will often also have strong beliefs around certain sets of 
rights – but may disagree about which rights are most important. Note that 
we can at times encourage people to reflect on their beliefs, but often our very 
identities are tied to certain core beliefs. We will discuss below questions of 
“justice” and “freedom” that often reflect and inform core beliefs.
3. Likewise, people may have a core set of values. They want to be caring, or just, 
or prudent, or courageous. They will evaluate policies or outcomes in terms of 
these core values. As with beliefs, these values may be difficult to change within 
individuals. For both beliefs and values, change may nevertheless occur across 
generations. We will often encounter changes in beliefs and values – some 
laudable, some troublesome – in what follows. We should thus be willing to 
speculate on the benefits of certain further changes in core beliefs and values.
4. The preceding three approaches assume some sort of conscious logical ana-
lysis. Perhaps, though, people will simply go with a “gut instinct” or intuitive 
response that a particular outcome makes them feel good. They may not sub-
ject this intuitive response to much conscious reflection – or they may pretend 
to a rational reflection that simply justifies a decision reached without much 
conscious thought. Some psychologists suggest that this is the most common 
human approach to decision- making. Note that people then pursue a con-
scious evaluative strategy in a very biased manner. It is important, then, that we 
examine why a policy or outcome might have intuitive appeal.
5. Finally yet importantly, people may simply agree with what their peers, group, 
or group leaders say. As with intuition, they may use one of the three con-
scious methods of evaluation above to rationalize decisions they have made 
because of the influence of others. We should not disdain this sort of collective 
decision- making. Groups over time develop shared traditions that generally 
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serve the group well. We should seek policies and outcomes that do not need-
lessly offend societal traditions. We may at times wish to encourage questioning 
of troublesome traditions.
As we discuss each goal below, we will ask how it accords with each of the five types 
of evaluation. We will seek to articulate goals in a way that appeals to each of the 
five types of evaluation.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
Readers should not find it too difficult to evaluate each goal articulated below 
in terms of each of these five types of evaluation. It is useful for readers to 
develop a small table for this purpose, with the first column representing par-
ticular strategies and five columns for each type of evaluation. It is also useful 
to visually diagram the effects noted below, and speculate on other possible 
effects.
BOX 2.1: JUSTIFYING AND CONNECTING THE FIVE TYPES 
OF EVALUATION
It is worth noting two key facts about these five types of evaluation. First, 
they are independent. Philosophers debate the relative strengths of the first 
three types of analysis, under the headings Consequentialism, Deontology, 
and Virtue Theory. Philosophers recognize that each of the three has different 
basic principles. While different philosophers have strong preferences, there 
is a general appreciation that each of the three approaches begins from valid 
premises – but that each also faces challenges. Peer pressure and traditions 
are studied for the most part by sociologists and anthropologists rather than 
philosophers. Anthropologists appreciate that societies develop traditions 
that often serve those societies well – though some traditions may become 
outdated, and others may serve elites better than they may serve others. 
Psychologists study human emotions and subconscious thought processes. 
They appreciate that our subconscious thoughts embody understandings that 
we might have trouble articulating in words. They also appreciate that our 
emotions may guide us to act in ways that we would consciously disdain. They 
recognize that our subconscious decision- making is not strictly rational, but 
rather draws (often biased) associations with easily retrieved memories. The 
fact that each of the five types of analysis is justifiable in different ways, and 
that neither is perfect, means that we have no objective basis for deciding that 
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one is superior. There is both a practical and ethical argument, then, for trying 
to satisfy all five.
The second fact is that the five types of evaluation are mutually supportive. 
Humans live complex lives and thus do not have the time or cognitive cap-
acity to evaluate carefully each decision they make. Even a diehard conse-
quentialist must default, then, to following certain rules or values much of the 
time. We value traditions in large part because we think they have provided 
good outcomes to our group. In the all- important ethical arena, our intuition 
provides the most powerful answer to the question “Why act ethically when 
you can get away with unethical behaviour?” The other types of evaluation 
may help us determine what is ethical, but only our wish to avoid feeling 
guilty will induce us to act ethically. Yet our guilt in turn reflects the values 
and beliefs that we have internalized. There are, of course, times where the 
five types of evaluation point in different directions (and then we must make 
difficult choices), but we can be heartened by the fact that they often reinforce 
each other.
2.2 Particular goals
2.2.1 Environmental sustainability (climate, resources, biodiversity)
Although there may be fierce debate regarding the seriousness of our environ-
mental challenges, and the best ways of addressing these, there can be little doubt 
that we all want our great- grandchildren to inherit a world with a healthy cli-
mate. We also want them to have resources to support their economic activities. 
Biodiversity is valuable both because most humans appreciate nature and especially 
wildlife, and because we are often able to construct valuable medicines from nat-
ural substances (though the latter motive may become less important as we become 
able to build any genetic compound in a laboratory). Maintaining our environ-
ment has good consequences for future generations that we care about, accords 
with core beliefs and values around caring for future generations, and reflects 
traditions in most human societies of caring for both nature and the young. With 
respect to our emotions, there is much evidence that humans gain pleasure from 
regular interactions with nature. We should thus feel good about maintaining our 
environment.
Environmental policy discourse tends to focus on big issues of climate, pollution, 
and biodiversity. Yet if humans do benefit psychologically from exposure to nature, 
then we should have a goal of maintaining both urban and wilderness parks. We 
should hope that everyone, and especially young people, have access to these parks. 
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2.2.2 Faith in democracy
We will follow Winston Churchill’s famous advice, that democracy is the worst 
possible system except for all the rest. It is important that we not oversell democ-
racy: Fools and knaves are often elected, and voters find it frustrating to monitor 
either politicians or government policies. Yet a functioning democracy allows the 
citizenry to exert some influence over government policy, and limits the abuse of 
governmental power. Those who have never suffered autocratic rule may under-
estimate these important achievements. If we accept that democracy is valuable, 
then our goal must be to restore faith in democratic processes. However, we do 
not want to fool people, and thus a restored faith in democracy must reflect actual 
improvements in the way democratic decisions are made, and this in turn must lead 
to a visible improvement in government policies. This is a tall order, but the failure 
to restore faith in democracy risks a slide into autocracy. We should recall that 
modern democracy is only a couple of centuries old, and that democratic govern-
ance depends on broad public support for the system: Democracies may be far less 
secure than they might appear.
We have already mentioned one good consequence of democracy: limits on 
governmental abuse of power. There are others. Voters often judge politicians on the 
basis of economic outcomes (even though economic outcomes depend on many 
things beyond the control of politicians). Faith in democracy will depend to a large 
degree on whether democracies are perceived to enhance economic prosperity. 
There is evidence that democracies on average grow faster than autocracies, but the 
economic success in recent decades of autocratic China leads many to question how 
strong the link between democracy and economic prosperity is. Causation in the 
other direction may be more powerful: Democracy is far more firmly established in 
most rich countries than it is in most poor countries – likely because literate people 
freed from hunger and with time to devote to political debate are more likely to 
support democracy and value the freedoms associated with democracy.
The record with respect to the environment is also promising. It is easier for 
complaints about pollution to be heard in a democracy. Some autocrats have shown 
great disdain for the natural environment. Again, though, there are exceptions.
We must be careful in our use of terminology in this book. Many of us conflate 
the terms “democracy” and “representative democracy.” Given that representatives 
do not always serve the interests of electors, we should have a special interest in 
this book in democratic institutions that allow the wishes of citizens to have direct 
impacts on policy unmediated by “representatives.”
We have suggested that we can only restore faith in democracy by reforming 
democratic institutions and generating better policies. Yet even this will not be 
enough. Democracy, in the end, must depend on a couple of core beliefs: that we 
can respect those who we disagree with and work together on shared goals; and that 
we can through careful argument and analysis identify superior policies. As Michel 
Foucault the French philosopher recognized decades ago, if we abandon faith in the 
value of careful analysis and argument, then we have no answer to authoritarians: A 
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dictator’s decisions are as valid as anybody’s. In addition, democracy depends on a 
shared sense of purpose. If we vilify those we disagree with, then that shared sense 
of purpose disappears, and democracy becomes a tyranny of a majority over a 
minority.
Our goal, then, must be to both improve the institutions of democracy and 
resuscitate the core values on which democracy depends. Happily, these sub- goals 
are mutually supportive: It is easier to improve institutions if we can work together 
in doing so, and it is easier to work together if we see a path to improvement. 
Reinvigorating values is particularly important for the project of this book, for 
those whose evaluative processes rely on beliefs or values will only then support 
our strategies and goals around reforming democratic institutions. Those guided by 
intuition may also be moved away from the attractions of politics as blood sport 
toward appreciation of institutions designed to achieve societal consensus, if they 
come to see real potential for achieving consensus.
2.2.3 Peace and international collaboration
Peace means the absence of war, and wars are generally understood these days to 
be horrific. Civilians have become common casualties in modern warfare, and thus 
no population wants to be drawn into war. Wars may at times be a lesser evil than 
dominance by a horrific dictator or the experience of mass starvation, but we could 
hope to eliminate wars, dictators, and starvation. Our belief in the value of life, and 
values of compassion and justice, also guide us away from war – and situations that 
might justify war. War has been a characteristic of human societies for millennia, but 
societies often hoped to achieve peace through conquest (a goal only very rarely 
achieved). Intuition guides most of us away from war, though certainly many/ most 
are capable of some rush of excitement in battle.
International collaboration is necessary for a variety of important goals: addressing 
climate change, policing overfishing in our oceans, and eliminating tax havens. 
International collaboration on a range of issues reduces the likelihood of war. 
Nationalist traditions and our personal instinct to identify with small groups limit 
our support for cooperation – but we can see that collaboration serves the interests 
of member nations on many issues. We can build on such values as respect for 
others to encourage international collaboration. The challenge at present is that 
autocrats govern much of the world, and we can have legitimate ethical concerns 
about acting in ways that give them legitimacy. A wholehearted embrace of the 
principle of international collaboration may thus have to wait for a day when 
most or all of the world is governed democratically. There may still be challenges 
even then, for democracies routinely elect charlatans and rogues, but we can at 
least hope that these cannot veer too far from reflecting the will of the people, 
especially when it may take multiple terms of office to negotiate international 
agreements. (We will discuss in the next chapter how democracies should engage 
with autocrats.) We can then embrace a combined goal of international collabor-
ation among democracies.
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2.2.4 Sense of community
Human beings almost always operate within groups. We intuitively value our mem-
bership in groups. And all human societies celebrate their uniqueness (ironically in 
very similar ways). All societies encourage a sense of loyalty to the group, and also 
encourage values that provide support for group members. The consequences of 
group loyalty can be both good and bad, for a sense of togetherness within a group 
is often accompanied by suspicion of or even hostility toward others. For a dem-
ocracy, then, it is critical that there be a sense of community within the nation as a 
whole. People may have a strong sense of attachment to ethnicities or occupational 
groups or religions or genders or other sorts of groups within the nation, but they 
should have some strong sense of overarching shared purpose with the nation as a 
whole. They should respect each other and interact with each other. If loyalties to 
groups within a nation become much more powerful than loyalties to the nation 
as a whole, then democracy is threatened. (Note that if we will value international 
collaboration then we will want some sense of a global community also.) Our ability 
to collectively pursue the sorts of strategies advocated in this book will be crippled 
in the absence of a sense of community: Mutual suspicion will prevent the devel-
opment and implementation of policies that could otherwise be broadly supported.
We should seek a balance between valuing community and valuing individual 
autonomy. We should appreciate that communities are stronger because of the 
interaction of diverse people within them. And we should appreciate that individ-
uals can only exercise their autonomy within communities. We should recognize 
that strong social pressures toward conformity are a challenge to democracy and an 
invitation to authoritarianism.
2.2.5 Economic prosperity
We want jobs to be available for those who want them – both so that people can 
feed their families and because work is (at least at this point in history) an important 
source of meaning for most people. Employment has good consequences both for 
the individual and society, accords with core values and beliefs, and makes people 
feel good about themselves. We will have an obvious preference for “good jobs” that 
pay well and give workers some capacity for expressing their individuality.
We also want to encourage entrepreneurs to develop goods and services that 
people want to buy. We of course want to discourage entrepreneurs from misleading 
or mistreating their customers, workers, or suppliers.
We want both workers and entrepreneurs to be able to buy a range of goods and 
services. We should respect their autonomy but can have some qualms:
• Measures of human happiness suggest that happiness increases markedly when 
we are able to meet basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare, but 
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• We may be particularly suspicious of goods and services purchased to impress 
others. The value that one person gains from buying an expensive car may be 
matched by negative feelings of envy among others.
• We may also worry about the capacity of advertising to convince people to 
buy things that do not enhance their happiness in the end.
• We should appreciate that people also place a value on leisure time, and that 
futurists have often dreamed of a future (still some way off) when humans 
could be freed from toil to engage in self- improvement. We can worry about 
whether humans would really want to be completely freed from toil, but can 
appreciate that leisure time deserves to be acknowledged in any evaluation of 
economic prosperity.
We might thus conclude that some goods and services have better consequences 
than others. Likewise, some may accord better with shared values than others. If 
individuals choose to work a bit less – but still support their families – in order to 
have more leisure, we should view this positively (though we might worry that they 
then pay less in taxes).
Note here that the way we collect statistics does not at all distinguish good and 
less good jobs, good and less good entrepreneurship, or good and less good goods 
or services (sorry; that was a mouthful). Moreover, our measures of output have 
no place for leisure time. We will have more to say about how we do and should 
measure economic prosperity in later chapters.
Some readers may at this point be getting ahead of us and wondering if the goal of 
economic prosperity is at all compatible with the goal of environmental sustainability. 
We can reassure them that this is precisely the sort of question this book engages. We 
are outlining goals in this chapter, and will discuss how to achieve them in the next.
2.2.6 Reduced economic uncertainty
We noted above that we might prefer some jobs over others. We might include here 
a preference for secure jobs over temporary jobs. Yet we must be careful of pushing 
this preference too far. There are advantages to economic flexibility, for this allows 
us both to adjust the range of goods and services we produce and to identify lower- 
cost ways of doing so. We must strike a difficult balance then between providing 
workers with job security and giving firms flexibility.
An alternative to tying workers to particular jobs is to provide a social safety net 
that facilitates moving between jobs. Such a goal might be met in a variety of ways:
• Employment insurance programmes that replace part of a worker’s income 
when they are laid off.
• A guaranteed basic income that ensures a minimum income for everyone.
• Public works programmes that provide jobs for the unemployed.
• Public education and healthcare programmes that enhance the resiliency and 
flexibility of workers.
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Reducing economic uncertainty can have major psychological benefits. We 
want here to strike a balance that eliminates fear while still encouraging people 
to pursue personal responsibility in supporting their families. If we reduce fear at 
the individual level, then we see further indirect benefits: Fear encourages social 
strife and especially the vilification of those who might take our jobs. Fear also 
limits our ability to pursue other goals such as environmental sustainability that are 
seen by some as a threat to their livelihood. People generally try to avoid fear and 
therefore will intuitively appreciate greater security. If we can strike a good balance 
between security and responsibility, then this will accord with key values such as 
compassion and the key belief that people should get what they deserve. And if in 
achieving security we reduce or eliminate homelessness and begging on our streets, 
even the most curmudgeonly may appreciate some selfish benefits. We can even 
appeal weakly to tradition here for most societies have made some effort to address 
economic security, if only to decrease the incentive for political insurrection: The 
Roman Empire famously provided free bread to the people of Rome. We can aim 
for a greater security than most previous human societies could achieve.
We should close this section by appreciating that we can also reduce economic 
(and other types of) uncertainty by becoming more adept at predicting and reacting 
to “surprises” such as technological innovations and epidemics. This will be the 
subject of  chapter 5.
2.2.7 Reduced inequality (economic but also social and power 
inequality)
The philosopher John Rawls famously argued that if individuals could choose the 
sort of society that they wanted to live in from behind a “veil of ignorance” in 
which they did not know where they would end up in the income distribution, 
they would opt for fairly egalitarian outcomes. But not entirely egalitarian: Even 
behind a veil of ignorance we would not wish to completely eliminate finan-
cial incentives for hard work and risk- taking. We need then to strike a balance – 
between beliefs and values of justice and fairness and caring that lead us toward 
egalitarianism, and beliefs and values around personal responsibility and rewards for 
hard work and risk- taking that lead us toward valuing some degree of inequality. 
We can be guided here by a critical realization that the incomes of all people reflect 
a combination of their own efforts and capabilities and the circumstances in which 
they find themselves. A great football player can make millions in the early twenty- 
first century whereas an equally skilled player a century earlier made a pittance. 
A corporate CEO can make millions only because there are huge globe- spanning 
corporations that are willing to provide lucrative pay packages. We can ask to what 
extent an individual’s income may exaggerate their personal contributions. We may 
then be able to enhance fairness by taxing them without detracting from rewarding 
their personal initiative.
We should also appreciate that some income is earned by theft or collusion or 
corruption or dishonesty. Here we can achieve greater equality without interfering 
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with rewards for beneficial behaviour. We must, then, distinguish deserved income – 
from producing goods and services that people value and at a fair price – from 
undeserved income that comes from bribing governments or lying to consumers 
or colluding illegally. We can easily define “deserved income” as that which involves 
providing a net benefit to the rest of society, while “undeserved income” imposes 
a net cost on the rest of society. It is, of course, much more difficult to measure 
the effects on others than to define these terms. It is often easier to strike at the 
characteristics of “undeserved income” such as bribery or collusion, though we 
could enhance our efforts to measure undeserved income. Our goal should be to 
eliminate undeserved income. Success in this endeavour will make society more 
just. It will also enhance economic prosperity, though perhaps not the way this is 
usually measured.
We likely underestimate the role that luck plays in economic outcomes. Successful 
investors cannot predict all of the circumstances that might affect the profitability of 
an investment, and so rely on a mix of judgement and luck for success. Entertainers 
often rocket to stardom on the basis of one role or song that might as easily have 
been given to another. Farmers can be wiped out by freak weather events. I have 
sat on enough hiring committees to know that there can be a lot of randomness in 
who gets hired. Humans have a natural bias toward thinking that things happen for 
a reason, but in every realm of human activity there is a significant role for luck to 
play in determining outcomes. And we might then think that the lucky should be 
generous toward the unlucky.
People will on average feel better in a more egalitarian society. Envy and jeal-
ousy afflict the very poor, and while the rich gain some pleasure from luxury, they 
often also report feelings of guilt. And they lose some of the joy of accomplishment 
after amassing huge wealth. Social discord is lessened when income distributions 
are more egalitarian. And there are huge political implications: The very rich are 
much more able to lobby and bribe and influence than are masses of the very poor. 
Our efforts to restore faith in democracy will become easier to the extent that we 
succeed in lessening income inequality. More practically, those raised in poverty 
are more likely to be unhealthy and unemployed and incarcerated, and these are 
very expensive outcomes for society. Cross- country comparisons find that greater 
inequality is associated with various social evils: violence, mental illness, prison time, 
distrust, teen pregnancy, school dropouts, and obesity.
There is thus strong support for policies that aid poor children (though we must 
be careful about limiting the responsibility of their parents). Public education serves 
many purposes, but one of these is to raise children out of poverty. This promise 
can only be met if the poor have access to schools of good quality. And children 
do not learn well if hungry: Hunger among poor children exists across developed 
countries. One obvious goal is to eliminate this.
While reductions in income inequality will themselves yield reductions in polit-
ical and social inequality, we should still recognize these as important goals in their 
own right. We should strive to change political institutions so that all citizens of 
a democracy have an equal voice. Such a goal, may, of course, be opposed by the 
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minority who at present wield above- average power. Yet such a goal is arguably 
even in their long- term interest, for the rich have the most to lose if the wider 
public loses confidence in our present democratic institutions. A core belief of 
democracies is that every voter should exercise equal power. Values of justice and 
respect call for such an outcome. Last but not least, the average person will feel 
validated if confident that their views are appropriately reflected in government 
decision- making.
Socially, we can strive for a world that is less stratified, where the rich do not 
display arrogance toward the poor, and where it is not considered outrageous for 
the rich and poor to socialize or even date. We can strive, that is, not just to reduce 
the experience of economic inequality but also social distinctions rooted in this.
We should pay special attention to the treatment of social groups. Discrimination 
against any ethnic, religious, occupational, or other group likely does more harm to 
the discriminated than the benefit it may provide to the discriminators. This is espe-
cially the case if the latter can be encouraged toward values of caring and respect. 
Discrimination fails other ethical criteria even more dramatically. The core belief 
of democracy in the inherent equality of all citizens should also act to discourage 
discrimination. Discrimination is inherently unjust and uncaring and thus defies 
core values and beliefs. The consequences for democracy and for social peace can 
be dire if one or more groups feels unfairly treated. The economic costs may also be 
significant, for a society that discriminates does not make the best use of its human 
capabilities. The psychological costs are huge: The discriminated feel disrespected 
and angry, and the discriminators may need to suppress feelings of guilt.
2.2.8 Increased personal control and sense of meaning
The goals above might all be seen as subsidiary goals to our main goal: enhancing 
human happiness. Psychologists are in the early stages of understanding the sources 
of human happiness. They distinguish two types of happiness: an important but 
transitory sort of happiness associated with individual pleasurable acts, and a longer- 
term sort of happiness associated with achieving goals. We should thus above all 
strive toward providing all humans with the capability to pursue their goals. This 
will have good consequences, at least if most people pursue goals that benefit the 
wider society. It accords with diverse beliefs and values around personal responsi-
bility, social responsibility, caring, and respect. It struggles, though, against traditions 
in many societies that limit the goals that humans might pursue. Yet these traditions 
have weakened considerably in recent decades in favour of a respect for personal 
choice. We can thus urge a new tradition of respecting all human goals that do not 
have negative consequences for the wider society. Such a tradition would accord 
with the other five types of human evaluation.
We noted in  chapter 1 that we will take a broad interdisciplinary perspective in 
this book. It is thus worth noting that humans can find meaning in a wide variety 
of human activities. Indeed, psychologists often urge humans to seek a balance in 
life across diverse activities. This has a practical advantage with respect to goals: If an 
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individual pursues multiple goals, they are better able to rebound from the inevit-
able disappointments in their path toward any one of them. We provide here a list 
of sources of meaning within each of the main categories of phenomena studied by 
human scientists, and can urge societies to facilitate each of these sources of meaning:
• Economically we can find meaning both in providing for our families and in 
helping the less fortunate to provide for theirs.
• Politically we can all find meaning in political activity at various levels (including 
volunteer organizations and school councils) with a focus on improving insti-
tutional quality and leadership practices.
• Demographically we can find meaning in raising children to be net contributors, 
and more generally in leaving a better world for our children.
• The prevalence of art in human history suggests that art plays a vital role in 
human lives; it could well be that we should all pursue artistic production 
(note that this tends to be common within traditional societies, and that young 
children everywhere enjoy drawing, sculpting, singing, and dancing) as well as 
artistic enjoyment.
• Socially we should find meaning in our various group identities – including 
our sense of community – in ways that are good for the world and do not 
interfere with self- actualization. We should recognize here, as in section 2.4, 
the symbiosis between healthy individuals and healthy communities that value 
personal diversity.
• This may involve consciously amending cultural practices. It will undoubtedly 
involve deliberately reflecting on what values are essential to both oneself and 
the world.
• Humans have lived closer to nature through much of history than do urbanized 
citizens of the twenty- first century. There is abundant psychological evidence 
that spending time in natural settings has positive effects on happiness. We 
might devote some of that time to caring for the natural environment.
• With respect to technology and science, we can all take pleasure in thinking of 
better understandings or ways to do things. Note that technology evolves, and 
that we benefit from countless minor advances through the years. Technology 
is a broad enterprise, embracing recipes in cooking and videos on how to 
recharge dead batteries for electric drills (jiggling the charger plug in and out 
of the wall socket actually works!).
• As noted above, we can take justified pride in our individual differences 
(uniqueness) – while striving to avoid arrogance and narcissism.
• Genetically we can take pride in our common humanity.
We noted above that an individual’s success in life is not entirely within their 
control. We can urge people toward a certain stoicism: It is meaningful to pursue 
valuable goals even if you do not have as much success as you might like (but you 
must be self- aware about the reasons for your lack of success). We should, though, 
strive as a society to enhance chances of success.
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Many of the above bullet points call for creativity. Two points seem relevant in this 
respect. First, scholars of creativity appreciate that persuasion is an important – for 
some scholars the most important – part of the creative process. It is not enough just 
to have good ideas: One must actively “sell” these ideas to others. Persuasion itself calls 
for creativity. Second, whether we succeed here is beyond our control, for no one 
person controls the selection environment for new ideas. We should again pursue a 
certain stoicism: If we have developed and advertised good ideas (with self- awareness!), 
we can laugh if the selection environment shuns these. One of life’s challenges is to 
put energy into selling one’s ideas but not be heartbroken if these efforts fail.
More generally, each of the bullet points above depends on human abilities. 
We can take as a general goal that we would like to enhance human capabilities. 
This might guide us to devote special attention to the health and education of our 
young. It will also open up a conversation about genetic engineering in  chapter 5.
We should not lose sight of the more ephemeral sorts of happiness associated 
with having fun. We should want people to have fun. Again, a useful goal is to allow 
individuals to have fun in any way that does not interfere with the happiness of 
others. We can also try to reduce the amount of time that humans spend in activities 
(such as commuting) that they find unpleasurable.
2.2.9 Enhanced health outcomes, including mental health
One clear and unsurprising result of research on human happiness is that healthy 
people are much happier than unhealthy people. Healthy people are freed from 
pain and discomfort and able to pursue diverse goals. They are thus better able to 
exercise personal responsibility. All human societies make some effort to help the 
sick, and this is perhaps the most basic application of the human value of caring. 
A societal goal of encouraging human health is thus a no- brainer: The challenge 
becomes one of determining how much to spend on this goal and how.
We should make special note of mental health. There is still a stigma around 
mental health, though this is declining. Since we seek a balance between personal 
and social responsibility in this book, we certainly want to avoid encouraging indi-
viduals to shirk their social responsibilities. However, mental illness is real, and our 
goal must be to help individuals to transcend these illnesses and live happy lives. 
We can appreciate that this will often mean that they also are able to lead pro-
ductive lives.
We tend these days to think that enhancing health outcomes is a task for 
healthcare systems. Our goal here is much broader, for we would hope to change 
society as a whole – by for example reducing pollution or congestion or unneces-
sary stress – in ways that enhance both physical and mental health.
2.2.10 Improved education
Humans like to understand the world around them. We may not enjoy every day 
we spend in school but we feel good when we grasp some idea that is of interest 
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to us. A properly motivated education, where students understand why they are 
learning particular material, is intrinsically valuable. Education has a variety of good 
outcomes, most obviously on our ability to be productive members of the economy 
and to be productive contributors to democratic discourse. (We should be aware 
of course that education may also serve to make children docile and prepare them 
to spend long hours in an office or factory later in life; and that some students 
leave our schools feeling unappreciated or useless. We should seek to ameliorate 
the negative impacts of education while building its strengths.) By increasing our 
ability to exercise both personal and social responsibility, education accords with 
key societal values. And if we believe that our society should encourage all citi-
zens to pursue their dreams, then education must be an essential component of 
that belief. All human societies have devoted considerable effort to educating their 
young, though these efforts were often less formal than they are today. In sum, we 
can easily justify a goal of an educated society in which all people have access to 
the particular education they wish. We would wish to encourage all citizens to avail 
themselves of an understanding of democracy.
2.2.11 Justice
We can likely all agree that we would like a (more) just world. We might also agree 
that justice involves people getting what they deserve. But we can easily disagree 
about what comprises justice in practice, such as when we contemplate taxing 
hard- earned money from one person in order to provide a disadvantaged person 
with greater opportunity. We can seek outcomes that will be widely perceived as 
just, and encourage efforts at societal consensus or at least balance when different 
ideas of justice conflict.
2.2.12 Freedom
There is likely also a fair degree of societal consensus in most developed countries 
that individuals should have the freedom to act as they wish, subject to the con-
straint that they do not interfere with the freedoms of others. Individuals generally 
value freedom, though cultural attitudes often constrain freedom. We can discuss 
later the best balance between freedom and cultural solidarity.
2.2.13 Technology and science that supports these goals
Technology (that is, practical understanding of how to do things) and science 
(understanding of how the world works) are in large part means to other ends 
rather than goals in themselves. Yet humans take some pleasure in understanding 
the world around them (This is indeed one of the motivations of this book.) And 
as noted above, there is scope for many people to share in the joy of discovery. Our 
values and beliefs tend to support increasing understanding of both how the world 
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practice often hold tightly to opinions that are not grounded in a careful analysis of 
arguments and evidence.
We can of course have some qualms about certain bits of science or technology. 
We might, for example, wish that nuclear theory and nuclear bombs had never 
been discovered (though nuclear energy may prove important in the battle against 
climate change, and nuclear deterrents may have prevented some wars). We might 
then state our goal as wishing to encourage science and technology with good 
consequences. In practice, though, it is often difficult to foresee the effects that a 
particular bit of research will have.
We might devote particular attention here to the effect of technology on work. 
Technology has eliminated some of the most difficult manual labour on farm, in 
factory, and in transport. It has, though, created some incredibly boring jobs on 
assembly lines, and eliminated the need for many sorts of skilled artisans. We might 
hope for a future in which machines perform boring and physically harmful jobs, 
while most humans are allowed to do work that they find congenial and person-
ally rewarding. We might also hope to achieve this transition without huge levels of 
unemployment along the way.
One key point to stress here is that most if not all technological innovations hurt 
someone. Producers of existing goods or services suffer when a better alternative 
is developed. Workers with particular skills (or the owners of particular machines) 
suffer when new methods of production are introduced. Through much of human 
history, governments restricted technological innovation in order to prevent the 
social dislocation that it inevitably created. Yet most innovations in the long run 
are beneficial: It is as a result of technological innovation that most residents of 
developed countries are able to consume a range of goods and services that their 
great- grandparents could not have imagined and can do so without performing 
the backbreaking labour that their great- grandparents took for granted. Our goal 
should thus not be to limit technological innovation in order to stop change 
(though we can encourage innovators to reflect on the likely social impacts of their 
innovations). But our goal of seeking beneficial technological innovation will have 
better short- term consequences (for both some individuals and for unemployment 
rates) if coupled with policies that provide economic security.
We shall see in later chapters that scientific judgement is an important input into 
many strategies for achieving societal goals. Since our hope is to identify strategies 
with broad public support, it is thus critically important that the public understand 
how science works. Science does not advance, as was once thought by philosophers, 
by proving or disproving particular hypotheses. Rather, it is now appreciated – by 
philosophers if not always by practising scientists – that every piece of evidence 
can be criticized or explained away on some grounds. Scientists thus at best slowly 
amass argument and evidence until scientific communities achieve consensus. The 
public is often understandably frustrated when scientists disagree, but it is actually 
only through disagreement that science proceeds. It is in disagreeing that scientists 
distinguish promising from misguided hypotheses. Consensus often emerges 
around nuanced understandings that combine pieces of previous disagreements. 
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Occasionally, consensus is overthrown by a new piece of evidence or argument 
(as when theories of relativity upended classical physics a century ago, or when 
careful measurement of the earth’s orbit established convincingly that the earth 
orbited the sun centuries before that). Such scientific “revolutions” are exceedingly 
rare. The public should therefore not casually ignore scientific consensus, though it 
can appreciate that this will occasionally appear misguided in retrospect. Moreover, 
scientists and the public should have intelligent conversations so that scientific 
understanding can guide public policy even in areas of scientific disagreement.
2.2.14 The ethical challenge of our times
The ethical challenge of our times is this: How can we embrace a respect for 
diversity – respecting that others might choose to live quite different lives – while 
holding on to a set of core values on which societal cohesion depends? Respect 
for diversity has advanced markedly in most developed countries in recent decades, 
and is now a dominant attitude within younger generations. But the young often 
then think that there are no shared ethical values beyond the admirable support 
for diversity itself (and often for disadvantaged groups): that respecting diversity 
means allowing others to choose whatever ethical principles they wish. Yet societies 
function much better – politically, economically, culturally, socially – if there is some 
shared appreciation of values such as honesty and both personal and social respon-
sibility. We will see in particular in later chapters that governmental institutions 
(formal rules) function best when these are supported by cultural values.
The reader may be surprised that we are giving cultural values such an emphasis 
so early in our book. Yet futurists have long appreciated that we need to under-
stand the values and beliefs that support undesirable future trends, and seek to 
change these. Both “respect for diversity” and “core values” meet each of our five 
evaluative criteria. They have strong beneficial consequences: Respect for diversity 
allows each individual to pursue their own dreams and capabilities; Shared values, as 
we shall see, facilitate democratic governance, simplify economic transactions, and 
encourage social tranquillity. They accord with core beliefs and – of course – values. 
Those who are guided primarily by values will be strongly supportive of societal 
recognition of core values. Respect for diversity has not been universal in human 
history but has been quite common. Most historical societies have found it useful 
to espouse a core set of values. And both respect for diversity and shared values 
smooth social interaction: Both (though in quite different ways) allow us to predict 
how others will react to our actions. We should thus feel an intuitive appreciation 
of both – though, admittedly our strong human temptation to identify with small 
groups may at times guide us away from respecting diversity.
It may seem odd to discuss “respect for diversity” and “shared values” together. 
But modern societies need both. In particular, the sense of community urged above 
depends critically on a sense of shared purpose – which means some sense of shared 
values – but must also embrace a strong degree of respect for our differences. Our 
sense of community in turn must be strong but not structured so as to limit human 
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freedom. While the goals of respect for diversity and shared values may seem at first 
glance to be incompatible, we shall argue in later chapters that it is entirely feasible 
to have them both. Moreover, we will suggest that failure to achieve shared values 
inevitably encourages a backlash against diversity.
For the project of this book, it is imperative that we address this challenge. It 
may seem unnecessary to worry about values in a book largely focused on changing 
society’s institutions. If we get the rules right, does it matter what people think? Or 
perhaps the right rules will inexorably encourage the right way of thinking? This 
was, we might note, Mao’s hope for Communist China, but decades of forced col-
lectivization did not cause people to abandon selfish urges. It turns out that it is very 
hard to enforce institutions if the values of a society do not support these. If most 
people expect and engage in corruption, it is incredibly difficult to enforce rules 
against corruption. Governments around the world are relaxing rules governing 
“illegal” drugs in a belated recognition that it is hard to enforce rules that a size-
able proportion of the population object to. Municipalities can only enforce rules 
against littering if the vast majority are opposed to littering. We will waste a lot of 
time fighting for the right institutions if we do not simultaneously encourage values 
that support these institutions. In turn we are much more likely to achieve desirable 
institutions if we achieve values that support these.
BOX 2.2: AVOIDING OVERSIMPLIFICATION
It is useful to note here that sometimes the simplest strategy for achieving a goal 
proves problematic. Societies cannot easily just ban the things we do not like. 
If we introduce laws against drugs (or prostitution), we inevitably cause people 
to act illegally, which introduces its own range of concerns. Likewise, introdu-
cing rent controls because we think rents are too high in a city will inevitably 
discourage construction of new rental units, and can easily make the situation 
worse over time. We cannot generally just say “We do not like X. Let’s outlaw 
it.” Rather, we have to carefully evaluate the consequences of our actions – not 
just for the goal we pursue but for all other societal goals. This is why we need 
to carefully outline a broad set of goals in this chapter, and carefully choose 
strategies that support all goals (whenever possible) in later chapters.
The field of “cultural studies” has long argued that political change can be 
achieved through cultural transformation. Yet it is not always clear what polit-
ical changes are encouraged by which cultural transformations. We will essay to 
describe important values below, and the effects that these might have.
Fortunately for our project, there are several key values that can be justified 
by each of the five types of evaluation. These justifications are not perfect: One 
can always sketch some reason for disagreeing with any ethical statement. But we 
do not live in a perfect world. Philosophers provide a valuable service in noting 
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imperfections in any ethical argument. However, we must get on with life and 
accept that we will be guided by ethical precepts that are fallible. A useful guideline 
is this: We can reasonably insist that most people most of the time follow certain 
ethical precepts, but allow for occasional reasoned arguments against doing so.
If we can identify an “ethical core” of values that receive strong support from 
the five types of evaluation, then a society might (somehow; see below) assert that 
its respect for diversity need not prevent a general expectation that such values will 
be pursued. We will, as noted, above, allow occasional well- argued exceptions. This 
compromise between diversity and core values may seem odd to those raised only 
to respect diversity – or alternatively to those schooled only in a set of inexorable 
values – but is in practice not hard to imagine. We can respect diversity in how 
people dress, what they eat, who they date, how they establish friendships, how they 
party, what they see as important in life, and so on, but still expect everyone to be 
honest.
We can close by noting that futurists often praise diversity: Diverse groups are 
better able both to predict plausible futures and to identify strategies for dealing 
with these. And futurists also often praise values such as honesty and self- knowledge 
that we will recommend below, for we are better able to cope with the future if we 
are honest with ourselves and with others.
Honesty
Honesty has amazingly good consequences in many realms. Democracies will 
function much better to the extent that politicians (and media outlets) are honest 
with voters, and bureaucrats are honest with both politicians and the public. The 
economy will function much better if businesspeople can trust those they deal with, 
and if customers can trust the goods and services they buy. Political and economic 
institutions are easier to enforce if there is an expectation that people will not lie 
about their behaviour. Our personal lives will unfold more smoothly if we can 
expect honesty from our acquaintances, friends, and partners. Honesty is a value 
that is commonly espoused, and is reflected in many ethical rules. The vast majority 
of human societies have encouraged honesty. And the vast majority of us feel a little 
queasy when we lie.
Both personal and social responsibility
There is perhaps no greater source of ideological dispute than between those who 
stress our personal responsibilities to care for ourselves (and our families) and those 
who stress our social responsibilities. Yet the vast majority of us recognize both 
responsibilities. Virtually all human societies have encouraged both types of respon-
sibility. And we feel good both when we care for our families and when we help a 
stranger or the broader community. There is of course an important question around 
the ideal balance between social and personal responsibility, and we should respect 
the fact that people might reasonably disagree about where to set the balance. But a 
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shared recognition that we (almost) all value both personal and social responsibility 
might take much of the emotion out of discussions of social policy, and allow us 
to better design programmes that help the unfortunate while discouraging sloth.
It is particularly valuable for us to appreciate that there are times in life to stress 
personal responsibility and other times to stress social responsibility. Our economic 
system functions well with each agent pursuing their personal interests – but even 
there it is critical that agents respect laws and cultural values rather than, say, lying to 
customers or bribing bureaucrats. We must be careful that the selfishness that serves 
us well in the economic sphere does not infuse our entire lives. When acting in the 
political, cultural, or community spheres, we have important social responsibilities.
Respect for others
It is often forgotten, but cannot be over- emphasized, that democracy depends abso-
lutely on mutual respect. If we cannot respect those we disagree with, then we lose 
the shared sense of purpose on which shared governance depends. A democracy 
in which elected politicians crassly ignore opinions with which they disagree is an 
unstable democracy. It may be momentarily satisfying to those in power, but it will 
crush the spirit of those out of power. They will lose confidence in all of the organs 
of government. Respect is useful beyond the political realm: Trade will be easier 
between agents that respect each other, and social relations will be less harmful if 
the relatively influential respect the less influential. Yet we must admit that the case 
for respect is weaker than it could be. Social guidelines – in both contemporary 
and historical societies – often stress respect for authority  figures – parents, teachers, 
rulers, and so on – and this may discourage the broader mutual respect that democ-
racy requires. Sadly, humans often feel good when they display disdain for others. Yet 
if democracy depends on mutual respect, then the benefits of this must outweigh 
the selfish enjoyment of acts of disrespect. And a community with a shared sense of 
purpose is in the end a happier place than a community riven by mutual contempt.
BOX 2.3: UNDERSTANDING
Philosophers have long appreciated that one does not really understand any 
issue until one can argue both sides of it. It is fairly easy to articulate one side 
of an issue. It is much harder to be able to articulate why people might dis-
agree with you (without defaulting to treating them with disdain). What are 
the key values and assumptions that drive opposing points of view? It can be 
a useful classroom exercise for students to articulate the other side of an argu-
ment that they have just made. And it is a useful personal task to try always to 
understand both sides of an argument. This will encourage each of us toward 
mutual respect. Ironically, it will also increase our chances of persuading others 
to our point of view, for we will better understand why they disagree with us.
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Self- knowledge
Many (most?) individuals might not wish to recognize consciously how often they 
treat others with disrespect. They may likewise try not to reflect too much on 
occasional acts of dishonesty or irresponsibility. Humans have amazing capacities 
for self- deception, and these allow us to act regularly in ways that we would con-
sciously disdain. There is much to be said, then, for a goal of self- knowledge. This 
will encourage us to be more resolute in our pursuit of other important values. 
And it will encourage individuals to self- actualization: to an appreciation of their 
goals and talents, and areas in which there is room for improvement. At the personal 
level, individuals with self- knowledge are much more likely to make rewarding 
career and dating decisions. Society as a whole benefits when individuals make 
good decisions. Not surprisingly, then, self- knowledge has been encouraged across 
all major philosophical and religious traditions. Yet we must appreciate that the path 
to self- knowledge is not easy, and that we may occasionally discover things about 
ourselves that we might regret. Still we cannot grow as humans and become the 
best that we are capable of without self- knowledge.
The reader can usefully reflect on how often they have observed another 
behaving in a self- destructive fashion: annoying others with arrogance, using anger 
to shield themselves from any possible criticism, exaggerating or under- appreciating 
their talents. These others could clearly benefit from a bit more self- knowledge. 
So what are the chances that you cannot? Trust me, if you have never reflected on 
such questions, you can use a bit more self- knowledge (but no rushing ahead to 
 chapter 3 to find out how).
BOX 2.4: THE ETHICAL CORE
There are several additional ethical statements that arguably receive strong 
endorsement from each of the five types of ethical evaluation. These could be 
more widely appreciated:
• We should value achievement but disdain the abuse of power.
• We should help others, but not deny ourselves.
• We should care for children and the elderly, and thus support families (of 
various types).
• We should care for the environment.
• Love, sympathy, and humour are generally positive emotions, while hate is 
generally harmful.
• Though we should respect personality diversity, we should encourage emo-
tional control, empathy, and respect.
• Charity is good.
 
 
Setting societal goals 31
• Justice should be pursued as a goal.
• Education is good.
• Crime deserves punishment.
We will leave it to the reader to justify each of these.
2.3 Desirable futures
Are these various goals compatible? We have already had cause to note several posi-
tive connections among these goals:
• Economic prosperity gives us the means to pursue other goals. At least 
some kinds of prosperity enhance happiness. In particular, work provides an 
important source of meaning.
• Economic security reduces fear and thus increases happiness. It enhances 
public support for environmental and economic policies that might disrupt 
labour markets.
• Enhanced democracy increases our ability to pursue good strategies for 
achieving a range of goals.
• Improved education likewise increases our collective ability to define and pursue 
good strategies. It also directly decreases inequality, and supports happiness.
• Improved health also enhances our ability to pursue multiple goals. Healthy 
people are happier. Healthy children learn more.
• Reduced inequality will enhance faith in democracy.
• Decreases in undeserved income enhance justice.
• Successful strategies for pursuing any broadly shared goal will enhance faith 
in democracy.
• Enhanced faith in democracy in turn makes people more willing to pay taxes 
that can be used to pursue other goals.
• Democracy enhances personal freedom and security.
• Shared values around honesty and responsibility make it easier to achieve a 
range of societal goals, but in particular enhance democracy and economic 
prosperity. Self- knowledge increases personal pursuit of key values.
• Democratization encourages peace and international collaboration.
• International collaboration allows pursuit of economic and environmental 
goals, and encourages peace.
• Exposure to a healthy environment makes us happy.
• A sense of community supports democracy, and is important for economic 
prosperity and personal happiness.
In many areas, compatibility is possible but not assured:
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• Some strategies for reducing inequality may be just, but not all.
• Some strategies for protecting the environment may be economically benefi-
cial, but not all.
• Some strategies for enhancing economic security may limit economic pros-
perity, but not necessarily.
• Some goods and services may not be socially beneficial.
• Science and technology support economic prosperity and other goals, but all 
technologies have short- term negative impacts, and some may be bad overall.
• There is some conflict between respect for diversity and the pursuit of core 
values. Yet without core values, we risk a backlash against diversity.
• Democracy may encourage economic prosperity, but some autocracies have 
enviable economic records. Prosperity encourages democracy, though there 
are again exceptions.
• Respect for diversity in some ways supports a sense of community, but may 
also detract from this. The same is true in reverse.
There are a few areas where the pursuit of one goal might interfere with the pur-
suit of others:
• Most obviously, certain environmental policies might limit economic growth, 
while certain economic policies can harm the environment.
• Some efforts to reduce inequality can infringe on freedom and justice.
• We must be careful that we do not enhance our sense of community in a way 
that makes international collaboration difficult.
• Some environmental and economic policies can increase economic uncertainty.
We try to capture the most important of these relationships in Figure 2.1. The 
reader is supposed to be impressed by the sheer number of complementarities – 
and should appreciate that only the most important of these could be diagrammed. 
There are also conflicts and uncertain relationships, to be sure, but the general take-
away should be that we can pursue most if not all goals simultaneously. Note that 
even where there are conflicts between two goals, there are positive relationships 
with other goals.
BOX 2.5: INVITATION TO REFLECTION
It is useful if readers every once in a while engage in a reflective act while 
reading this book. They should occasionally ask something like “Is Rick crazy?” 
Does the list of goals above seem reasonable? Does the discussion of their 
compatibility seem naïvely optimistic? Since we will spend the rest of the book 
discussing how to achieve these goals, this would be a good time for a discus-
sion about whether they make sense. I have not prioritized them on purpose, 
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for we will seek to pursue them all in unison in later chapters. It may neverthe-
less be useful for the reader to prioritize goals. Also, if the reader disagrees with 
some of the goals above, or some of the suggestions regarding connections 
across goals, they should redraft the flowchart below and keep the redrafted 
flowchart in mind through the rest of the book.
We will in box 5.3 discuss a possible narrative exercise. Students could be  
asked at this point to write a short story or newspaper article that would cap-
























FIGURE 2.1 Compatibility among societal goals.
Note: Thin arrows indicate compatibility, wavy arrows indicate possible compatibility, 
and thick arrows capture incompatibility. Note that only the most important arrows 
from democracy and economic prosperity and core values (and education, health, and 
technology) have been included; we noted above that these have positive effects on 
many goals. Readers will have to imagine the thick arrow from sense of community 







PLOTTING STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE 
SOCIETAL GOALS
3.1 How to plot strategies
There is no strictly logical process for identifying strategies. This is an inherently 
creative undertaking. We are seeking, after all, novel ways of organizing our world in 
order to achieve better outcomes, and we should be prepared to “think outside the 
box.” Futurists when advising organizations urge the gathering of diverse groups of 
people, and encouraging these to brainstorm freely, in order to generate ideas that 
might not otherwise occur to anyone (see our discussion of scenario planning in 
 chapter 6). This chapter can be seen as a contribution to a societal- level conversa-
tion about possible strategies. We do not pretend that the strategies listed below are 
either exhaustive or beyond question.
People often imagine that creativity is some sort of magical process in which 
creative ideas just pop into the minds of lucky individuals. The truth is less exciting 
but more useful. All humans are capable of creativity – and we can train to become 
more creative. Creative insights usually follow intense periods of reflection on a 
particular problem or issue. The inspiration when it comes is often imperfect and 
needs revision. Many inspirations prove misguided upon further reflection. One 
then needs to persuade others of the value of one’s creative insights. There is, that is, 
a lot of effort required in creativity (but the moment of inspiration usually comes 
when the mind is at rest), and we can purposely set about seeking creative insights.
We have several guidelines to follow both as we prepare for inspiration, and as 
we evaluate inspirations:
• We seek strategies that accord with the five types of evaluation described in 
 chapter 2. It is important not just that our goals be broadly popular but that our 
means of achieving them be widely approved also.
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• We thus want strategies that accord with a wide range of values and beliefs (and 
traditions); we may at times wish to encourage changes in values, but should 
appreciate that this is a slow and unpredictable process.
• We want strategies that can be instantiated in mutually supportive institutions 
and values. We want to change our rules so that they guide people to pursue 
our goals. But rules are only strong if supported by values.
• We are guided to seek strategies that pursue multiple goals, or at least do not 
have deleterious effects on some goals. At times, we will be forced to seek a 
balance among strategies that pursue different goals. We must thus carefully 
examine how any strategy affects multiple phenomena.
• We are guided not to insist on perfection. Our goal is to make the world a 
better place, not to move immediately to some utopia. Most/ all strategies are 
imperfect. We need to minimize imperfections, but should not be scared into 
inaction by these.
• On a related matter, we should seek Golden Means. We may wish, for example, 
to help the less fortunate but not encourage laziness, and seek a set of policies 
that work imperfectly toward each goal.
• We should be aware of our collective ignorance. We should be willing to 
suggest novel strategies, but willing also to subject these to careful evaluation.
• In what follows I will outline some general arguments for and against par-
ticular strategies. In most cases, these should be subjected to further exam-
ination in order to estimate the likely costs and benefits of any change. We 
should appreciate, though, that we can often only get a good sense of costs 
and benefits after the fact. There may be some need, then, to take small risks in 
testing new ideas, but we should be wary of making huge changes.
We could rephrase many of the bullet points above in the language of systems ana-
lysis. The core idea of systems analysis is that we need to appreciate that each phe-
nomenon we might study (particular institutions or values or objects) is embedded 
in a larger system in which it interacts with other phenomena. We need to under-
stand the system in order to understand how to change any phenomenon. And we 
also need to understand the system in order to predict how changes in one phe-
nomenon will affect others.
The most accessible guide to systems analysis around is still Thinking in Systems: A 
Primer by D. H. Meadows and D. Wright (2009). They make a set of points about 
systems that are worth noting here:
• We need to distinguish “positive feedback loops,” which are self- reinforcing and 
drive the system in a particular direction (at least for a while; investors may inter-
pret stock market gains as a signal to increase investments, driving prices further 
until a market crisis), from “negative feedback loops,” which tend to keep the 
system stable through time (as when human bodies are triggered to use insulin to 
reduce blood sugar levels). We may wish at times to stop positive feedback for the 
sake of stability, and at other times to disrupt negative feedback to facilitate change.
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• Systems are generally open. That is, we can strive to identify the key phe-
nomena involved in any system, but need to appreciate that these are in turn 
influenced by (and influence) other phenomena. (Our world, in other words, 
comprises a messy and large set of overlapping systems.)
• Systems often have players pulling in different directions (as in the war on 
drugs) and thus systems tend to be hard to budge, for the actions of one 
agent encourage reactions by others. We need to ask whether we can get 
different agents pushing in the same direction (as happens in wartime or when 
responding to disaster). Systems with lots of players with equal influence will 
be more stable – which may be a challenge if we want change.
• It is common for agents to not face the costs they impose on others. We can 
often achieve better system results by making agents pay for costs imposed on 
others.
• Systems may decay if people give up and stop enforcing expected standards 
of behaviour. We may need to ensure that we encourage good behaviour, and 
accept that perfection is unachievable.
• Systems may spiral out of control if agents are ultra- competitive. We need to 
focus competition in ways that are not destructive. One important strategy is 
to generate rules that all agents respect.
• One common failing of public policy is that we address symptoms rather than 
underlying problems. Systems analysis guides us to ask questions like “Why is 
there prostitution?” and guides us to address root causes. Attacking symptoms 
rarely achieves desired goals. (A somewhat analogous problem occurs when we 
set a misguided goal such as focusing on Gross Domestic Product (GDP; see 
box 3.2) rather than on human well- being; in this case we need to ask why we 
care about GDP and recognize that it is an imperfect goal.) More generally, our 
goal is to identify phenomena within a system that we can most easily change 
in desired directions, and yet these phenomena exert important influences on 
other phenomena in the system.
Meadows and Wright appreciate that systems thinking is complicated. They com-
pare it to skiing or gardening: We need to have a goal in mind but adapt to 
events around us in our pursuit of that goal. The better we understand a system, 
the better we will be able to change it in desirable directions. They urge a var-
iety of strategies. One of my favourites is creating new feedback loops so that 
decision- makers face the consequences of their actions (what if politicians had 
to go to wars they vote for?). We can also strengthen existing feedback loops by, 
for example, increasing government and corporate transparency and access to 
information: The sooner that society is aware of challenges, the quicker we can 
adjust. (They also urge us to carefully evaluate our goals, a point we have pursued 
in earlier chapters.)
I would draw an important implication from the last bullet point. Readers of 
this book should always be open to the possibility that there may be deeper causes 
at work than those I recognize. I seek to identify the most important influences at 
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work for every issue we discuss, but there may be forces at work within the relevant 
system that are less obvious but may drive the forces that I elucidate.
A further key implication follows. One way of identifying deeper causes and/ or 
more creative strategies is to gather a diverse body of people together to discuss key 
issues. Consultative processes can thus add to the list of strategies outlined in this 
book. They will often generate strategies unimagined at the outset. I will often urge 
consultative processes in what follows. I note here that some futurists would put a 
greater stress on such processes and less emphasis on identifying workable strategies 
at the outset. But I think this book would not work if I never said more than “we 
should talk about this.” I would stress, though, that I hope that there will be class 
discussions around many of the strategies I recommend.
I will in what follows outline a set of strategies that appear to me to accord with 
these various guidelines. The purpose is to illustrate forcefully that there are indeed 
a set of achievable strategies for charting a better future that could achieve broad 
societal support. This purpose is achieved even if some readers are sceptical of some 
strategies. Moreover, the student of this book is urged to develop further strategies. 
Read widely and with an open mind, and talk to diverse others….
GUIDING QUESTIONS
As noted in the preceding section, the reader can evaluate each strategy below 
in terms of the five types of evaluation outlined in the preceding chapter, 
and diagram the impacts of these strategies. We now add some additional 
questions: In what way do values and institutions support the strategy? What 
are the imperfections or negative side effects, and are these acceptable in 
scope? How can we identify the best balance when there are competing goals? 
How does each strategy affect different groups of people? How might the 
strategy be evaluated – both in advance and after implementation? Can the 
strategy be implemented gradually? What incentives do we give to agents to 
work toward desirable goals? Have we appreciated the relevant system and 
encouraged desirable feedback effects?
BOX 3.1: SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE
One approach to systems analysis is highly mathematical. We could attempt 
to measure each phenomenon we study. We could develop a mathem-
atical model of interactions that would predict how a change in one phe-
nomenon will affect another. Such models have value, for they can point us 
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to relationships that we might not have appreciated. At our present level of 
understanding, though, we can have limited confidence in the prediction of 
any model. We do not fully understand how the world works, and have limited 
capability of measuring many of our key phenomena (How strongly are values 
held? How strongly are institutions enforced?). It is thus still invaluable to 
examine particular relationships carefully. That is the approach taken in this 
book. The reader should be aware of the danger that we may ignore or down-
play important relationships through ignorance.
We now live in a world of big data, and computers regularly scan reams of 
data seeking hidden relationships. There is some hope, then, that techniques 
of “artificial intelligence” (AI) may be able to help us identify relationships of 
which we are unaware. By its nature, though, artificial intelligence is limited to 
existing patterns in data. It may prove of limited value in guiding us to goals 
that we have not previously achieved. Yet AI is already showing promise in a 
diverse range of tasks: searching complex law codes and identifying conflicts 
and inconsistencies; managing water and power systems, and identifying 
emerging environmental health challenges.
3.2 Strategies for achieving particular goals
We will deal in turn with the goals identified in  chapter 2, with the exception of 
technology, health, and education. These will be addressed in later chapters. We will 
discuss freedom, justice, and meaning at many points in this and later chapters.
3.2.1 Democracy
We noted in  chapter 2 that an enhanced democracy improves our ability to pursue 
many other goals. If, in turn, democracies prove capable of pursuing strategies outlined 
for other goals in this chapter, then faith in democracy will be greatly enhanced. Yet 
we will discuss in the next chapter some worrying trends toward decreased faith in 
democracy and decreased quality of government programmes. We need to appreciate 
both the advantages of a better democracy and the dangers of a far worse (perhaps no) 
democracy. It thus makes sense to consider a range of strategies for improving dem-
ocracy. We start with some suggestions for improving democratic decision- making, 
follow with some strategies for reforming spending practices and enhancing transpar-
ency, and close with a brief discussion of encouraging democratic values.
Selection by lottery
Ancient Athens selected many of its officials by lottery. It was thought that such 
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such officials would have no need to pander to voters. Such a strategy is tried only 
rarely in contemporary democracies. We might wonder if this is simply because 
elected politicians are wary of giving up any of their collective power. Yet we might 
worry that selection by lottery would bequeath us a group of officials with little 
aptitude for governance. However, it is not clear that electoral processes do so very 
well in this respect either. And modern representative democracies have the advan-
tage of a skilled bureaucracy that can give advice to legislators whether elected 
or chosen by lottery. We might still worry that bureaucrats will “capture” unsus-
pecting legislators and persuade them to do as bureaucrats wish. We might also 
worry that special interests will “capture” these legislators through lobbying. Again, 
this is hardly a challenge to which elected legislators are immune.
As with any novel strategy, it is advisable to start small. We might decide, for 
example, to choose one tenth of legislators by lottery. If they prove incompetent, 
we will find out soon, and can rely on the other 90 per cent of the legislature to 
carry on much as before. It may be, though, that those chosen by lottery will be 
less in thrall to ideology and more willing to seek compromise than their elected 
peers. They may serve to reduce ideological battles and encourage cross- party col-
laboration. (Or maybe they get stuck on misguided principle and bring legisla-
tive processes to a grinding halt.) They might also prove able and willing to fight 
corruption among their elected peers.
Even a small number of legislators chosen by lottery might do much to restore 
faith in democracy. Many voters have come to think that all elected politicians 
are corrupt. Legislators chosen by lottery might be able to convince voters of the 
rationale for government policies – especially if legislators chosen by lottery were 
able to achieve better policies.
If selection by lottery reduced corruption, there would be economic 
benefits: Government contracts would more likely go to the best firm for the 
job, and government regulations would not be biased toward the interests of par-
ticular firms. If selection by lottery calmed partisan bickering within legislatures, 
it would enhance social peace beyond the legislature. If many of those chosen 
by lottery proved competent and virtuous, this would enhance our collective 
respect for “average” members of our community. And citizens could identify 
with their successes (“I too might have been chosen by lottery and would do 
similar things”) and feel good about legislative processes. Selection by lottery 
both reflects and reinforces values such as mutual respect, as well as the core 
belief of democracy that government decisions should reflect what typical 
people believe and want.
The reader may have been surprised that we have started with such an unusual 
suggestion. Yet the challenge of contemporary democracy can be encapsulated as 
this: a concern that elected politicians and bureaucrats serve their own interests 
rather than the interests of the typical citizen. The direct antidote to such a concern 
is to give typical citizens a direct say in governance. This can be seen as a “feedback 
loop” in which the average citizen has an immediate impact on public policy. No 
other selection mechanism can guarantee typicality. Do we want to be governed by 
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ourselves? Do we trust ourselves? Do we think that the average person can exercise 
good judgement if acquainted with relevant information?
Consultative assemblies
A lottery can also be employed to gather a random group of citizens to debate 
particular issues. Such a gathering can provide useful guidance on how the popu-
lace as a whole would likely view a particular complex issue. Such a gathering also 
has the advantage of focusing attention on one particular issue at a time – though 
participants should be advised to carefully consider interactions with other phe-
nomena. It is thus one means of addressing the complexity of modern governance. 
Note that such assemblies must be given a clear purpose lest their conversations 
become diverse and unproductive.
Members of such consultative assemblies can receive presentations from both 
experts in a field and from interested parties. Assembly members can ask questions. 
Then they can engage in discussions among themselves. If an assembly can achieve 
broad consensus on particular policy proposals, we can have confidence that the 
wider population would also agree if similarly acquainted with the issue. Notably, 
it is generally observed that participants in such assemblies soften their views and 
move toward consensus as they come to understand and respect those they dis-
agree with.
One key challenge in democratic governance is, after all, that the average person 
has neither the time nor the incentive to become deeply informed about every 
issue that modern governments must engage. The citizens’ assembly serves to tell 
us what the people would think if they were given the time and reason to study 
a particular issue. However, this will only work if they have some confidence that 
their suggestions will be adopted. The advice of consultative assemblies, when these 
have been attempted, has often then been ignored by politicians – itself a clear sign 
that politicians may not be acting in full accord with the people they represent. It 
may be possible in some cases for legislatures to delegate decision- making power to 
such gatherings. It may be possible in other cases for such a group to trigger a ref-
erendum if politicians do not act – though such referenda need then to be properly 
funded (see below).
Consultative assemblies are particularly useful for issues where ethical concerns 
and analytical evaluations are closely intertwined. Policy on drugs is one such area. 
Should we treat drug addiction like a crime or like a health issue (or a bit of both)? 
Consequential analysis clearly depends on estimates of how addicts will react to 
different policies. Yet assembly members guided by values or emotions or beliefs 
will also be influenced by such analyses: Should I be angry or caring? Is compassion 
or tough love called for? If a random group of citizens can achieve consensus, then 
the wider society should appreciate that the best balance between competing beliefs 
and values has been struck. A consultative assembly in Ireland grappled with divisive 
issues such as abortion and same- sex marriage in such a way that later referenda 
were passed by a very large majority.
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Consultative assemblies are also useful when society needs to strike a balance 
between competing goals (our preceding discussion of drug policy might also fit 
here, for we seek a balance between – at least – enforcing the law and showing 
compassion). Social policy often faces a contest between treating the unfortunate 
with compassion and encouraging everyone who can to get a job. A consultative 
assembly, after being acquainted with detailed information on the actual lives of the 
very poor, would be well placed to make a decision about where the best balance 
is struck. Moreover, they may suggest creative solutions to deal with at least some 
cases: Outsiders are often able to see things that those immersed in an issue fail to 
see (and, sadly, those who get paid to deal with a problem may naturally do better 
at managing it than at solving it and putting themselves out of a job).
A third situation in which consultative assemblies might be particularly valuable 
is where politician self- interest presents a real barrier to making the best decisions. 
The rules governing elections and fundraising should generally not be set by 
people who have benefited from the existing rules. Non- politicians can best decide 
restrictions on politicians’ power. We need, that is, to add links to our systems of 
decision- making that restrain the power of decision- makers to pursue selfish goals.
How many consultative assemblies can we have? If these assemblies can only 
affect legislation indirectly by stirring up public opinion, then they must be rare and 
well publicized. If, though, we can think of clever ways to give them actual power, 
then we can have many assemblies focused on distinct issues. The cost of these 
need not be huge. If their advice is actually translated into law, then improvements 
in governance and restored faith in democratic decision- making will surely justify 
paying some random citizens for a couple of weeks or months of their lives.
Though consultative assemblies are useful at all levels of government, it may 
well be that these are easiest to introduce at the local level. Indeed, some localities 
already use such assemblies to rank spending priorities – and have found that citi-
zens gain an appreciation of the choices governments face through such a process.
Individual elected representatives might also invite randomly selected constituents 
to participate in an informal discussion of some key issue. But such representatives 
would need to commit to actually paying attention to what constituents said.
If consultative assemblies can have an important influence on public policy, they 
can do much to restore confidence in democratic governance. Notably, consultative 
assemblies have been found in surveys to be particularly attractive among voters 
with limited political influence and with suspicion of political processes.
Referenda
Referenda are another way of handling the sort of issues addressed in the preceding 
section. They may be the best alternative when a societal balance is particularly hard 
to strike, and we need then to be sure that we are indeed consulting a representa-
tive sample of the population. (The whole population is the only precisely repre-
sentative sample of the population – though note that in most countries a sizeable 
proportion do not vote.)
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The challenge with referenda is that voters again have little incentive to become 
deeply acquainted with the issue, for rarely is a referendum decided by one vote. 
Inevitably, then, many will vote without fully understanding the repercussions of 
their choice. Referendum campaigns are rarely an exercise in careful analysis, but 
are often characterized by misinformation and appeals to emotion.
Referenda are most useful when politicians’ self- interest is thought to work 
against the public good. (Campaign finance reform, rules governing corruption and 
compensation, and insistence that constituency boundaries be drawn by an arms- 
length commission rather than politicians, are but three examples.) There should 
thus be some capacity for appeal to referenda in all democracies. It should probably 
not be too easy to trigger a referendum, for we do not want excited minorities to 
force unpopular referenda on the wider population. There should probably be a 
provision whereby signatures of a sizeable proportion of voters can force a refer-
endum (a third? surely a half should be able to force a referendum?).
Whereas selection by lottery and citizens’ assemblies can pursue consensus, ref-
erenda tend to accentuate social disagreements. This tendency can be minimized 
if, when possible, voters are given more than two choices and the ability to rank 
their choices. In such a situation, voters will often choose some sort of compromise 
between opposing points of view.
Referenda also suffer from focusing on one issue at a time, ignoring the 
connections between issues that are so crucial to good governance. Voters might 
pass a referendum that says “Increase spending on X,” but also a referendum that 
says “Reduce taxes.” Good governance requires that we recognize the trade- off 
between taxes and spending. We might insist that referenda be revenue- neutral: Any 
proposal to cut taxes has to stipulate where spending would fall, and any proposal to 
increase spending must stipulate where the money comes from. We would need to 
have some trusted arm of government that would confirm that the numbers add up.
In jurisdictions where referenda are allowed, they might usefully be employed 
to introduce selection by lottery to legislatures, and to allow citizens’ assemblies to 
make certain decisions. Yet again we are adding to our system of decision- making 
in order to reduce the ability of those in power to serve themselves.
Corporatism
There must be a better word for this! But the idea is simply that representatives 
of different groups in society meet to reflect on public policy. There are several 
advantages. Most obviously, doctors or bakers may see side effects or opportunities 
that are not obvious to lawyers and politicians. Governments can quickly gain the 
insights of multiple stakeholders by gathering them in one room. And by engaging 
in conversation, different groups come to understand each other. We are thus in a 
better position to hammer out a policy that works for most/ all groups and takes 
into account the concerns of all. Corporatist consultation also reflects the insight 
that diversity encourages creative decision- making: Gathering individuals with 
quite different life experiences is a powerful means to encourage novel ideas.
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One challenge is that these sorts of consultative bodies will be more effective if 
they are confident that they will be listened to. I have sat through way too many 
government consultations where the government seemed only to hear what 
it wanted to hear. Governments need to actually respect the people they gather 
enough to listen to what they say.
In the 1990s the premier of my province gathered such a body, with 
representatives of teachers, school boards, nurses, hospitals, farmers, entrepreneurs 
(lots of them), mayors, community groups, arts groups and so on to plot general 
strategies for the province. As I told my friends at the time, it was a gathering of 
100 leading Albertans plus me – as the (youthful, I leap to emphasize) representa-
tive of university and college faculty. The premier would ignore our hundreds of 
recommendations after we failed to give the desired “cut our taxes,” in favour of a 
more nuanced “only cut our taxes if we can retain quality public services.” But the 
conversations were viewed positively by the participants and there was a general 
desire to keep meeting. I recall in particular several interesting interactions with the 
representative of the province’s chicken farmers. The government for some reason 
decided that it did not want us to be regularly evaluating its non- action on our 
recommendations. The outcome could have been quite different, and a government 
that wanted to listen and wanted to achieve policies with broad support might have 
found our deliberations useful.
We might consider giving some authority to such bodies. But that raises a host 
of practical problems: Where would they fit in legislative processes, and how do we 
ideally weight different groups (with the ideal perhaps varying by issue)? There is 
also an important risk that the process becomes politicized if representatives wield 
real power. Political parties might then seek to interfere in decisions about who will 
represent plumbers, and that representative may be more beholden to the party than 
fellow plumbers.
Beyond its direct political effects, such deliberative bodies might help to foster 
a greater degree of respect and community. They could serve as an exemplar 
that people from quite different backgrounds can get together, achieve mutual 
understanding, treat each other with respect, and achieve some consensus on at least 
some issues. Such “corporatist” consultations have been tried in many times and 
places. They would arguably have been more widespread in human history if more 
rulers had been guided by respect for their citizens. Such consultations could build 
on values of respect and open dialogues. Participants that are guided by respect will 
find the proceedings rewarding, especially if the recommendations are heeded.
Beyond the effect on public policy, these consultations can play an important 
educational role. Systems theorists worry that agents do not appreciate the role 
they play in a larger system. By engaging with others, and coming to better appre-
ciate the impacts they have (and are perceived to have), agents may be motivated to 
change their behaviour in a way that is beneficial to others.
It should be stressed that these corporatist consultations can be very inexpensive. 
Group representatives are generally willing to volunteer a few days of their time, 
and their groups can finance some moderate travel expenses. Governments need to 
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rent some meeting rooms and order some food. Those who worry about govern-
ment expenditures can rest easy.
Devices for incorporating expert advice
Many of the strategies to be outlined in this book are fairly easy to grasp and 
communicate. This is generally the case for strategies to reform institutions of 
governance themselves. But when we discuss economic strategies, there is often a 
considerable challenge in translating the basic principles behind a strategy into pre-
cise policy proposals. Whether regulating financial activity or stimulating techno-
logical innovation, it is all too easy for desirable goals to be under- achieved through 
faulty implementation. One obvious challenge is that the average voter cannot be 
expected to grasp the minutiae of financial regulation or technology policy. There 
is considerable scope for addressing this challenge through a citizens’ assembly. But 
such an assembly is best at determining the best balance that policy should seek 
rather than itself drafting a detailed policy. After all, the financial regulations of a 
modern developed economy run to thousands of pages. A second challenge is that 
those to be regulated or subsidized are far better able to mobilize a lobbying effort 
to influence policy than is the wider public. Scholars often speak of “regulatory 
capture” whereby those who are regulated slowly influence policy in ways that 
benefit them. There need be no evil intent here but just the fact that regulators 
spend most of their time interacting with the regulated and inevitably come to 
accept some of the latter’s point of view. This can at times be a good thing, if regu-
lation is unnecessarily burdensome, but it can easily lead to policies that are not in 
the best interests of society as a whole.
How then can we best ensure that dispassionate expert advice drives the devel-
opment of complex policies? (In systems lingo, how can we strengthen the link 
from expert understanding to public policy, while reducing the link from special 
interest pleading to public policy?) A skilled public bureaucracy is critical here, 
but we have just seen that this can easily be captured too. We want experts that 
are equally acquainted with all sides of an issue: how a regulation will affect firms, 
workers, consumers, and tax revenues. We want experts that will honestly and trans-
parently evaluate the effects on each, and design complex policies that achieve a 
desirable balance. These experts might defend these complex policies before a citi-
zens’ assembly that might also hear presentations from representatives of all affected 
groups.
We have, we should note, already taken the step of allowing one important area 
of economic policy to be run by an arms- length group of experts. Central banks 
in most countries operate very independently from elected governments – though 
the latter occasionally politicize the choice of central bank governors. There has 
been a general acceptance that people need to have confidence in their currency 
and their banking system, and this is best assured if the major decisions are made 
at arm’s length from elected officials. Citizens occasionally complain vocally about 
particular central bank decisions (I thought we should have fought inflation less 
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zealously for years), but there is a general acceptance that central banks should be 
independent. We also have arms- length securities regulators in most countries, but 
politicians determine the rules that these enforce. We should consider expanding 
the independence of financial regulators. As noted above, we might provide some 
oversight by citizens selected at random as a protection against both regulatory 
capture and expert error. We should appreciate that experts have their own biases 
which may get in the way of socially ideal policy.
We should carefully evaluate all government policies. It may be especially 
important to evaluate complex economic regulations. There is a lot of money at 
stake, and therefore great incentives for the exercise of inappropriate influence. We 
need experts, then, both to design policies and to evaluate these after their imple-
mentation. It will be a very good idea if we have different experts perform the two 
tasks, for we tend naturally to like our own ideas. One possibility is to choose ran-
domly from among recognized (by those in the relevant field) groups of experts.
We should recognize in all of this that experts are not infallible. We can usefully 
ask where the expertise comes from. Experts will be most reliable when dealing 
with repeated situations: An expert who has analysed several financial crises (espe-
cially if they were rewarded or punished for their handling of these) will be well 
placed to give advice on how to avoid or prepare for the next one – unless the next 
one is very different in some ways. Experts, we should recognize, may be more con-
fident than they should be in their ability to engage with novelty. It is useful, then, 
to have expert advice subject to scrutiny from diverse agents who might spot novel 
challenges ignored by experts.
We can pause to note here the challenges in achieving political change: Providing 
a stronger link between (relatively) unbiased expertise and public policy may have 
a dramatically positive impact on the quality of public policy, but may nevertheless 
not inspire a lot of protest banners or bumper stickers (“Power to economists and 
accountants!”). A greater appreciation of the system of public policy formation may 
inspire greater public interest in this linkage.
Dispassionate sources of information
The French philosopher Marquis de Condorcet noted one huge potential advan-
tage of democratic decision- making way back in the eighteenth century. If we 
assume that the average person makes good decisions even slightly more often than 
bad decisions, then (he showed mathematically) we are very likely to get a good 
decision if we combine the opinions of a large number of people. But this result 
depends crucially on people having access to good information about the issue at 
hand. We cannot assume that the average person will make a good decision if they 
are relying on limited or biased information.
Where can the average voter turn if they want unbiased information on key 
issues of the day? Voters can only act if they first understand the issues, and thus 
the link from information to voting (and urging others to vote in certain ways) is 
critical. We have recognized above that the typical voter has limited incentive to 
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master public policy issues, and we should thus be keenly interested in lowering the 
cost of doing so. Many media outlets have clear ideological or party preferences. 
The open- minded voter can consult competing sources. Given the constraints on 
voters’ time, it would be advantageous if there were outlets that sought to provide 
dispassionate analysis in support of broad consensus around complex societal issues. 
I should stress the word “analysis” here: The long- standing journalistic practice of 
getting quotes from two people who disagree and filing that as an unbiased report 
does little to advance human understanding. We need to transcend differences of 
opinion, understand the sources of disagreement, and attempt to integrate the best 
of opposing points of view.
If I am correct that most people want sensible but novel approaches to a range of 
public policy issues, then there should be an audience for precisely the sort of ana-
lysis recommended here. I am less clear on how this audience can be induced to pay 
for this content. This may be a task that calls for support from charitable foundations. 
Government support might invite political interference – unless we engage strat-
egies for having voters directly determine certain sorts of spending (see below).
Democracy rests on the right of people to make bad decisions. We must embrace 
that right – respecting those we disagree with no matter how appalled we may be 
by their decisions – while trying to limit its exercise through a combination of good 
institutions and sound arguments around public policy. We have suggested a few 
institutional improvements above, and seek here to provide voters with ready access 
to information that will help them make good decisions.
Reducing short- termism
Futurists and others often bemoan the fact that politicians face strong incentives 
to focus on short- term problems rather than engage in long- term planning. Public 
pension plans may be actuarially unsound in many jurisdictions but politicians 
avoid raising taxes in the present to address a problem that will not explode until 
long after the next election. Politicians have been slow to address climate change 
also because the costs of doing so will be incurred now but the benefits extend far 
into the future.
It is not just politicians that face short- term incentives. Bureaucrats also can be 
tempted to focus on present emergencies rather than planning over a long horizon. 
And business leaders may be guided more by short- term fluctuations in stock prices 
than concerns about the long- term trajectory of their firm.
There is no single solution to this problem. But there are many partial solutions:
• We can change values so that the concerns of future generations are weighted 
more heavily by voters. Arguably, this has happened to some extent with 
respect to climate change.
• We can create some organ of government that advocates on behalf of future 
generations – but this will only be useful if voters and politicians pay attention 
to what it says.
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• We can place certain types of long- term planning in the hands of arms- length 
experts (see above).
• We can encourage politicians, bureaucrats, and voters to engage in the sorts of 
scenario planning exercises encouraged by futurists (see  chapter 6). More gen-
erally, we can insist that governments carefully evaluate the future implications 
of their policies.
• We might develop constitutional requirements that politicians and bureaucrats 
take the interests of future generations into account (Wales has done so in the 
United Kingdom). Forcing politicians to explicitly justify actions that hurt 
future generations might encourage more forward- looking policies.
• We can require governments to report regularly on how they are addressing long- 
term challenges – but this will only work if voters pay attention to such reports.
• More radically, we could give more votes to young people, or perhaps parents 
of young children.
Campaign finance
The whole purpose of democracy is defeated if one group of voters has dispropor-
tionate influence on democratic decision- making. The rich may at times have the best 
interests of the public at heart – they do, after all, depend on society functioning well – 
but they can also be expected to pursue their own interests. They will encourage low 
taxes on the rich, regulatory rules that give their firms an advantage, and perhaps 
labour and environmental laws that enhance their economic power. If politicians can 
be bought by the rich, then democratic decisions will be biased, and faith in democ-
racy weakened. The very survival of democracy depends on the link from economic 
power to political power being limited – and being seen to be limited.
We will below make one bold proposal for reform of how political parties are 
financed. We make here a more general plea for efforts to reduce the influence of 
money in politics.
One important policy is to prohibit corporate (or union) donations, not just to 
parties but to “political action committees.” Corporations are not people, and cor-
porate executives cannot know the political preferences of shareholders. Corporate 
donations must thus either be an abuse of power by executives or must represent a 
calculation of what policies will increase corporate profits. We should want political 
campaigns to be financed by people, for these at least potentially can have societal 
well- being in mind. Another useful policy is to at least insist that the names of 
donors be disclosed: Voters should know who is providing large sums to particular 
candidates or political action committees. Some jurisdictions provide matching 
funds for small donations (sometimes in multiples of that donation).
Ranked ballots
Elections in which voters can rank their preferences for multiple candidates can 
potentially have many advantages, especially if they have a choice between multiple 
representatives of particular parties:
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• Most obviously, power is transferred from parties to people.
• Voters may find that the incumbent from their party has not lived up to their 
ethical standards but find it difficult to vote against their party. With ranked 
ballots they can choose a (apparently) more ethical representative of their 
favoured party.
• Voters get to rank the candidates from all parties, and thus are collectively less 
likely to choose politicians with extreme views.
• Ranked ballots increase a little the probability that one (complex) vote matters.
Government programme evaluation
We have and will at many points in this book suggest strategies that involve spending 
government funds. All of these strategies can be far more feasible – far more likely to 
gain broad public support – if we can increase voter confidence that funds are spent 
well. Political debate is too often dominated by people on one hand that have never 
seen a government programme that they disliked, and people on the other hand 
that have never seen a government programme that they liked. The sensible middle 
ground is that governments are fallible, that all government programmes need to be 
regularly evaluated and improved, and that some government programmes may not 
be worth it. We should not need to fear that any new programme will last forever 
no matter how misguided it proves – nor that a programme will be cut for no good 
reason before it has a chance to prove itself.
Those with a suspicion of government often advocate across- the- board cuts 
of government spending. Unless one truly believes that all government program-
ming is a mistake, it is hard to justify this strategy. If one thinks that bureaucrats 
are empire- builders who squander taxpayer money in order to expand the size of 
their bureaucracy unnecessarily, how can one then be confident that they will reso-
lutely cut the “fat” in a budget crunch? If they cannot be trusted to spend money 
wisely when governments are growing, how can they be trusted to do so when 
governments are contracting? The strategic response of an empire- building bureau-
crat would be to make cuts that will cause the most complaints.
While rare small across- the- board cuts may inspire some limited bureaucratic 
cost- saving (as business cycles do in the private sector), there is simply no sound 
alternative to direction from the top about what programmes need to be reformed 
or removed. This also should not be done on a political whim but should reflect 
careful evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with a particular programme. 
In the imperfect world in which we live, we have to expect that some government 
programmes simply cannot achieve their goals in a cost- effective way.
The first challenge is getting evaluations that we can trust. This will require us 
to hire unbiased external consultants. The second challenge is that the benefits of 
government programmes are harder to estimate than the direct costs. Negative side 
effects on other societal goals will also be hard to measure precisely. Nevertheless 
the task must be done as well as we can do it.
The bureaucrats who run a programme can be expected to believe in it. They 
would live quiet lives of desperation otherwise. (There is nevertheless considerable 
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value in providing bureaucrats with some incentive to report wasteful practices. 
Those who are involved in programme administration have the best opportunity 
to spot inefficiencies. They may be able to overcome psychological incentives to 
ignore these but cannot be expected to risk their jobs in reporting stupidity.) Those 
who benefit from the programme will likely also see it as a good thing. They will 
have selfish motives for doing so, but unless very self- aware, will likely imagine 
that what benefits them is good for society as a whole. The third challenge, then, is 
that programmes that seem to cost more than they are worth will still have vocal 
advocates.
This leads to the fourth and critical challenge: It may be politically dangerous to cut 
a programme, even if we are sure that the costs exceed the benefits. Those who benefit from 
a programme will know very much how much they benefit, and will be prepared to 
lobby and vote and bribe to protect it. The costs are generally both more diffuse and 
invisible: We may suffer as taxpayers or as consumers from a higher price due to a 
tariff or regulation. We each suffer only a little from any one misguided programme, 
and thus are unlikely to bribe or lobby or make our vote depend on cutting it.
It could well be that citizens’ assemblies or legislators selected by lottery will 
be less likely to be swayed by the vocal minority. Another possible solution to the 
fourth challenge is to package a set of reforms together so that the savings become 
large enough to motivate the typical taxpayer or consumer – and ideally for even 
those who benefit from one programme to appreciate the gains from abolishing 
others, and thus find the whole package acceptable. Unfortunately people tend to 
feel losses more keenly than gains, and may thus evaluate such a package negatively 
even if they gain more than they lose. They may well reason that their losses were 
the results of evil intent while the gains were simply common sense.
We might also strive for broad public acceptance of a key principle: If both 
experts and the broader public agree that a programme does more harm than good, 
it should be cut despite the vociferous objections of beneficiaries.
Some of the hardest programmes to address are those that protect particular 
firms, or groups of workers, or groups of farmers. It may become easier to change 
such programmes if we can achieve greater economic security more broadly. Such 
reforms may also be easier to achieve in a time of economic prosperity – but sadly 
governments tend to care more about saving money when times are tough.
Given the challenges of evaluating programmes after they are introduced, it 
becomes especially important to take care in creating new programmes. We should 
not allow ourselves to be frightened into inaction. But one useful activity is a 
“premortem” (a term I borrow from Daniel Kahneman, who in turn borrowed it 
from Gary Klein): Those advocating a new policy or programme should be provided 
with a scenario in which the initiative is later judged a failure and asked to explain 
why. They may be guided to recognizing challenges that should be addressed at 
the time of introduction. An alternative idea is to ask advocates of a new policy to 
estimate the likelihood of its success: This also forces reflection on what might go 
wrong. Large organizations might pursue a third idea of designating a team to pre-
tend to be the organization’s competitors or opponents and ask how they would 
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react to the new policy or programme. The main lesson here is that we are more 
likely to make good decisions if we are keenly aware of what might go wrong.
Recognizing all the costs and benefits of new programmes
We have spoken at great length in this book about the complexity of the world. We 
should thus have a healthy suspicion that there may be valuable programmes that 
are valuable precisely because they have a range of beneficial effects. We can think 
here of public healthcare. The COVID- 19 pandemic was a powerful reminder that 
universal access to healthcare can have benefits for the entire population. Healthcare 
does not just benefit the individual, but reduces their chances of infecting others. 
In a world that experiences epidemics every few years, that benefit deserves more 
attention than it has received in the past.
Are there programmes that might deserve consideration because of the wide 
range of benefits they might provide? Here are a couple of examples worth 
subjecting to careful evaluation:
• Pharmacare. Governments subsidize some kinds of healthcare in all developed 
countries, but only rarely subsidize drug purchases outside of hospital. One 
important benefit of pharmacare is that at present both doctors and patients 
extend hospital stays for the simple reason that drugs are covered while in hos-
pital but not beyond. Another potential benefit is that governments might be 
able to negotiate better prices with pharmaceutical companies. The net cost 
to taxpayers of a switch to pharmacare may thus be much less than it seems.
• Homes for the homeless. This not- surprising solution to homelessness has 
been tried in a few localities. The idea is that the homeless are better able to get 
their lives together if provided with a home. The home can be very small (they 
do not have much stuff) but should provide the security that they cannot find 
in most homeless shelters. The no- longer- homeless then spend far less time in 
police cars, jail cells, and emergency wards, all of which are hugely expensive 
places to care for people. And some then are able to get jobs, providing further 
benefits to the wider society. Society can also appreciate not having to step over 
the homeless on the streets.
The message here is that we may be able to pursue some societal goals at little or no 
net cost to society. We are prevented from doing so by not fully appreciating the full 
range of benefits of certain policies. We need, that is, to engage in systems analysis, 
looking at a set of interrelated phenomena simultaneously.
Direct expenditure by taxpayers
It is entirely possible that decisions about certain kinds of spending can be made 
directly by voters themselves. We then establish a direct link from voter preferences 
to detailed public policy. A government might decide that a certain amount per 
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taxpayer (say $5) was going to be spent on the arts, or sports and recreation, or even 
projects of urban renewal. Taxpayers could then indicate on their tax return where 
they want their money to go. The administrative costs can be negligible if most tax 
returns are filled out online. Art galleries and sports clubs might need to put more 
effort into their websites so that voters can quickly acquaint themselves with what 
the organization does. But we would no longer need a government bureaucracy 
devoted to making allocation decisions. More importantly, (most) citizens get some 
say over how their tax dollars are spent, and can hopefully identify organizations 
that they feel good about supporting. This may mollify those who worry about 
taxation in general. It is likely that many/ most taxpayers will incur some pleasure 
in identifying some worthy beneficiary of their tax dollars. And if some taxpayers 
cannot be bothered to name a beneficiary, then other taxpayers get to allocate their 
money too.
There may be challenges. Maybe local art galleries get funded at the expense 
of national art galleries? Maybe “popular” art forms get funded at the expense of 
“highbrow” art forms? But if these are what taxpayers wish, is that really a problem? 
And is it a problem or a good thing if obscure sports popular only within certain 
ethnic minorities gain more funding than they do at present? (We can hope, and 
strive to ensure, that disadvantaged groups are not further disadvantaged.)
There may be unseen advantages. Perhaps some community will develop an 
idea for a popular art project that gains support from distant taxpayers, and that 
later becomes a tourist attraction? Who knows what sort of creativity might be 
unleashed by this sort of decentralized decision- making?
As with most novel ideas, it is best to start small. If the policy works in trial 
areas – funds get allocated in a reasonable manner, taxpayers like the power to make 
decisions, innovation is facilitated – then governments might apply it more widely. 
Maybe non- governmental organizations (NGOs) could compete over certain kinds 
of social spending? There will undoubtedly be limits: We probably do not want 
voters picking weapons for the army.
Governments might find that it makes sense to allow each taxpayer to spend 
the same amount in some areas (where it seemed a democratic principle), but to 
instead have each taxpayer direct a certain percentage of their taxes in others. The 
latter strategy is less democratic but may give those who pay high taxes a greater 
sense that their taxes are spent wisely. It may thus reduce antipathy to taxes among 
those with high incomes.
It might be especially useful to apply this idea of taxpayer funding in the polit-
ical arena itself. Taxpayers could be required to indicate which political party they 
wish to support with their taxes. Political parties might then be forbidden to take 
funds from other sources. This would have the obvious advantage of limiting the 
influence of the very rich on political processes. It would also divert the energies 
of political parties: Where they must now devote much of their energy to raising 
money they might instead debate policy. (Some governments subsidize parties on 
the basis of the votes they receive. This unnecessarily complicates voting decisions. 
And it gives voters no way of rewarding or punishing parties between elections.)
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As with any sort of government expenditure, we must justify governmental 
support of political parties. The argument here is simple: Politicians struggle to raise 
thousands (sometimes millions) of dollars in order to get elected, but once elected 
make decisions about billions (trillions) of dollars. The invitation to corruption is 
too obvious. It is all too tempting for the rich and powerful to fund candidates who 
will make decisions that benefit them. Nor do we need explicit corruption: The 
basic human tendency to return favours will encourage even the most ethical pol-
itician to bend decisions toward those that donated to their campaign. We do not 
have to assume that politicians are very corrupt or biased in order to predict a 
net benefit to government budgets if we free politicians from the need to beg for 
donations. The argument here is based on the huge order of magnitude difference 
between the funds required for a political campaign and the funds that elected 
officials have influence over spending. In addition to the real benefits, there is the 
important fact that funding becomes more transparent and thus voters can have 
greater confidence in political processes. Voters cannot be expected to have con-
fidence in political leaders as a group if they have suspicions about how they get 
elected in the first place.
Political parties are not the only players on the political stage. Taxpayers might 
be asked to fund issue- oriented political advocacy groups. These might take on 
the hard task of developing detailed policy proposals. The rich and powerful have 
no difficulty developing detailed and self- serving proposals. The mass of taxpayers 
has a harder time getting organized but can if acting in concert develop detailed 
proposals that serve a wider interest. They can then engage in public advocacy of 
these proposals.
There is much talk these days of public subsidies of media outlets. But many 
observers cringe at the thought of politicians subsidizing those who report on 
them. If – and it’s a big if – such subsidies are warranted, it would be far better to let 
voters themselves decide. To be sure, some voters will opt to support media outlets 
that provide extremely biased information. But our hope for democracy must rest 
on a hope that most voters want to think for themselves. They might then choose 
to fund sources of unbiased information as recommended above.
Transparency
The complexity of modern governments is a huge problem for democratic gov-
ernance. This problem may be more obvious to some voters than others, but is no 
less real for that. Voters cannot be expected to monitor all of the many activities 
in which their governments are engaged. We might hope that different voters 
with different priorities will keep an eye on different government programmes 
(and can then appreciate some advantage to the common electoral practice of 
micro- targeting whereby politicians send targeted messages to voters with cer-
tain identifiable characteristics – but we must count against this the enhanced 
ability to promise different things to different voters). Yet elections tend to pivot 
on a handful of issues and thus most politicians face little incentive to care deeply 
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about the full range of government activities. We noted above that the link from 
information to voting behaviour is of critical importance and see here another 
way in which this link needs to be strengthened. Whatever one may think of the 
practical problem here, there is a huge problem of appearance: Voters know that 
government is complex, and that democratic oversight is limited. It is quite under-
standable to then worry that much of their taxes are wasted on initiatives that may 
do more harm than good.
We have already suggested above some ways of dealing with complexity. 
Taxpayers might spend some funds directly. Consultative assemblies might make 
some allocative decisions.
One simple policy that might be easily implemented in an era of (increasingly) 
online tax filing is to tell taxpayers how their taxes were allocated. That is, we can 
take the proportion of total tax revenue spent on each major type of expenditure, 
and apply these proportions to an individual tax return: We spent $X of your taxes 
on the armed forces, $Y on healthcare, $Z on roads, and so on. Arguably, taxpayers 
have a right to this information: They should be told how their tax money is spent. 
One complication here is that the voter pays taxes to and receives services from 
different levels of government, and will thus have to put calculations together (espe-
cially in the case of something like roads, which tend to be financed by national, 
regional, and local governments). Still, taxpayers might then be in a better position 
to judge whether they are getting a good bang for their buck, and focus their ire 
on particular programmes rather than government as a whole (with more focused 
objections much more likely to lead to positive change).
How, though, can we be confident that governments are spending money wisely 
within programmes? We may at times be concerned by the total size of a particular 
programme’s budget. But much of the time we can only be sure that a programme 
is spending wisely by looking at detailed budgetary breakdowns. There is much that 
can be done here:
• Publish online as much detail as possible. It is now quite easy for 
governments to provide a great deal of online transparency. Many developing 
countries have found that they reduced corruption by simply publishing how 
much was spent on particular programmes in particular localities: Locals then 
knew when local officials were siphoning off funds. Many politicians and 
bureaucrats in developed countries have been shamed into trimming their 
expense claims by public transparency. It is much easier to spot corruption in 
any country if the terms of government contracts are published. But public 
scrutiny can address ignorance as well as corruption: Voters may be able to tell 
governments how to access less expensive goods and services. Beyond its prac-
tical benefits, transparency has the important benefit of making government 
expenditures seem less suspicious. Those who complain about government 
waste now have an enhanced opportunity – and duty – to identify that waste. 
(The Open Government Partnership is a grouping of governments and NGOs 
that pushes for enhanced transparency.)
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• Pay more attention to auditors. Most governments have their books 
audited. And auditors’ reports often make a big splash: Every year the auditor 
exposes a few cases of flagrant stupidity or malfeasance. But there is no 
organized follow- up. It is hard for voters to know if or how well governments 
have followed the auditor’s advice. Yet this could and should be one of the main 
criteria by which voters decide whether to re- elect a government. Auditors 
should clearly grade government progress in addressing problems.
• Query budgets in legislatures. Legislators could also play a bigger role 
in querying government officials about particular expenditures. We might 
imagine a rotation in which the detailed budgets of different departments 
receive detailed scrutiny.
A final but critical institution is whistle- blower protection. If a bureaucrat 
becomes aware of wrongdoing by others, they need to be able to “blow the whistle” 
without fear of losing their job. These protections need to be formally enshrined 
and carefully enforced. A whistle- blower’s superiors will often be embarrassed by 
the whistle- blower, and will be tempted to fire the troublemaker if they can and 
make their life miserable if they cannot. Whistle- blowers may then need a right 
to be transferred to a different office. As with all institutions, there is a potential 
downside: We do not want to encourage bureaucrats to lodge false complaints just 
because they are annoyed with co- workers. There needs then to be some adjudi-
cation of whether the whistle- blower had cause to complain. The bar should be 
low here – it may sometimes be difficult to prove the alleged wrongdoing and so 
we cannot insist that this be clearly established – but it should usually be possible 
to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate complaints. Obviously, the adjudication 
should not be made by those who are complained against.
A civics lesson
What on earth are we teaching our children? As much as politics may be polarized 
these days, there is hopefully still consensus out there that we should be doing a 
better job of explaining democracy to our children. And perhaps we just need to 
be honest with them. Stirring portrayals of democracy may too easily lead to disen-
chantment later in life. We should be honest that government is complex and voters 
ill- informed. But we should rejoice in our ability to complain about politicians and 
programmes we dislike. And we should celebrate constitutional limits on the abuse 
of power – and remind our young of the terrible atrocities committed (mostly) by 
authoritarian regimes. We will see in later chapters that we should not presume 
that democracy will always be maintained; we should teach the young that demo-
cratic freedoms need to be valued and fought for. Most importantly of all, we need 
to teach them that democracy depends absolutely on respecting (and seeking to 
understand) those we disagree with. Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.
One key tenet of this book is that we need to work toward both good institutions 
and good values. It is a mistake to think that the future of democracy is guaranteed 
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by the right institutional structure. The checks and balances in the constitution 
of the United States are indeed laudable, but constitutions explicitly modelled on 
it in Latin America and the Philippines have often been set aside by autocrats. 
Constitutions cannot foresee every circumstance, and must in practice be supported 
by a set of values. Individual voters need to respect each other. And we need to 
police those we elect to ensure that they do not abuse their power in ways that 
threaten an independent judiciary, or media, or army.
Summing up
We have spent much time suggesting reforms to democratic governance. We have 
done so because progress on many fronts depends on governments working well, 
and on citizens having confidence that governments both function well and are 
responsive to the needs of citizens. As we will see in  chapter 4, there are good 
reasons to fear that faith in government and quality of government will decline 
if we do nothing. Indeed democracy itself may be eclipsed. Yet we have sketched 
above several paths to an alternative future in which average citizens are empowered 
and thus government policies more closely reflect what the typical citizen wishes. 
This would also be a world in which much of the heat is taken out of political dis-
course, and it becomes easier to pursue policies that a large majority of citizens can 
support. Last but not least, it would be a world in which governments spend tax 
dollars more wisely, and are seen to do so. As we proceed to discuss a range of spe-
cific policies in this and the next chapters, readers can reflect on how much more 
likely (and better) many of these policies would be in a society that pursued the 
political reforms outlined above.
3.2.2 The environment
Yes, carbon taxes
The intense debate around taxing carbon in many countries is a powerful example 
of an important point: A strategy may be wonderful in terms of all five types of human 
evaluation and yet it may prove challenging to communicate and gain broad support for it.
The argument in favour of carbon taxes is straightforward: These taxes give both 
producers and consumers incentives to reduce their carbon footprint. An industrial 
firm facing a carbon tax of $X per ton will be guided to adopt any technologies or 
processes that reduce carbon output for a cost less than $X per ton. The 
alternative methods of getting industrial firms to reduce carbon emissions is for 
government bureaucrats to either order firms to employ certain technologies or 
processes, or order them to achieve a certain reduction in carbon footprint. For any 
given reduction in carbon that we might achieve, a carbon tax will be less costly 
for society than bureaucratic rules regarding production processes if we make the 
reasonable assumption that firms understand their production processes better than 
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reduction than governments telling each firm to reduce by a certain amount if we 
appreciate that some firms will find it easier to reduce their carbon output than 
others. In sum, a carbon tax allows each firm to choose the lowest- cost ways of 
reducing their carbon footprint, whereas direct government edicts will inevitably 
require some firms to engage in much costlier efforts while some less expensive 
opportunities for carbon reduction are foregone.
A carbon tax thus has a highly desirable consequence: It achieves any given level 
of carbon reduction in the least costly way possible. It does so, we might note, by 
following a key bit of advice from systems analysis: Give diverse agents the incen-
tive to move the system in a desired direction. Moreover, it respects key beliefs and 
values around respect and autonomy by allowing consumers and producers to make 
their own decisions rather than being told what to do. It thus accords with centuries 
of traditions across most human societies that allow market exchange to proceed 
without undue government interference. And note that the way that governments 
“interfere” in this case involves employing a market mechanism: Markets by their 
nature cannot put a price on pollution, even though producers and consumers 
impose real costs on society through their actions. So governments introduce a 











































FIGURE 3.1 Placing strategies for better governance in context.
We use square boxes here for strategies and rounded boxes for desired outcomes (wavy 
lines and thick lines have the same meaning as in Figure 2.1). This complex system 
of generally positive reinforcement depends critically on whether more democratic 
decision- making results in better decisions and less corruption. There should, of 
course, be a link between Social Harmony (which here means greater consensus 
around controversial issues) and Sense of Community.
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other price signal that they receive (pollution is what economists call an “exter-
nality,” and the standard recommendation for any externality is to put a price on 
it). Since producers and consumers are all quite familiar with responding to price 
signals, they can potentially be entirely comfortable with carbon taxes.
Some countries have introduced “carbon permits” (often called cap- and- trade 
schemes) rather than carbon taxes. These also put a price on carbon: Firms need 
to buy permits to emit carbon (often above a certain allowed level). These permits 
have a political advantage in that they avoid the word “tax.” But they have some 
challenges. In particular the price of such permits tends to fluctuate a lot through 
business cycles, and thus they do not provide the same clear price signal that a 
carbon tax does. Still, cap- and- trade schemes are likely better than bureaucratic 
edicts.
Why then are carbon taxes so controversial? There are several reasons, each 
troubling in its own way. But an appreciation of each points toward strategies for 
overcoming it:
• Many people simply doubt that there is a cost imposed on (especially future) 
society by carbon emissions. It is becoming less socially acceptable to say this 
explicitly: There is mounting evidence that climate is changing in an unpre-
cedented fashion, and some 99 per cent of climate scientists accept that this 
is happening and that it poses severe threats to humanity’s shared future. (We 
can still do more to increase public understanding and respect for science; 
see below.) If you do not believe in climate change, but do not wish to be 
called a Neanderthal, it will be tempting to oppose the very transparent policy 
of carbon taxation in favour of vague promises to somehow achieve costless 
carbon reductions through government regulation. (Other strategies that push 
for government transparency, and for honesty in political discourse, can be 
helpful here.)
• People are busy, and like to believe convenient arguments. Promises of reducing 
carbon at little or no cost are attractive. But note that if there are easy ways to 
reduce carbon – and there are – these will be activated by even a small carbon 
tax wherever they are feasible. (The problem here is simply that the logic of 
carbon taxes has not been communicated.)
• People worry that any serious environmental policy will cost them finan-
cially. They worry in particular about losing their jobs. These fears are often 
exaggerated: The price of oil has bounced around in recent decades far more 
than it would be affected by any carbon tax that has been widely proposed. 
Such people should nevertheless prefer a carbon tax over a more expensive 
approach to carbon reduction – but may be attracted to vague promises to 
reduce carbon emissions costlessly. Note that jobs are likely more endangered 
by bureaucratic rules – which might force some firms out of business unneces-
sarily – than by carbon taxes. (Still, the best answers to this concern involve 
identifying types of economic prosperity that are environmentally sustainable, 
and developing a social safety net that addresses fear of unemployment.)
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• People dislike taxes, and hate the idea of a new tax. The key point here is that 
we need taxes to fund government activities. We can potentially reduce other 
taxes by the amount of revenue earned from carbon taxes. And note the advan-
tage here: We are able to reduce the taxes on things we like, such as income 
and consumption, by raising the taxes on something we do not want, carbon 
emissions. Rather than discouraging work and consumption, we discourage 
carbon emissions. We have to be careful of the distributional effects of such 
a change in tax regimes (which may require tax rebates to the poor), but in 
general the idea of replacing “bad” taxes with useful taxes should be broadly 
attractive. The problem here is that many voters simply do not trust politicians 
when they promise that a new tax will be completely offset by reductions in 
existing taxes. (This is in part a communication problem and in part a challenge 
again of enhancing honesty and transparency in governance. There may be 
ways of guaranteeing a maximum tax take.) [Note that many people may have 
an intuitive objection to taxes but then use one of our other bullet points to 
justify their antipathy to a carbon tax. We need then to address both their real 
and pretend reasons for objecting.]
• People fear that a carbon tax, once introduced, will keep increasing. There is 
some truth in this. It is hard to estimate in advance how much of a carbon tax 
is needed to achieve any given target for carbon reduction. And so it may well 
prove necessary to raise the tax level. But note that we have urged throughout 
this book for a gradual approach wherever possible: It makes sense to start with 
a smaller tax and raise this through time (though we should not move too 
slowly on this issue, given predictions of how fast global temperatures might 
increase, and the damage this might do, and our desire to give clear price signals 
to both producers and consumers). We will learn both about how much carbon 
is reduced and how much economic activity is disrupted. And recall yet again 
that any increase in carbon tax can be offset by a decrease in other taxes. (This 
is again an issue of communications, but also honesty and transparency.)
• Some worry that carbon taxes disproportionally affect the poor. This effect should 
be carefully measured. If it is found that the poor are suffering, a carbon tax 
can be coupled with the sorts of redistributive policies recommended below.
• Some worry that people respond slowly if at all to price incentives. We can expect 
that firms will take actions to reduce the amount they pay in carbon taxes, 
though perhaps not immediately. We can expect that consumers will respond 
to changes in prices, but again we can worry about the time lag. Higher fuel 
prices may encourage the occasional walk to the grocery store, but will not 
cause an immediate purchase of a more fuel- efficient car. It is estimated that 
the least expensive gains in carbon reduction come from refitting buildings and 
changing furnaces to reduce heating and cooling costs: Indeed, many home 
and business owners can actually save money in the long run by doing so. But 
the challenge is that the costs of retrofitting occur at the start, while the cost 
savings are spread over decades. People are often both bad at such calculations 
and present- oriented in their thinking. We may in such cases need more than 
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just carbon taxes to encourage people to act in their own interest – but can still 
expect carbon taxes to have some effect.
• Some worry about international competition. There is a fear that firms paying 
a carbon tax will be hurt in international competition with firms elsewhere 
that do not need to pay such a tax. This, we should first note, is a challenge 
for any effort to reduce carbon emissions – and thus yet another argument for 
doing so as inexpensively as possible. That is, a firm being told by bureaucrats 
how to operate will be at an even greater competitive disadvantage. This fear 
of unfair international competition can be mitigated within a country by tariff 
policies, but these interfere with international trade. The best solution involves 
international agreement on a carbon tax. This simultaneously addresses another 
common concern: “Why should we do something when our country alone 
cannot solve the carbon emission problem?”
We should say more about that last point: international agreement on a carbon 
tax. The international community has struggled for decades to agree on carbon 
reduction targets, and has proven even more inept at achieving these. (My own 
national government often brags about how it has been an international leader in 
setting carbon reduction targets, even though it has never come anywhere near 
meeting them, at least before the COVID- 19 crisis.) It could well be that inter-
national negotiations would be better focused on an agreed carbon price. This 
ties questions of how to share the cost internationally and how to achieve reduc-
tion targets into one tidy bundle. And individual governments might pass binding 
resolutions: “We will introduce a carbon tax of X dollars when at least 90 per cent 
of other countries do so.” Environmental activists could then focus their energies 
on recalcitrant countries. A combination of international pressure and the lure of 
a more palatable source of revenue may prove attractive to governments that are 
otherwise uncooperative.
I should note in closing that it is entirely possible to structure a set of carbon 
taxes and innovation incentives that actually allow big emitters to maintain or 
increase profits while reducing emissions. And these emitters are increasingly aware 
that some governmental action is inevitable, and may thus be willing to endorse 
predictable policies, even at some cost.
Incentives to innovate
Many people hope that there will be a technological solution that will solve climate 
change for us costlessly. This might be some super- scrubber that can be cheaply 
installed in smokestacks. Or a breakthrough in the generation of some kind of 
renewable energy. Or perhaps some technique for neutralizing atmospheric carbon. 
Such a technology would be mind- bogglingly valuable to humanity. It is therefore 
very much worth subsidizing research that might lead to such a solution.
We should note that there is also a sound economic argument for subsidizing 
the development of new technologies that will reduce carbon emissions. It is in 
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the nature of technological innovation that the inventor will not capture all of the 
benefits of their innovation, for (even if patented for a while) eventually others will 
adopt the new idea. The private incentives to innovate are thus far less than the 
societal incentives to innovate. The devil is in the details, though, and it is challen-
ging to develop innovation subsidies that are cost- effective. One challenge is that 
governments often end up subsidizing activities that firms were going to undertake 
anyway.
We have delayed so long in introducing carbon taxes that some sort of techno-
logical solution is increasingly important. Indeed, humanity may be forced to con-
sider messing with the environment even more in order to limit climate change: We 
might sprinkle substances in the atmosphere that would have the effect of reflecting 
solar heat before it arrives. This should only proceed with widespread international 
agreement. Such a solution would require great confidence in the scientists and 
engineers that design it.
It is highly likely that there will not be one great innovation that solves our 
problems but rather a host of little innovations. This is a general lesson from the 
history of technology: that a host of small innovations have a cumulatively greater 
impact on human lives than the handful of great breakthroughs (steam engines, 
harnessing electricity, or computers) that garner the vast bulk of public attention. We 
should be willing to subsidize some projects with grand ambitions but also a larger 
number of projects that promise smaller but worthwhile gains. Such innovations 
have already led to a dramatic fall in the cost of solar and wind energy in recent 
decades. Other innovations have lowered the carbon emissions associated with oil 
and gas production (and we will likely need some of this for both petrochemicals 
and transportation for some time, even if renewables are able to become the prime 
source of electricity generation).
We should note again that carbon emissions are easier to abate in some activities 
than others. We have had great success in developing sources of renewable energy 
in recent decades. We also have developed techniques for making buildings more 
energy efficient. Electric cars and trucks are showing much promise, but electric 
planes and even ships seem a distant dream. The large carbon emissions associated 
with steel and cement production (8 per cent of total global emissions) may be 
even harder to abate – though there are exciting advances in the use of engineered 
timber as a construction material.
Other pollutants
The strategies outlined for addressing climate change can also be applied to other 
pollutants. We can tax any kind of pollution, and encourage research that would 
limit this. We might stress here that taxes are only possible if we first measure 
emissions accurately. This is not a particularly challenging task, for the technology 
exists to measure most pollutants very accurately as they enter our air and water. We 
could reasonably argue that it is important for our goal of human health, and for 
respecting personal autonomy and personal rights, that we regularly measure and 
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tell people what is in the local air and water, and where this is coming from. People 
are willing to suffer some pollution in the interest of staying employed – though 
this willingness might fall if we enhanced economic security more generally. They 
deserve to know, though, exactly what trade- off they are being called upon to make.
It should be appreciated that important strides have been made in recent decades. 
Many bodies of water are much cleaner than they used to be. Many cities are less 
smoggy than they once were – and not just cities suffering industrial decline. Some 
pollutants such as lead are much less prevalent than they once were. These gains 
have been accomplished through a mix of government incentives and techno-
logical advances. Notably, life has carried on despite reductions in some pollutants. 
Society has proved quite capable of scoring some environmental successes while 
maintaining economic prosperity. We can undoubtedly push for reductions in other 
pollutants without destroying our economies.
Biodiversity
The methods employed to deal with pollution are less well suited to protecting bio-
diversity. We may in the not- too- distant future develop the technology to recreate 
extinct life- forms, but even this will require us having saved samples of that species’ 
DNA. In the meantime there are limited technological fixes for maintaining bio-
diversity – though substitutes for some of the products produced from rare species 
might be imagined (and electronic tracking of endangered wildlife can make pro-
tection a bit easier). Taxes may also not be feasible for species where we must 
totally protect remaining populations. There is thus no alternative to prohibiting 
the killing of certain species or banning destruction of the habitats on which 
they depend. This will often require international cooperation. It almost certainly 
requires legal enforcement, which can be difficult and thus expensive. Most of all, it 
requires greater understanding of ecological systems and the effects that decreased 
biodiversity have on these.
Urban planning
We tend to think of rural areas when we think “environment,” but our cities have 
huge and diverse impacts on our environment. And since most humans now live in 
cities, urban planning has a major impact on whether humans can regularly interact 
with nature. Urban planning at the same time affects a variety of other societal 
goals. Income inequality encourages and reflects the existence of rich and poor 
neighbourhoods. Our sense of community is shaped in important ways by how we 
design our cities. Human health is very much affected by urban design. Last but not 
least, the aesthetics of urban infrastructure and buildings exerts an important effect 
on human well- being: We are happier in attractive surroundings.
Property developers have a strong financial incentive to build homes that people 
want to live in and buildings that firms want to operate in. Yet developers often 
face limited incentives to pursue environmental, health, equality, or community 
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coherence goals – unless their customers indicate strong preferences around such 
things. Urban planners and city governments often exert limited influence on 
developer decisions.
Our first step must be to appreciate that there are strategies that serve mul-
tiple goals:
• Maintaining natural areas within city boundaries benefits nature (and espe-
cially certain plants, birds, and animals) but also reduces flooding (since natural 
areas can absorb water whereas concrete does not), enhances air and perhaps 
water quality (note that flooding can interfere with water supplies) and thus 
health, provides attractive places for people to both congregate and exercise, 
and makes it easier for urban residents to interact with and appreciate nature. 
Many studies show that people are happier if they regularly interact with nature. 
Natural areas can also be economically beneficial in attracting tourists. We must 
nevertheless be aware of a trade- off: If we protect natural areas within cities, 
we must either have bigger cities or pack the population more densely where 
construction is allowed. There is good reason to believe that most cities have 
too little nature, since city governments are often desperate for new sources of 
revenue. Note, though, that this trade- off becomes less severe if working from 
home becomes more common: The costs of commuting long distances are 
thus much smaller.
• Buildings that allow for natural ventilation are more energy efficient than those 
reliant on air conditioning. They are also healthier. They may be more expen-
sive to build, but are much less expensive to operate.
• Urban gardens can increase supplies of fresh foods. They can be situated on 
rooftops or small strips of land with limited alternative uses. They decrease the 
need to transport food long distances. They provide another venue for com-
munity cooperation. They also can serve to mitigate flooding.
• We should be planning for urban resilience as the world experiences fire and 
flood more frequently. Yet we have seen that measures that increase resilience, 
such as natural areas and urban gardens, serve other valuable goals.
How can we best ensure that our various goals are reflected in urban design, 
and that we pursue design strategies that provide benefits in excess of costs? The 
diversity of goals calls for broad consultations to guide urban planning. These 
consultations should seek to identify first the goals, and how these interact, and 
then strategies for achieving diverse goals. In discussing goals, cities should engage 
in backcasting: forecasting future needs and deciding how to meet these. The com-
plexity of interactions means that we must be ready to revise our plans as we see 
what works and what doesn’t. Since all cities face a very similar set of challenges, 
there is much scope for learning from successful urban planning exercises in other 
cities (and there are a number of cities that have pursued broad consultations and 
instituted exciting projects as a result). There is also, it should be appreciated, much 
scope for learning about what did not work in other cities: We can avoid making 
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the same mistakes. Once we have strategies clarified, we can give developers both 
guidelines to follow and financial incentives/ penalties to guide them.
Recycling and more
Some environmentalists worry that a global focus on climate change – though 
understandable and important – distracts attention from other environmental issues. 
They would urge us to see climate change as part of a broader problem: humans 
messing with complex ecosystems that we do not fully comprehend in ways that 
may lead to disaster. They urge humans to get back in contact with nature and 
appreciate its diversity. We have addressed some such concerns above.
There is also the problem of garbage, and especially toxic garbage, which fouls 
our lands and waters. One important proposal here is to place some sort of tax 
on goods to cover the cost of eventually recycling these. (On a related point, we 
should require mines and factories to put a fraction of revenues toward funds that 
will clean up their sites when they wind down production). Just like pollution, the 
cost of recycling is an externality that should be factored into the price of goods. 
As with pollution, manufacturers then gain a financial incentive to reduce the costs 
of recycling.
3.2.3 Economic prosperity
We must first address the question of whether we can have economic growth that 
is compatible with environmental sustainability. We have urged above the adoption 
of a carbon tax, and have appreciated that this will encourage firms to spend funds 
on reducing carbon emissions. This will increase costs of production for some goods 
and services. Some opponents of carbon taxes have argued that such taxes would 
have a huge negative impact on our standard of living. Yet the sort of carbon taxes 
that are generally proposed would increase the price of oil (the price most likely 
to be affected) by far less than that price has bounced around in recent decades. 
Carbon taxes will have an impact to be sure – they would have no point if they did 
not change the way both producers and consumers behaved – but they will not 
bring an end to economic prosperity as we know it.
Carbon taxes may encourage consumers to shift away from carbon- intensive 
goods and services toward goods and services that produce little in the way of 
carbon emissions. There are a host of services that have a very small carbon foot-
print. We mentioned in  chapter 1 that we might wish to value some of the goods 
and services we produce more than others. It might be no bad thing if carbon taxes 
encouraged people to spend less of their income on conspicuous consumption (of, 
say, cars with off- road capabilities that are never employed) and more on services 
such as going to the theatre or exercise classes or playing/ watching sports or biking 
through nature.
People also fear the effect of carbon taxes on employment. But if we change 
our consumption patterns, we will create new jobs to replace old jobs. We may, in 
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particular, need to build a whole new infrastructure of electric vehicle charging 
stations. And if we change how we produce goods and services, we will also create 
new jobs: installing emission- reducing equipment in industrial plants, building 
renewable energy facilities, and retrofitting our buildings to reduce energy con-
sumption. We may worry about how fast we can retrain assembly line workers as 
yoga instructors. But the need for retraining may not always be severe: Geothermal 
energy production can use many of the skills employed in oil and gas production.
We discussed the possibility of resource constraints on growth earlier, and urged 
efforts to identify resource substitutes and pursue recycling. It is worth noting here 
that both recycling and the production of alternative materials will require workers. 
Efforts to limit the amount of materials used in the production of particular goods 
and services may also require more labour.
We should be guided away from thinking that our future must be one of eco-
nomic sacrifice. We can still have jobs and consumption, though perhaps not quite 
the jobs and consumption that we are accustomed to. It is nevertheless no bad thing 
to encourage people to reflect on how much happiness they really gain from con-
sumption of particular goods and services. If some people were to decide that they 
preferred more leisure to more consumption, this would be no bad thing – though 
there might be economic dislocation if everyone chose to do this at the same time.
BOX 3.2: MEASUREMENT ISSUES
We tend to evaluate economic prosperity in terms of a single measure: Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). GDP measures the total value of all goods and ser-
vices produced in the economy. Economists are well aware that it is an imper-
fect measure and occasionally suggest reforms. But GDP has the advantage 
that it is fairly easily calculated, and thus national statistical authorities are 
hesitant to make changes. The key assumption of GDP is that all goods and 
services produced in an economy should be valued at their market price. 
This allows us to easily add cars and socks and haircuts into one composite 
measure. But we as a society might reasonably decide that spending a certain 
sum of money feeding hungry children is somehow better than spending it 
on a fancy car. There is a more practical difficulty that only goods and ser-
vices that are bought and sold get counted: If I cook and clean for myself, 
it does not show up in GDP, but if I hire someone else to do this for me, it 
does. GDP thus gets artificially inflated when we engage in market exchange 
for things we used to do for ourselves. The GDP of less- developed countries 
thus looks lower than it should, for people in those countries not only do 
their own cooking and cleaning but still often make their own clothes and 
even build their own homes. Another problem with GDP is that bad things 
can make GDP go up: If we consume extra fuel in traffic jams, then GDP 
rises even if we hate traffic jams; the money we spend cleaning an oil spill 
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likewise goes into GDP. Last but not least, we might note that GDP makes 
no attempt to include the costs of pollution or resource use (though it could 
do so in much the same way it includes estimates of the depreciation of 
buildings and machines): If we sell a barrel of oil for a dollar, GDP goes up by 
exactly a dollar, though we no longer have that oil for future use and gen-
erate pollution producing it.
Since government services are not sold in the marketplace, the decision 
has been made that these should go into GDP at precisely the cost of produc-
tion. Polarized political debate around government spending suggests that 
some people think that government programmes are worth far more than 
their cost and others suspect that they are worth far less. For the purposes 
of this book it is important to appreciate that any improvement we might 
achieve in the quality of government programmes will not at all be reflected 
in GDP.
The Human Development Index (HDI) favoured by the United Nations 
combines equal weights for GDP and measures of literacy and life expectancy. 
It is thus an explicit recognition that we might want to value goods and ser-
vices associated with education and health more than they appear within GDP. 
HDI statistics receive a lot of attention – countries brag when they do well in 
international HDI comparisons – but this rarely involves any close examination 
of the weights that go into HDI. The good news about HDI is that it is possible 
for an alternative to GDP to receive attention from both governments and 
citizens. The bad news is that the weights that guide HDI are both entirely 
arbitrary and little discussed.
Though the public attention span is limited, the best alternative may be 
to publish a set of statistics: GDP (with maybe some tweaks), literacy, life 
expectancy, (different types of) pollution, resource use, congestion, and so on. 
The public should then be encouraged to make nuanced judgements about 
how to value a combination of increases in GDP, pollution, congestion, and 
resource use.
One particularly useful statistic would be GDP per hour worked. We do not 
always bother to divide GDP by population, and especially not by the size of 
the labour force, and may thus get unduly excited about an increase in output 
that simply reflects a bigger population. Dividing GDP by hours worked can 
be particularly useful. GDP per person in Germany is lower than in the United 
States, but so is the average number of hours worked in a week (due largely 
to more generous vacation provisions). Surely we would want to know about 
the difference in hours worked in deciding on the relative prosperity of the 
two countries?
We should stress in closing that the present focus on GDP encourages 
bad decision- making. We can easily value bad policies that nevertheless 
increase GDP.
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We want to encourage a type of economic growth that is environmentally sus-
tainable. We would also prefer to see growth that reduces economic insecurity. 
There are a variety of strategies here:
We can encourage technological innovation. There is a sound economic argu-
ment for doing so. Innovators do not receive all of the benefits of their innovation, 
because others will eventually employ their ideas. The social benefits of innovation 
thus greatly exceed the private returns to innovation. Though the theoretical jus-
tification of public support for innovation is sound, there are practical problems. 
For one, we want to avoid paying firms to do things they would have done anyway. 
Second, we need to decide how and if to focus our subsidies. Since research is 
inherently unpredictable, governments should in general pursue a broad innovation 
policy rather than trying to predict winners. Yet we have seen above some reasons 
for favouring some kinds of research. We could encourage research on technolo-
gies that reduce carbon emissions or other sorts of pollution. We can encourage 
the development of new goods and services to stimulate employment. But note 
that in the long run we also want to see process innovations that will decrease 
the costs of producing goods and services. The clearest role for governments is 
in sponsoring basic scientific research: This is rarely profitable for private firms 
(though the boundary between science and technology is blurred in areas such as 
biotechnology), but often encourages technological innovation.
Before patents became common from the eighteenth century, governments 
often offered prizes for particular kinds of innovation. Some philanthropists have 
offered such prizes in recent years. Some scholars have suggested that prizes may be 
a better way of encouraging innovation than patents. Prizes have both the advan-
tage and potential risk of governments setting innovation priorities. They have the 
advantage of not restricting competition as patents do, but the disadvantage of 
requiring a substantial government expenditure upfront.
We can encourage creativity more generally. We have employed a broad definition 
of technology in this book so that even a new recipe can be counted as a techno-
logical innovation. Still, there is scope for creativity even beyond a broad definition 
of technology: improvements in the appearance of a good, changes in business 
practices, new combinations of existing services. We could do more as a society, and 
especially within our schools, to encourage everyone to appreciate their creative 
potential, and know that there are strategies for enhancing creativity (see below).
We can foster institutional changes that enhance competition or contract enforce-
ment. Note that any improvements we achieve in economic efficiency allow us to 
have more at lower cost. As with process innovation, such changes allow us to have 
higher incomes even while lowering our environmental impact. There are par-
ticular concerns at this moment in time about monopolies in online platforms and 
resulting concentrations in access to big data. Note that efforts to enhance compe-
tition simultaneously support growth and equality.
We can further liberalize international trade. In doing so, we should insist that all 
countries pursue similar environmental policies. Recall that we encouraged inter-
national agreement on a carbon tax above.
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We can increase the ability of workers to work part- time if they wish. There are 
now artificial institutional barriers to this. Note that this may enhance growth in 
GDP per hour (if happy and rested workers are more productive, as many studies 
suggest), but may have a negative impact on growth in overall GDP. Note that 
giving part- time workers better access to the benefits plans available to full- time 
workers would have the added advantage of discouraging employers from forcing 
workers who would prefer full- time employment into multiple part- time jobs (a 
practice that was found to spread COVID across long- term care homes as workers 
moved between jobs in different homes).
We can avoid the temptation to achieve job security in unnecessarily costly ways. 
It may be tempting to enhance job security by placing limits on international 
trade or technological innovation. Yet since trade and technology are key drivers of 
economic growth, we should be hesitant to do so. We have suggested that we may 
be able to achieve a better balance between prosperity and security by creating a 
stronger social safety net to catch those who lose jobs due to trade or technology. 
We can note here again that we can then achieve greater public support for growth- 
enhancing policies with respect to trade or technology – and can also achieve 
greater support for environmental policies that may also dislocate jobs.
BOX 3.3: COVID AND TRADE
The COVID- 19 pandemic exposed how dependent countries have become 
on international supply chains. This will and should cause reflection on 
whether efforts should be made to ensure local supplies of food and medical 
equipment. Such concerns were accentuated by the efforts of some countries 
to ban exports during the crisis. It will be no easy task to restore confidence 
in the international trading regime. Yet we should be careful of restricting 
trade too much in the interest of national self- sufficiency. The way to deal with 
medical supplies is to stockpile these – and obtain them from the lowest- cost 
supplier of dependable equipment. We might also wish to stockpile grain – a 
strategy pursued by governments around the world for thousands of years.
We can explore enhancing government spending in some areas. Governments have 
become an important share of GDP themselves. We can increase GDP growth if 
we can achieve public support for certain kinds of public expenditure. For example, 
we might as a society wish to spend a bit more both on public art and public parks 
and gardens. Taxpayers might be more supportive of such expenditures if they could 
have a direct say in how the money was spent (see above).
We can ensure that our educational systems are preparing our young for the jobs 
of tomorrow. This involves on one hand training for specific needs such as solar 
power technicians. Yet in an environment of change there is also a need to teach 
 
Plotting strategies to achieve goals 69
broad skills so that people can move between occupations during their lives. How 
should we finance education? For primary and secondary education, there seems 
broad societal consensus around public funding. Parental choice can be facilitated 
within public systems, thus providing competitive pressure for schools to com-
pete and innovate, without giving those with higher incomes greater access to 
quality schooling. At the post- secondary level, students can be provided with 
income- contingent loans that they pay back depending on their post- graduation 
income: Those who prosper because of their post- secondary education thus foot 
more of the bill for this. These policies strive to achieve educational success (which 
has good consequences politically as well as economically) while striking a balance 
between personal and social responsibility. By making loan repayment contingent 
on incomes, such programmes may also encourage social mobility (for poor students 
are not saddled with unpayable debt loads); sadly, social mobility has declined in the 
United States and elsewhere in recent decades. An alternative is to lower or elim-
inate tuition fees but this is a costly initiative that may encourage some students to 
pursue post- secondary education that does not serve the individual or society well. 
It is also a social benefit that benefits those with the greatest earning potential. (It 
may be a good idea to transfer some resources to young adults to help them get 
started in life, but we could help all young people rather than just those heading 
to college.)
We can improve the health of the population. The COVID- 19 pandemic brought 
home powerfully one economic benefit of a healthy population: Healthy people 
may be infected by unhealthy people. Though the economic lockdown associated 
with COVID- 19 was unusual (but may happen again; see  chapter 5), the advantages 
of maintaining the health of the entire population are enduring. Healthy people 
are more productive than sick people, and thus certain investments in healthcare 
can encourage economic prosperity. Note that healthcare expenditures themselves 
are part of GDP. We should strive to ensure that all have access to healthcare, but 
that we provide decent healthcare at the lowest possible cost. Public provision of 
healthcare achieves the first goal but struggles with the second. Yet private provision 
is also often expensive for the simple reason that it is hard to measure the quality 
of healthcare. If we cannot readily observe what we are paying for, the beneficial 
effects of competition are blunted. Hospitals can easily have competitive bids for 
laundry services because it is easy to see if the sheets are clean, but competitive 
bidding on hip replacements is a much scarier enterprise. We need also to look far 
beyond the traditional healthcare system in thinking about encouraging health, for 
public health messaging around drugs and obesity may yield significant advances in 
health at low cost. Our educational systems also might better communicate advice 
on healthy practices.
We can encourage a change in values. If people have a greater appreciation for 
leisure time, and for services with a limited environmental impact, then prosperity 
can be quite compatible with environmental sustainability.
We can encourage economic activity among the disadvantaged. We can create 
programmes that are successful in moving disadvantaged groups – the homeless, 
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the disabled, certain visible minorities, indigenous peoples – into employment. 
Successful programmes would soon pay for themselves due to decreases in the costs 
of social programmes (and emergency room visits and prison time) devoted to such 
groups. Of course, if this were easy it would have been done already. But there are 
already proven strategies: Homeless people provided with a home and some coun-
selling are often able to find work; indigenous people with property rights over land 
on a reserve are more prosperous. There are exciting new strategies: In the wake 
of Black Lives Matter protests both governments and banks have announced plans 
to increase loans to entrepreneurs from visible minority communities (who suffer 
both from discrimination and from possessing less collateral, and are thus severely 
under- represented in the ranks of entrepreneurs). We can be imaginative here: The 
economist Joseph Stiglitz has suggested that the government might be able to offer 
cheaper mortgages to the poor because it has access to lots of information on their 
income and expenditure history, and could use the tax system to collect payments. 
And we have advocated both a basic income and public works programmes else-
where: These could be especially valuable to members of these groups, erasing the 
fear of extreme poverty and introducing them to steady jobs. More generally, there 
is statistical evidence that countries with more equal income distributions grow a 
little faster, and thus policies for reducing inequality (below) may encourage growth.
We can reduce the disruptiveness of business cycles. Basic incomes and public 
works projects can serve to limit the size of business cycles, for those who lose their 
jobs need not suddenly reduce their spending. This means that prosperity will not 
take as big a hit during recessions. But there may be longer- term benefits because 
investors are more willing to invest and workers more willing to train if they do not 
have to worry about sharp recessions.
We can encourage trust. This may seem horribly squishy, but there is a good 
deal of evidence that economies function better when people trust each other. 
Businesspeople can then complete deals more easily, and consumers have greater 
confidence in what they buy. While we should all remain vigilant, there are never-
theless significant economic advantages to encouraging a sense of community and 
particular values such as honesty and personal responsibility.
We need good transport infrastructure to support economic prosperity. Transport 
infrastructure also serves other goals, including personal freedom, happiness, and 
political conversations. There is much that can be done to improve transport flows 
while reducing the environmental impacts of transport. Strategies to reduce con-
gestion serve both goals, for there is no more wasteful human activity than running 
our engines in a traffic jam. Self- driving cars and trucks will undoubtedly prove 
helpful here, as will better systems to guide drivers onto less crowded roads. Shared 
self- driving cars may reduce the need for urban parking lots – which are both ugly 
(usually) and costly to construct and maintain. Allowing workers to work from 
home or work non- standard hours can reduce rush- hour congestion. Electrification 
of vehicles may reduce urban pollution, and overall pollution depending on how 
the electricity is generated. Carbon taxes may shift some goods from trucks to rail, 
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and some people from cars to urban transit. Traffic interchanges and elevated rail 
crossings, though expensive, can in places generate large savings in both energy 
consumption and time in travel.
There are calls in many countries for massive investments in infrastructure. It is 
critically important that these funds be spent wisely. Often, the best bang for buck 
comes from repairing existing bridges or sewer systems, but politicians may be 
tempted by new projects that might bear their name. Governments should do cost/ 
benefit analyses of all projects (taking all costs and benefits into account), and pursue 
the most beneficial first. (One advantage of a priority list is that governments might 
be able to more quickly activate spending in a recession.) Cost over- runs are almost 
taken for granted on construction projects, and this may be an area that can benefit 
the most from increased transparency.
We can keep interest rates low. It may be a distant memory now, but central 
banks may have been overly vigilant in fighting inflation in the not- too- distant 
past. By raising interest rates to fight inflation, they discouraged investment. This 
discouraged hiring, which may have slowed both wage increases and efforts to 
develop labour- saving technology. This policy also discouraged the development of 
new goods and services. We can avoid these dynamic losses by allowing a little more 
inflation – assuming that we again experience moderate rates of inflation in future.
A Summary Exercise. It would be useful at this point in the chapter for readers to 
produce a flowchart like Figure 3.1 summarizing the effects and interrelationships 
among the economic strategies outlined here – in part just to recognize that these 
flowcharts take a bit of thought to produce. The reader can then reflect on how this 
figure overlaps with Figure 3.1. The reader can then add new boxes and lines as we 
address inequality and economic security in the next two sections.
Or you can just trust me that there are lots of arrows, and most suggest that we 
can pursue multiple goals simultaneously.
3.2.4 Inequality
Recall that we ideally wish to reduce inequality in ways that have a limited impact 
on economic prosperity. We thus should be wary of proposals that might have a 
serious negative impact on investment or work effort. We should also be wary of 
false claims by those who benefit from existing institutions that any change risks 
economic disaster.
We can tackle inequality at both the top end – by reducing the incomes or wealth 
of the very rich – or at the bottom end – by raising the incomes or wealth of the 
very poor. A number of policies work simultaneously to achieve both goals. Note 
that all policies that operate at the top end also have social and political benefits in 
reducing political and social inequality. Policies that operate at the bottom end may 
benefit personal autonomy and health outcomes. Reductions in inequality at either 
end will likely enhance our sense of community. We should keep these various 
consequences in mind as we evaluate particular policy proposals.
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At the top end of the income distribution, we could consider a few options:
We can encourage donations to charity by the wealthy. We can do so through 
both institutions (such as tax incentives) and values. This is the least invasive policy, 
for it leaves the wealthy with the freedom to do as they wish. The consequences 
may be quite beneficial for a range of societal goals if we imagine that we will get 
imaginative solutions to a range of societal challenges from lots of independent 
decisions by successful (or lucky) individuals: Some may develop programmes that 
train the unemployed; others may finance public art; still others may donate nature 
reserves to the public. Such a policy accords with values of both personal responsi-
bility and caring for others. It accords with beliefs on the one hand that people have 
a right to their income and on the other that we should help the less fortunate. In 
most human societies there have been social expectations that the rich will share 
some of their wealth. Most humans that are able engage in some charitable giving. 
A society that appreciates that high incomes and wealth reflect a combination of 
personal and societal attributes is more likely to encourage charitable giving.
We can think of other imaginative voluntary policies. Perhaps some wealthy indi-
viduals would like to bequeath their wealth not just to immediate descendants 
but through many generations? We could allow a trust that paid every descendant 
some significant but not huge sum on their eighteenth birthday. The wealth still 
stays in the family but is spread across a large number of individuals. Such trusts, if 
popular, might eventually be rolled into a public scheme to provide all citizens with 
a payment on their eighteenth birthday (see below). This policy has the advantages 
associated with being voluntary but its benefits to society are likely less than with 
charitable donations. Still, there are societal advantages of large numbers of young 
people receiving a sum of money that they might devote to post- secondary educa-
tion, starting a business, or making a down payment on a house. Throughout history, 
young adults have often had little independence until the death of parents. While 
many young people might make foolish decisions, most would likely benefit from 
greater independence.
We could insist on donations. We can require individuals and corporations with 
incomes above a certain threshold to donate some small proportion – say 1 per 
cent – to charity. Such a policy has most of the benefits of voluntary donations. 
It can lead to a dramatic increase in the total volume of donations. It may have a 
negative impact on voluntary giving: This may seem less noble or exceptional in a 
world of forced giving. It will offend values and beliefs that people should be able to 
spend their incomes as they see fit. Notably, though, it should offend these sensibil-
ities far less than a similar increase in tax rates would, for people and corporations 
still get to decide how to allocate their donations. A society that accepted that the 
rich should give something back might be troubled little by such a policy. Forced 
donations may be institutionally rare in history, but strong social pressure to do so 
has been common. It is less clear whether such a policy is intuitively appealing. 
(There is an important question of how corporations – which are owned by large 
numbers of people – can identify shared societal goals of their shareholders. Yet it 
is often straightforward for companies to identify charitable activities that serve to 
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enhance their public visibility and reputation. Energy companies fined for polluting 
are in some jurisdictions forced to perform environmental clean- up; this serves to 
enhance the corporation’s public image.)
We can strive to identify and eliminate sources of “undeserved income.” Corporate 
executives achieve very high salaries that appear loosely tied to firm performance. 
Levels of executive compensation differ markedly across countries, with little if 
any effect on firm performance. We can change the institutions so that executive 
pay reflects firm performance. Stock options have a laudable goal of incentivizing 
managers to increase the value of the firm – but are structured unnecessarily at 
present so that executives get huge payouts when the entire stock market rises. 
Stock options could easily be structured to only reward executives that outper-
form competitors. Financial analysts are often rewarded for beating market indices, 
which they may do simply by talking on excessive risk. Financial regulations can 
eliminate the rewards for misleading clients or taking enormous risks with their 
money or pursuing obscure tax loopholes (and if governments need to bail out 
a financial institution judged “too big to fail,” they can do it in a way that forces 
shareholders and senior executives to suffer financially for bad judgement). Even 
more insidiously, some businesspeople make money by bribing government officials 
or lying to suppliers or consumers. Note that our faith in politics is enhanced if we 
reduce income that comes from corruption or lobbying or abuse of power. (Recent 
legal cases in the United States in which drug firms were found guilty of encour-
aging opioid abuse provide a powerful example of attacking undeserved income.) 
Speaking of power, we need to have robust competition policies that prevent firms 
from dominating markets and earning excess profits at the expense of consumers.
We can close tax loopholes. There are in many countries tax loopholes that 
can be closed at little cost. Such loopholes generally aid the rich and powerful 
while providing little benefit to the wider economy. Removing them is thus a very 
low- cost way of reducing inequality. The challenge is identifying the tax breaks 
that serve little or no purpose, and then pressuring politicians into removing tax 
breaks from their donors. There may be little political gain from doing so. This 
is the sort of issue for which some sort of objective arms- length source of inde-
pendent advice might be very useful. And then there is tax avoidance: There is good 
reason to believe that greater efforts to stop some very rich people from cheating 
on their taxes would more than pay for themselves (maybe we should encourage 
financial bounty hunters?) And there is at least one novel idea, the Unexplained 
Wealth Order, pioneered in just a couple of countries, whereby governments can 
ask people with expensive cars or boats or homes to explain how they could afford 
these: This may potentially help authorities identify not just undeclared income but 
many types of undeserved income. More prosaically, minimum tax rates for both 
individuals and corporations can limit their ability to escape taxes via loopholes, but 
only if they declare their income.
We can increase income taxes and inheritance taxes and consider wealth taxes. We 
have above already discussed the value clashes involved in any sort of involuntary 
transmission of income or wealth. There are also important practical considerations. 
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Individuals may move to low- tax jurisdictions unless international agreement on 
tax rates can be achieved. These agreements might prove invaluable but hard to 
achieve in the absence of concerted global pressure – but small tax havens could be 
forced to change by the concerted efforts to, say, limit their access to global finan-
cial systems. In the case of wealth taxes, it may prove impractical to measure wealth 
accurately enough to tax it (though a handful of countries in the world, including 
Norway, have had wealth taxes for years). Increased taxes on land (maybe progres-
sive taxes) may be especially attractive since land is hard to hide and impossible 
to move to another tax jurisdiction. We must also worry about – and attempt to 
measure – the incentive effects of very high levels of taxation. We must then strive 
to achieve the best balance between fostering equality and fostering growth. This 
sort of decision, about where the best balance lies, might best be entrusted to a 
citizens’ assembly (see above). I would note here, though, that top tax rates in most 
jurisdictions are far below what they were just a couple of decades ago, and there 
is little reason to believe that growth has been spurred much if at all by lowering 
tax rates.
BOX 3.4: THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY
History tells us that it is hard to fight inequality outside of a crisis, partly because 
the rich are powerful and partly because of the natural tendency for the rich to 
get richer (since the rate of return on investment is generally much higher than 
the growth rate in wages). Inequality has thus risen most of the time, but fell 
during the World Wars and Depression. Yet inequality also fell in the decades 
immediately following World War II across many countries; this was in part due 
to rising real wages, but also due to widespread public support for redistribu-
tive policies in the aftermath of Depression and War.
Another lesson that can be drawn from history is that societies often 
collapse precisely because of increases in inequalities in wealth and power. In 
the long run, then, the efforts of the rich and powerful undercut the system 
on which the prosperity of their heirs would have depended. The message 
that inequality threatens societal stability is one that everybody needs to hear.
At the bottom end of the income distribution, there are also multiple options:
We can introduce a basic income (sometimes called a guaranteed annual income). 
This has benefits in eliminating the most extreme forms of poverty. It could then 
indirectly decrease homelessness, emergency room visits, petty crime, and begging 
(a basic income experiment in Finland found significant increases in reported levels 
of happiness). Some individuals who dislike the idea of giving money with no work 
requirement may be persuaded by these benefits. And a case can be made that all 
citizens deserve a “return” on the land that we all share. Or that all humans deserve 
basic human sustenance. The best balance here may – at least at first – involve a 
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very low basic income that barely meets basic human needs. [Note that a citizen’s 
assembly may be the best way to set the level.] The introduction of a basic income 
should replace a welter of programmes offered by various levels of government 
aimed at the very poor. We need to carefully evaluate both these cost savings, the 
savings to health and justice systems, and the possible effects on work effort. Note 
that a basic income is entirely transparent: Citizens can know exactly what everyone 
gets from the programme. Note also that the benefits of a basic income depend a 
lot on societal attitudes: If taxpayers view it as a societal responsibility and recipients 
mostly view it as a means to get a better education or job, then the benefits may 
far outweigh the costs. The benefits will not just be economic but will include an 
enhanced sense of community.
We could supplement a basic income with various sorts of public works projects. 
These have the advantage that individuals are required to work for money; such 
a policy is less offensive to those who wish to reward work. And there are many 
low- skilled tasks that can usefully be performed: clearing garbage from urban lands, 
erasing graffiti, planting and weeding gardens. A flexible programme could tailor 
public works employment to the skill sets of the unemployed: Public arts projects 
could be pursued by those with artistic talents. Note, though, that these workers 
have to be supervised, and thus the programmes have significant administrative 
costs. (Nevertheless India has introduced a programme guaranteeing a hundred days 
of work annually to each household.) The key here may be that such programmes 
can produce results that are visible to taxpayers. Public works programmes were 
pursued in many countries during the Great Depression but became less popular 
postwar, partly because they seemed communistic to some during the Cold War, 
and partly because Keynesian economic theory suggested (too optimistically) that 
governments could successfully fight unemployment indirectly through govern-
ment tax and spending policies or monetary policy. It could well be that the cost 
of public works programmes would be less than the cost of attempting to stimulate 
private employment.
We can employ an “earned income tax credit” that tops up the income of those 
with low incomes. Such a policy is popular on both right and left because it helps 
the poor while increasing the incentive to work. (We can also raise minimum 
wages but need to recognize that such increases will in some circumstances cause 
employers to reduce employment.)
We might develop special programmes for those who are artistically inclined to be 
paid to produce urban art. Note here that even those with limited experience can 
be trained in building mosaics.
We can improve access to government programmes. Programmes to aid the poor, 
including a basic income, will only aid the poorest if these apply for benefits. Some 
countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, already automat-
ically fill out income tax forms for the poorest members of society, ensuring that 
they receive benefits for which they are eligible. This is straightforward, since their 
incomes are low and government agencies or employers provide income figures to 
tax authorities. An estimate in Canada suggests that only 3 per cent of the homeless 
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file tax returns; the rest miss out on benefits for which they are eligible. Sadly, com-
panies that provide tax advice lobby against this free service.
We can improve education and health. Note that a host of programmes that 
aid the goal of personal autonomy, such as education and healthcare, also increase 
the ability of the poor to gain employment or start businesses. Many studies show 
that programmes of early childhood education pay for themselves in the long run 
by improving life outcomes of children; they have a more immediate impact in 
allowing parents (especially mothers) to work.
We can be more imaginative. Some have suggested rules limiting the degree of 
difference between the lowest and highest annual income in any large firm. This 
might motivate changes at both the top and bottom end of the income distribution.
What, though, of the inequality rooted in racial discrimination? The author 
should confess that in the first draft of this book he said relatively little about this. 
The author dreams of a future in which, as Martin Luther King famously said, 
people will be judged by their character rather than their skin colour. But we are 
not there yet, and have progressed toward such a future far less quickly than we 
should have. The Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 have established that it is past 
time to address this issue.
I would still note that many of the general strategies advocated in this book 
would serve to enhance racial harmony. Racism is often motivated by fear and jeal-
ousy, and any programme that reduces inequality and provides a better social safety 
net will reduce the impetus for racism. Changes in cultural values are also critical. 
I defended my emphasis on cultural values earlier in the book against those who 
might focus entirely on institutions. The most hopeful sign in the Black Lives Matter 
protests was their multiracial nature and the fact that many people in power reacted 
by removing symbols (team names or statues or flags) that were perceived as having 
racist connotations. Culture matters a lot in the battle against racism: Nothing may 
be more important than a cultural acceptance among all social groups that racism 
is wrong and needs to be combated. Perhaps most importantly, there was a broad – 
though far from unanimous – acceptance that members of visible minorities have 
good reason to be angry, and that their concerns need to be heard and addressed.
In many countries, neighbourhoods are still racially segregated. Happily, odious 
laws that once mandated segregation have largely disappeared, but the reality on 
the ground is still that many members of visible minorities grow up in ghettoes 
in which they rarely interact with people of other races. Likewise, Whites may 
have very limited interactions with members of visible minorities – and then 
perhaps mainly in service roles. It is far easier to harbour racist attitudes if you 
rarely interact with people of other races. There is good evidence that familiarity 
breeds respect and understanding. A society in which people from different social 
groups regularly interact is one in which racism and discrimination will be far less 
likely. There have been important successes (but also some failures) in integrating 
neighbourhoods, schools, and workplaces in recent decades, and it could be that 
there is a tipping point in the not- too- distant future where racist attitudes become 
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socially unacceptable in all sizeable social groups. Integrating neighbourhoods may 
be the single most important avenue for decreasing racial tensions.
It is critically important to face up to our history. Visible minorities faced 
decades of discrimination in many lands. This has often been buttressed by vio-
lence: Lynchings and other sorts of gang violence prevented Blacks in the United 
States from pursuing both political activity and economic prosperity for well over 
a century. We must ensure that such violence remains anathema. And we must 
appreciate that as a result of such violence – and racial segregation in housing, most 
Black children will inherit far less from their parents and grandparents than White 
children. The differences in wealth between races are even larger than differences 
in income. We should then as a society consider ways that we can help those from 
poor backgrounds succeed (I quite like the idea of giving all 18- year- olds a one- 
time grant, but am well aware that this is an expensive idea not to be engaged 
lightly).
3.2.5 Economic uncertainty
The idea of a basic income has gained popularity across the political spectrum in 
recent years. It is attractive to some because it guarantees a certain level of income 
to all, and thus erases the most extreme forms of poverty from society. We thus 
urged a basic income above as one strategy for addressing income inequality. A basic 
income is attractive to others because it potentially replaces a welter of social 
programmes operated by various levels of government (though some programmes 
for particular groups like the disabled might remain). It is thought by many to be 
especially important in the near future because of the disruptions to labour markets 
that might result from artificial intelligence (which notably may replace workers 
in diverse fields such as trucking, manufacturing and middle management). It is 
the role of a basic income in reducing economic uncertainty that interests us here. 
Workers who know that there is a minimum income below which they cannot fall 
can worry a bit less about losing their jobs. This is a direct benefit to society, for 
we do not want families to worry about how they are going to feed themselves. 
And increased economic security has further benefits: We have seen elsewhere in 
this chapter that a basic income might increase societal support for a variety of 
beneficial policies such as carbon taxes and trade treaties. It appeals to our senses 
of justice, social responsibility, and caring – we do not like to see hunger. It does, 
though, challenge our sense of personal responsibility, for we would generally prefer 
that families support themselves. We might also worry about the cost of such a pro-
gramme, and thus the taxes needed to pay for it: This cost will of course depend on 
how many other programmes it can replace. It is hoped by many that there may be 
significant savings in administrative costs if several programmes can be replaced by 
one that can be run fairly readily through existing tax systems (though some people 
will need assistance in filling out the forms to qualify). We can also note here that 
some existing social support programmes discourage people from seeking work 
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because they lose their benefits if employed; a basic income should be structured to 
maintain the incentive to work.
As the COVID- 19 pandemic caused a massive economic contraction in many 
countries in 2020, governments rushed to get money into people’s hands to stave 
off economic disaster and ensure that families could feed themselves. If a basic 
income had been in place, there would already have been a mechanism that ensured 
these outcomes.
We have described above several potential impacts of a basic income, most good, 
some not. It is a challenging task to estimate each of these. It is likewise challenging 
to estimate the costs, for these will depend both on how people react (do they work 
more or less, get more education or not?) and how many existing programmes are 
eliminated. Experiments with basic incomes have often produced promising results, 
but small- scale experiments by their nature cannot capture the myriad effects of a 
full- scale programme. We need on the one hand careful and multifaceted evaluation 
(embracing a systems approach), and on the other, a recognition that at some point 
we will have to make a decision based on imperfect information. We need at that 
point to commit to evaluating the programme carefully down the road.
Concerns about both cost and personal responsibility will likely combine to 
keep the ideal basic income fairly low. It might be set at a level that provides 
for the most basic of human needs, and it may be best to entrust some citizen 
assembly with the task of setting the level. Note that it would be invaluable for 
assembly members to actually meet (randomly selected?) recipients of a basic 
income. We need to put a “face” on poverty and understand why people are in 
poverty and how they might escape it. Public policy by stereotype is unlikely to 
be constructive.
We might then want to supplement the basic income with some sort of public 
works programmes. Here we must incur some administrative costs, for public works 
projects need to be organized and supervised. Yet it seems that communities could 
easily compile a list of projects that require limited skill and supervision: picking 
up litter, erasing graffiti, weeding and planting gardens (which may be vegetable 
gardens in the event of food scarcity), and so on. Such projects have a direct and 
observable benefit for taxpayers, and provide workers with a sense of accomplish-
ment. It is hard to measure the direct psychological effect of beautiful versus ugly 
landscapes, but humans respond to their surroundings and are more likely to be 
happy and supportive of their communities if strolling past flowers than piles of 
garbage. If we are able to commit that we will create such employment for the 
unemployed (perhaps only part- time, in order to facilitate job search), we can fur-
ther reduce economic uncertainty.
There are, of course, also a range of existing programmes that might be 
enhanced: (un)employment insurance, and subsidies for retraining and relocation. 
These cushion and encourage the transition between jobs. They serve to enhance 
security for those with incomes well above a basic income. Note, though, that 
these programmes aid those who have had long- term employment, and thus they 
alone do not support a growing proportion of today’s labour force. One key public 
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policy question going forward is how to enhance the security of workers in the 
gig economy.
3.2.6 Immigration
We have not stated a goal with respect to migration in  chapter 2. Migration can be 
shown in most cases to be beneficial for both the country that migrants leave and 
the country they move to: They may lessen unemployment where they leave, and 
often send money back to relatives; and they often fill jobs in the receiving country 
that locals are unwilling or unable to perform. The global economy as a whole nat-
urally benefits if labour moves to a place where it is more productive. Yet migration 
is controversial. Values such as respecting human freedom and caring for the less 
fortunate encourage flexible migration policies. However, values around a sense of 
community may urge limits on migration from quite different places (though recall 
that we also embrace a respect for diversity). Though the general economic case 
may be positive, there certainly can be situations in which local workers can have 
legitimate concerns about the effects of migration on their incomes. (The reader 
may be getting tired of me talking about economic security, but here again efforts 
to increase economic security may facilitate a change in attitude.)
Large waves of migration can be a shock to labour markets. Moreover, many 
migrants require time to learn local skills, languages, and customs, and then to find 
jobs or entrepreneurial opportunities. (The Canadian policy of having families and 
community groups sponsor migrants has been shown to accelerate processes of 
integration.) There is thus likely a limit to the number of migrants that any country 
can easily absorb at any point in time. This number will likely be far below the 
number that want to migrate.
One obvious solution is to charge migrants for entry. Since many are poor, this 
fee would likely have to be paid as an extra tax on income earned after migration. 
(Even a small upfront fee for entry may be an improvement over the fees paid at 
present to people smugglers.) Such a surtax is an affront to our sense of commu-
nity and our desire to help the disadvantaged. (We would likely wish to exclude 
from the surtax migrants joining family members.) It has the advantage of rationing 
entry to those who most want it. Most importantly, such a surtax can reduce local 
resistance to migration and thus increase the number of migrants that a country 
can handle. Such a policy, then, can have the unlikely impact of appealing both 
to people who might want to limit migration and to others who might want to 
expand it. (Recall that systems thinking encourages strategies that reduce conflict 
and get diverse agents working in the same direction.) Intense distrust between 
those who support migration and those who oppose migration make it difficult 
to discuss a controversial strategy that might just bring some satisfaction to both.
What, though, of refugees? People of the future may well look back on 
inhabitants of earth in the early twenty- first century as barbarians for the simple 
fact that millions of refugees from horrific wars have been abandoned to their fate, 
welcomed nowhere, left to starve or die of disease or risk their lives crossing borders 
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illegally. The refugee situation is the most basic test of our common humanity and 
we have failed, and should be collectively ashamed. The number of refugees is, on 
the one hand, a humanitarian disaster, and, on the other hand, small relative to total 
global population. Rich countries unwilling to take more refugees might at least 
have paid poorer countries to take them (as Europe did to some extent with Syrian 
refugees in Turkey). Or we might have considered military options that would have 
provided a safe haven. We could, that is, have decided that abandoning them was 
simply not an option and set our collective minds to doing something. Charging 
refugees a surtax seems heartless but it beats the crap out of leaving them without a 
home. We might all usefully take a moment to place ourselves in their shoes.
There are legitimate concerns that some refugees might wish us harm. But 
imagine how much more likely they are to disdain our principles if we abandon them.
There; you didn’t see that coming, did you? We can have a better world where 
we collectively act with courage and compassion, where we are the good people 
that we aspire to be. We should be willing to make small sacrifices to help those in 
the most desperate need, but can take solace from the fact that we need not make 
enormous sacrifices. It would in fact do the poor no good if we destroyed our 
economies in an orgy of self- sacrifice, so we can rest easy that we can achieve a 
healthy balance between doing what is right and living comfortably. We can, if we 
choose wisely, have nice homes and cars and yet also have self- respect. This balance 
is possible if we pursue a set of strategies like those outlined in this book, which 
achieve a variety of goals in a sensible manner. We cannot save everyone in trouble 
overnight but we can save those in the worst of situations. The collective needs of 
humanity are great but finite, and we can slowly address one social injustice after 
another. Decide now: What sort of person do you want to be and what sort of 
world do you want to live in?
3.2.7 Peace
We cannot stress too much that peace can only be ensured by democracy. To be sure, 
democratic leaders have at times whipped up a frenzy for war, but it seems increas-
ingly unlikely that a democratic government could justify a war against another 
democratic government. However, a democracy might feel it necessary to attack 
an autocracy that was either a threat or was violating human rights internally. And 
autocrats will often find it useful to mask their shortcomings by engaging in foreign 
adventures. The pursuit of peace is thus intertwined with the pursuit of democracy.
Autocrats will try to paint efforts to support democracy in their lands as an 
attack on that country rather than the autocrat in power. Autocrats are limited in 
their ability to block knowledge of the outside world. And thus it is important that 
democratic countries be clear about the principles that guide them. We can have a 
foreign policy based on principle or a foreign policy guided by naked self- interest, 
but it is not possible to have both. It may have been easier to get away with duplicity 
in the past, but this is increasingly impossible in an age of rapid communication and 
NGO scrutiny: Self- serving abuses of principle will soon be known to the world. If 
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democracies speak clearly about their support for democracy, and are seen to pursue 
that goal globally, it would be harder for autocrats to vilify democracies.
Democratic governments should try when possible to interact with those 
fighting for democracy within autocracies, and listen to their advice on how to 
encourage democratization. Democratic governments can also usefully interact 
with their own citizens. The German foreign ministry has often gathered random 
groups of citizens to discuss challenges in foreign policy.
Peace will also depend on countries treating each other fairly. This means 
agreeing to international institutions and then abiding by their decisions. If one 
country deems itself too powerful to abide by the rules, other countries will feel 
aggrieved. This is dangerous.
Countries in the past often went to war to guarantee raw- material supplies or 
to open up new markets. Institutions that facilitate the movement of goods and 
services throughout the global economy not only encourage economic growth but 
take away one of the most powerful incentives for war. Efforts to facilitate migra-
tion would take away another potential international flashpoint.
If the world someday becomes almost entirely democratic, then countries may 
feel comfortable endowing an institution such as the United Nations with more 
power. Such an institution could achieve many valuable goals: facilitating trade, 
policing overfishing (while economists like the idea of enforcing global quotas on 
fishing, it may be easier in practice to simply prohibit fishing in important spawning 
grounds), and limiting climate change. It may have an important role to play in 
managing some of the technological changes we will engage later in the chapter. 
And it might serve as the final guarantor of international peace, if it could credibly 
commit to act forcefully against any act of aggression. (The UN’s bureaucracy needs 
reform even more than the bureaucracies of most developed countries, we might 
note. It is even harder to police bureaucratic inefficiencies in such a body.)
In the interim it may be useful to create some sort of League of Democracies. This 
could provide a forum in which democracies could debate how best to encourage 
democratization and ideally achieve consensus on how to interact with authoritarian 
states. If the League performed useful functions, it would incentivize other states to 
democratize and seek membership (Spain and Portugal democratized in the 1970s 
in large part to gain membership in the European Union.) If the League insisted on 
a set of democratic principles, it could discourage backsliding among member states.
States within such a League will not always agree. But they can agree on how 
to disagree. Yuval Harari makes an important point that civilizations can be defined 
not just by what they agree about but by what they disagree about. Citizens of the 
European Union may disagree about the role of the European Parliament but are 
united in caring about it. A League of Democracies can identify a set of shared 
concerns and work collaboratively toward solving them.
We have argued throughout this book that institutions function best when 
supported by values. The institutions that support peace will work best if we can 
extend values around respect for diversity and sense of community to a global 
level. As with achieving these goals within countries, the greatest challenge here 
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lies in the arena of religion. We must then encourage a respect for diverse religious 
beliefs. This is easier said than done. But we should appreciate that world history 
has witnessed many lengthy periods in which major religions cohabited particular 
empires peacefully for centuries – including religious communities that do not 
get along at all well today in some parts of the world. We should be willing to 
embrace any religion that is in turn willing to live in harmony with other religions 
and with the non- religious.
We can appreciate that nationalism can have both positive and negative attributes. 
It can guide people to work together on shared goals. It can also guide hostility 
toward foreigners (and often minorities within the nation). We need to encourage a 
respectful nationalism that can foster a sense of community and shared purpose but 
stops short of blaming all imperfections in the world on others. Note here that the 
project of this book – to carefully grapple with the complexity of the world and 
plot a shared path forward – reduces both the attraction and feasibility of blaming 
some group of others for life’s shortcomings.
BOX 3.5: FOREIGN AID
This book has focused for the most part on domestic policies. We can note 
here that both democratization and peace are more likely if poor countries 
become richer. It is no fluke that most of the world’s democracies are fairly 
rich and peaceful: Democracy requires literacy, time to debate, and freedom 
from desperation. Rich countries thus have both selfish and altruistic motives 
for helping poor countries develop. The most useful policy here is openness to 
trade, for trade has stimulated economic development in many countries such 
as China in recent decades.
There has been quite an intense debate – both in public and in academic 
circles – about the effectiveness of foreign aid. There can be little doubt that 
a lot of aid has been wasted. One problem has been corruption, with local 
officials stealing much aid money. Another has been the deliberate use of aid 
by rich countries as a cover for foreign policy, so that much of it was spent on 
armies rather than schools. Still another has been donor arrogance, so that 
expensive irrigation schemes were built without consulting local farmers.
Yet how can we really doubt that there can be value in spending money in 
other countries on the things that governments pay for in rich countries, such 
as schools, roads, and hospitals? We need to do these things consultatively, to 
make sure there are teachers in the schools and doctors in the hospitals and 
maintenance of the roads. And we need transparency to ensure that most of 
the money reaches its end goal. And we need to ensure that our spending on 
schools does not just allow local governments to divert their own funds toward 
palaces and tanks. We need, that is, to be far more careful in future than we 
have been in the past.
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It is tempting to listen to those who say that aid cannot work. We can then 
say to ourselves, “I recognize some ethical duty to help the less fortunate, but 
unfortunately I can do no good.” We can in fact help the world’s poorest. 
And we can do so at a very small cost to ourselves. And we benefit not just by 
enhancing the chances for democracy and peace, but by increasing the ability 
of poor countries to buy stuff from us.
3.2.8 Crime
We did not articulate the obvious arguments against crime in  chapter 2. Crime 
creates injustice and is often encouraged by injustice. Crime reduces our freedom 
to act as we might wish. More concretely, crime imposes economic costs as indi-
viduals and firms pay for protection, and limits activities that might be dangerous or 
hard to protect. Societies have a right to protect themselves from crime: Criminals 
arguably sacrifice their rights when they commit crime. But care must be taken 
that our efforts to combat crime do not create their own injustices: that a majority 
defines crime in a way that offends a large minority; that some types of innocent 
people are more likely to be suspected or convicted of crime, or hassled or injured 
or killed by police; that some people are far better able to evade justice. It can be 
hard to find the right balance in criminal justice. Yet we can still point to some very 
useful strategies that can reduce crime at low cost.
First, we should note that our strategies for enhancing economic security and 
reducing income inequality will serve indirectly but significantly to reduce criminal 
activity driven by desperation and much that is encouraged by resentment and a 
feeling of disconnection from the wider community. There is also much evidence 
that tidying up vacant lots and buildings in underprivileged neighbourhoods serves 
to create hope and a sense of connection.
Second, efforts to enhance mental health in our communities can have a huge 
impact on crime rates. There are estimates that a majority of criminals in many 
developed countries have some recognizable mental health issue (and even that a 
majority have an identifiable brain injury). A sizeable proportion suffer from fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder, and efforts to keep pregnant women off drugs can thus 
be hugely beneficial (but with a 20- year time lag that may not encourage most 
politicians to act). There is evidence that lead in the pipes used for drinking water 
in many cities contributes to mental dysfunction.
Third, many are imprisoned for possession of illegal drugs. Decades of efforts 
to decrease illegal drug use through the police and courts have signally failed. And 
there is an important ethical issue as to whether a majority has the right to crimin-
alize an act that a large minority wishes to pursue. I personally think that drug abuse 
is an abrogation of personal responsibility. However, I also appreciate that much of 
the criminal activity associated with drug abuse reflects the fact that our policing 
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efforts drive up the price of drugs. In determining the best way to handle drugs 
we must grapple with a complex set of both ethical and empirical issues: What will 
happen to use if certain drugs are legalized? What are the effects on personal health, 
crime rates, and social interaction? What are the implications for both personal and 
social responsibility? A citizen’s assembly may be able to weigh these various issues 
and reach a consensus that should attract broad public support. This consensus will 
almost certainly involve putting fewer people in prison on drug offences.
Vengeance is a powerful motive, and society can have an understandable desire 
to punish criminals. Yet decisions about the length of criminal sentences should be 
based on careful estimates of the deterrent effects. It is incredibly expensive to keep 
a criminal in prison for a year, and we should do so only if this will have the effect 
of deterring further crime. For certain criminals – serial murderers or rapists, say – 
the value of keeping them off the streets justifies long sentences. For most criminals, 
we need to estimate both the chances of them re- offending and of others being 
deterred by a fear of long sentences. Here, the advantage of extending sentences 
that are already long may be minimal: Is it at all likely that I might risk a 10- year 
sentence for killing my annoying neighbour but control myself if the sentence 
increases to 12 years? Note here that rates of incarceration differ markedly across 
countries – but there is no obvious indication that countries that imprison more 
people benefit from lower crime rates as a result.
There are a variety of other programmes that should also be carefully 
evaluated: after- school programmes for troubled youth; community policing; 
retraining programmes within prisons; counselling programmes within prisons; and 
so on. A minute proportion of the population commits most violent crimes, and 
programmes focused on them may thus prove very effective. As with any gov-
ernment programme, we cannot expect perfection, but if a programme to teach 
impulse control to inmates succeeds in preventing a couple of crimes upon their 
release it is probably worth a few dollars. We have vociferous debate about such pol-
icies on occasion because we distrust expert advice, and we need to try to rekindle 
our confidence in our ability to estimate the likely effect of such programmes. We 
may be able to achieve a costless reduction in crime by reallocating some of the 
funds we spend keeping too many prisoners in prison for long periods toward other 
crime- reducing programmes. Note that these other programmes act by increasing 
personal choice and opportunities rather than reducing these.
There are also strategies that can target particular types of crime. Increased 
funding for safe houses is an important first step in addressing domestic abuse. 
Prosecution is more likely if victims feel safe. And abuse will decline as fear of pros-
ecution rises.
Attitudes around sexual assault are hardening. Fear of prosecution or the destruc-
tion of reputation will reduce assault. There is also a lot of scope for public out-
reach within our schools: to discuss issues of consent, to get people (both potential 
assaulters and potential witnesses) to reflect in advance on how they want to behave 
in certain situations, to encourage witnesses to intervene, and to encourage victims 
to seek counselling and perhaps legal action.
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The Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 have highlighted the unfortunate fact 
that the security of the majority has been paid for with profound injustice toward 
visible minorities. How can we protect society in a manner that is fair to all? There 
is a danger as I write that cries to “defund the police” will scare many who are 
otherwise motivated to act against racial injustice. We may have a narrow window 
in time to enact real reforms that guide police to fight crime without terrorizing 
any parts of the population. Such reforms likely include:
• Bodycams. The evidence is admittedly mixed here, but I have urged transpar-
ency in government elsewhere in this book, and strongly suspect that brutality 
is less likely when people might see it. Victims of brutality would also gain a 
much better shot at redress.
• Ban chokeholds.
• Keep better data on incidents of police brutality.
• We need to appreciate that some people join our police forces (and armies) to 
exercise force rather than serve the people. It may be difficult to screen these 
out during recruitment, though we should try. We need to be more willing 
to fire police officers who exercise unnecessary violence. Yet we also need to 
appreciate that policing is a challenging job, and that police officers face many 
situations in which they have legitimate fears for their safety. We need to help 
good cops do their job while reining in bad cops.
• There appears to be a clear need for a greater role for social workers or 
psychologists in handling many police calls. Many of the worst outcomes 
occur when dealing with people who are mentally unstable or agitated. The 
use of force in such circumstances tends only to make matters worse. Trained 
professionals can often achieve a peaceful resolution. (We may also want to 
change the way we train police officers.)
• I have mentioned community policing above, and also noted that racism is less 
likely when we know each other. Police officers who actually know the com-
munity they are policing are less likely to treat community members abusively.
• Values are again of critical importance. Police officers need to be encouraged 
not just to shed racist attitudes but to report other officers with troubling 
behaviours or attitudes.
3.2.9 Values
Educational systems across most of the developed world have had great success 
in recent decades in encouraging respect for diversity (Educational systems were 
not the sole mover of this change, and might be seen as having reacted to changes 
already occurring in society.). The generational shift that we have observed in a host 
of attitudes around diversity issues should signal that it is possible for societal values 
to change dramatically in a matter of decades.
As noted in  chapter 2, there is an important downside to this story. Young 
people, when surveyed on a range of ethical issues, dutifully respond that it is up to 
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particular groups of people to decide what is right for them: “Honesty”; “It’s okay 
as long as people like the idea.” A laudable belief in diversity has triggered a belief 
that there are no core ethical values, and that all ethical questions are a matter for 
discussion within small groups. Beyond its implications for ethical behaviour, such 
attitudes risk a backlash against diversity itself. If we must choose between honesty 
and diversity, which do we prefer? The ethical challenge of our times, then, is to 
manage to embrace both diversity and a general respect for certain core values.
We argued in  chapter 2 that there is broad support for key values such as honesty 
and both personal and social responsibility. There is also a general if less apparent 
appreciation of self- knowledge. It should, then, be quite feasible to reinvigorate 
societal support for such values, and thus encourage more individuals to pursue 
them more keenly. But who will lead such a cultural renaissance? Politicians in 
general are too distrusted to be plausible advocates of ethical behaviour. Religious 
leaders seem to be far more interested in who is sleeping with whom than with 
honesty – and their advice in any case will only motivate some believers. If we have 
a fair bit of societal consensus, then our school systems can provide some ethical 
education. It is often wondered if we can “teach” ethics. The answer is that we can 
certainly teach students the arguments in favour of certain ethical precepts, and 
invite students to reflect on what sort of people they want to be. A reflective life is 
more likely to be an ethical life, and we can get our young in the habit of thinking 
about ethical issues. (Universities can reinforce these lessons. But social sciences 
often devote little attention to our ethical nature, and enrolments in philosophy 
have been in decline. I think all university students should be exposed to an inter-
disciplinary appreciation of ethics.)
BOX 3.6: TWO PATHS TO SELF- KNOWLEDGE
Humans can usually grasp how to be honest or responsible, once they have 
decided that they wish to do these things. Self- knowledge is a bit more mys-
terious. How exactly do we come to know ourselves? It is thus the value that 
can benefit the most from some educational effort.
There are two paths to self- knowledge. One is introspective. It involves 
regularly asking questions: Why did I do that? Why do I feel bad about that? 
Why was I so angry there? Why are my friends annoyed with me? What are 
my values and am I living in accord with them? What do I want to do in life 
and am I taking steps to get there? As in most things in life, one gets better 
at answering such questions with practice. Your goal in introspection is to 
uncover motivations that you would not consciously condone: fear, jealousy, 
insecurity, and more. Through self- knowledge you can become less of an arro-
gant jerk, and achieve greater success and happiness in life.
The second path is outward- looking. We will each of us receive a lot of 
advice and criticism in our lives. Some of this will be misguided, reflecting the 
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stupidity or jealousy or arrogance of those we interact with. It is dangerous to 
take every criticism to heart, but equally dangerous to assume that everyone 
else is a malevolent moron. We must actually ask why we received a certain 
piece of advice or criticism. The fault will sometimes lie with ourselves and 
sometimes with others. The greatest danger here is that we use anger as a 
weapon that prevents even our closest friends and family from offering advice.
These attitudes will have to be reinforced in adulthood. In the absence of any 
elite that can encourage ethical principles – and we should appreciate that the vast 
majority of historical societies had a religious or state elite that did encourage eth-
ical behaviour – this reinforcement must be diffuse. We must all, that is, encourage 
ethical behaviour and discourage unethical behaviour. We should be respectful in 
so doing, recalling that there may be occasional reasoned exceptions to any ethical 
principle. We should avoid arrogance and try to avoid unnecessarily humiliating 
others. But it should be okay to question whether someone else has acted honestly 
or responsibly – both in our personal lives and in the wider political sphere.
Global surveys find that levels of trust have declined in most countries in recent 
decades. We can reinvigorate trust by encouraging honesty and responsibility. And 
trust in turn facilitates both economic transactions and constructive political dia-
logue, not to mention strengthening our sense of community. It is, of course, far 
better to ground our sense of community in trust and shared values than in hostility 
toward others.
A cultural renaissance will not happen overnight – especially in the political 
sphere. If we were to start today pointing out every ethical lapse by political leaders, 
we would have little time for anything else. Yet if we make a start and – import-
antly – are willing to cross political lines in holding officials to some minimal eth-
ical standards (and I personally have been appalled of late by politicians from across 
the political spectrum in my country) then we can slowly through time raise our 
expectations. One critical step is that we decide not to vote for people who do not 
live up to the standards we hold ourselves and our children to. Maybe at first we 
need to vote for the least offensive candidate. A collective message that ethics plays 
a powerful role in our voting decisions can change the way politicians behave.
We have often in this book argued that institutions work best when supported 
by values. The reverse argument also holds. Our efforts to create greater transpar-
ency in government will make it easier to monitor the behaviour of elected officials. 
Moreover, governmental transparency will do much to deflect the powerful but 
misguided idea that politics is inherently murky and thus only scumbags can get 
things done. Politicians often justify ethical lapses on this basis, at least to them-
selves. And voters often sigh and vote for rogues for the same reason. If debate 
happens in the open, and government contracts are awarded openly, and govern-
ment programmes are evaluated objectively, then honesty can more readily triumph 
over deception and deceit.
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Our efforts toward a cultural renaissance must move far beyond the political 
arena. We should also hold entertainers and athletes to ethical standards. These can 
in turn play a critical role in urging ethical behaviour in others. Indeed these might 
potentially do more good in the world by setting an example for their fans than 
by singing or scoring: There may be thousands who could sing or score almost as 
well, but there may be few who can effectively convince others to behave ethically. 
It might be a good start if professional sporting leagues imposed tougher penalties 
for cheating.
If we will collectively urge ethical behaviour, then we should consider moving 
some other ethical values into the ethical core (that is, the set of values that can be 
strongly justified according to each of the five types of evaluation). We might here 
stress open- mindedness, respect for others, and humility. These each receive limited 
support from societal traditions to date. In the political arena, these will encourage 
the sort of respectful discourse on which democracy depends, and which is most 
likely to generate the sort of strategies advocated in this book that can achieve wide 
public support. We could then engage in discussions rather than debates where we 
strive to understand why others disagree with us, and how we can work toward 
consensus. In our daily lives, such values can spare us from inflicting pain on others 
by treating their ideas with disdain or arrogance.
While the benefits of these values may be clear, we tend in both political and 
daily life to prefer people with strong opinions. Those who are flexible are accused 
of being weak or “sitting on the fence.” This may be a fun attitude when friends 
gather to debate which is the best football team, but is harmful in more serious 
conversations. We need to make the obvious point that only a fool refuses to change 
their mind in the light of new information. A politician who changes their mind 
should be allowed to justify this change. Even if they are just reacting to new polling 
data, we can respect that they have shown some intellectual flexibility.
We may each take some pleasure in scoring a debating point (I am guilty, I con-
fess). But we can also take pleasure from learning, and from identifying a solution 
that works for a lot of people. If we internalize values of respect, open- mindedness, 
and humility, then our intuition will guide us away from our baser instinct to crush 
our opponents.
As long as society’s values tilt toward close- mindedness, the open- minded will 
have to tread carefully around the close- minded. The latter can employ a range of 
rhetorical strategies – appeals to emotion, vague definitions, obfuscation, outright 
falsehoods – that will make their arguments appear stronger than they are. The best 
strategy here may be to ask precise questions and patiently insist on very precise 
answers. Yet even then you may appear to lose in the eyes of others just because you 
do not score cheap debating points. If you cannot succeed in drawing the other 
into dialogue, you may then need to focus on outlining your own arguments. (We 
discuss approaches to advocacy in  chapter 6.)
One of life’s little lessons is that arrogance is almost always a mask for insecurity. 
I learned that lesson early in life when thrown into close contact with someone 
I had long disdained at a distance for their arrogance. It became abundantly clear 
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that he was a twisted mass of insecurities who knew no better way of navigating 
life than to project a false confidence and refusal to accept disagreement. It was sad. 
And it was unfortunate not only for those around him but for himself, because he 
was widely thought to be a jerk. A bit of humility would have served him well. This 
need not mean a lack of self- confidence: We can and should project a justifiable 
confidence in our abilities, while recognizing that we always have more to learn 
from others.
We should, more generally, be willing to carefully debate any societal value or 
belief. We may have inherited values and beliefs that are ill- suited to the modern 
world. We should not discard these casually, but should reflect deeply on the role 
they may play in human society. We function in society only because we have shared 
expectations of how others will behave – this is why human societies have cultures – 
and should thus have a healthy wariness of cultural innovation. Yet cultures evolve 
through time, and we should not shy away from trying to guide cultural evolution 
in beneficial directions.
3.2.10 Sense of community
We have urged above a balance between respect for diversity on the one hand and 
respect for a core set of values on the other. This balance may be absolutely critical 
for our sense of community. We need to respect our differences but feel that we 
have some shared values and purpose. Our sense of community will be stronger 
the greater the sense of shared values. Here even simple everyday norms can be 
important: If, for example, we agree on how to greet others (bow, shake hands, 
cheek kiss), we both prevent a lot of needless misunderstanding while forging a 
common bond.
Our sense of community depends critically on how parents raise their children. 
Our respect for diversity encourages parents to pass along cultural practices to their 
children. Yet if we are to be a community, then parents must accept that their chil-
dren will have friends from other groups, and may even date and marry members 
of other groups. Diversity is, after all, advantageous only if we interact with each 
other, learning about other customs, enjoying different cuisines, and participating 
in diverse celebrations. Religion becomes the great challenge here for some reli-
gious traditions are very hostile to the idea of marrying out. We can still encourage 
parents to be as flexible as possible.
3.2.11 An interdisciplinary education
This may seem like a bit of self- flattery coming from a scholar of interdisciplinarity. 
Yet one key premise of this book is that we all need to be able to grapple with 
complexity. Interdisciplinarity encourages us to appreciate how the phenomena 
studied by one set of scholars interacts with the phenomena studied by different 
sets. We have taken great care to explore cross- disciplinary linkages when investi-
gating goals and strategies in  chapters 2 and 3, and will need to do so again when 
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examining trends in the next chapter and surprises in  chapter 5. A public trained 
in interdisciplinary methods can see when experts are biased by their expertise and 
are failing to consider other phenomena. Interdisciplinarity teaches us to be wary of 
expert bias. Importantly, it does so in a way that does not cause us to either ignore 
or vilify expert advice. Rather, we are guided to carefully evaluate the reasons why 
experts might disagree, and seek to integrate the best elements of their insights into 
a more comprehensive understanding. Interdisciplinarity thus teaches both skills 
(systems thinking, evaluation, comparison, integration) and values (respect, con-
structive scepticism, confidence in our own capabilities) that are crucial if demo-
cratic citizens are to constructively engage the complex issues before us.
Decades ago, many philosophers of science argued that science advanced by 
proving or disproving hypotheses. Most philosophers of science now appreciate 
that proof and disproof is impossible. Some then engage nihilism, a belief that we 
have no good basis for choosing one hypothesis over another. Yet most at least 
implicitly recognize that science advances by amassing argument and evidence and 
striving for consensus around certain hypotheses. Interdisciplinarity builds on such 
a belief, arguing that we are best able to have confidence in a hypothesis if it can be 
justified by different methods, data, and disciplinary perspectives. The wider public 
is often frustrated when scientists disagree, and take this as a sign that they know 
nothing. Interdisciplinarians show that disagreement is a step on the way to better 
understanding, but that we each have techniques for understanding the bases of 
disagreement and seeking to transcend this. Citizens need to find a middle path 
between believing everything an expert says and disdaining everything an expert 
says. Interdisciplinarity provides a path for constructive engagement with expert 
advice.
One large strand of the Future Studies literature focuses on providing advice 
to organizations on how they can best navigate the future. That strand strongly 
emphasizes the need to gather a diverse group (usually from both within and 
beyond the organization) and having these engage in conversations about both the 
trends they see in the world and strategies for addressing these. In scaling up this 
idea to society as a whole, interdisciplinarity provides the diversity of viewpoints 
from which we will best be able to plot our way forward.
We mentioned confidence above. It is easy for citizens to feel overwhelmed by 
the complexity of the world. It is then tempting to adopt some ideology or follow 
some charismatic leader, rather than engage the challenging task of identifying 
desirable public policies. This book will hopefully help people to make sense of 
their world, and see how they might usefully participate in discussions with others. 
An interdisciplinary education should further discourage unthinking obedience 
but also nihilism, and encourage us to an open- minded and humble kind of self- 
confidence. Each of us has unique skills and experiences to contribute to public 
discourse, and we will make our best contribution if we are able to integrate the 
understandings of others with our own.
It deserves to be stressed that a good interdisciplinary education will expose 
students to the five types of ethical analysis introduced at the start of  chapter 2. It 
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should then urge students to reflect on what sort of person they want to be. Less 
obviously, an interdisciplinary education should introduce students to the study of 
rhetoric. They should be able to identify different rhetorical strategies, and thus 
develop skills at analysing the true meaning of what others say.
Though most of the interdisciplinary literature focuses on college education, 
interdisciplinarity can usefully infuse elementary and especially secondary educa-
tion. Interdisciplinarity encourages a problem focus rather than a subject focus. This 
can motivate students who otherwise under- appreciate the value of the distinct 
subjects they are taught. Why don’t we teach high school students how to fill out 
income tax forms? This important activity requires a mixture of reading skills and 
algebra skills, and might thus motivate students to pay a bit more attention in both 
language and maths classes.
I have a pet peeve: that we do not relate probability theory (a staple of high 
school maths) to the real world as we could. Here is one example: The occa-
sional instance of people achieving great success despite being born into humble 
circumstances encourages many in the belief that society need not provide greater 
opportunities to the disadvantaged. But we should look at the probabilities: If chil-
dren from some neighbourhoods have only a 5 per cent chance of getting a good 
education or career, then there is clearly scope for public policy or philanthropy 
to improve their chances. We all employ probabilistic analysis in our daily lives (for 
example when choosing the route to work that is likely to be quickest) but need to 
practise consciously applying it to novel situations. A greater facility with probabil-
istic analysis would allow citizens to better appreciate a range of public policy issues 
(including how best to deal with a pandemic). As it is, our public policies sometimes 
simply ignore risks with low probabilities and at other time lavish great attention 
on events that occur rarely (such as terrorist attacks). Psychological experiments 
suggest that our intuitive (subconscious) thought processes grapple poorly with 
questions involving probabilities; it is thus particularly important that we substitute 
conscious applications of probabilistic analysis.
We noted in  chapter 1 that there would be considerable scope for creativity in 
identifying strategies, persuading others of the value of these, and predicting the 
future. Scholars of interdisciplinarity appreciate that there is much scope for cre-
ativity in interdisciplinary analysis. Indeed there is a broad similarity between the 
process of interdisciplinary analysis and the creative process as outlined by experts 
in the two fields. In both cases, one must start with a question (that is, recognize 
a problem or opportunity). One then gathers relevant information. The greatest 
creativity (or interdisciplinary discovery) will generally come from connecting 
quite disparate ideas from quite distinct communities – but there is also a greater 
risk of failure the farther afield one wanders. The act of inspiration will usually 
occur subconsciously – leading to a mistaken sense that such things just happen 
to creative geniuses – but is only possible because the mind has been prepared by 
the previous explorations. Notably, the act of inspiration usually comes while the 
mind is at rest: while we are walking in a park or taking a bath. Some find that 
music or aromas or physical sensations stimulate inspiration. Looking at complex 
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diagrams like the flowcharts used in this book, but with all relevant ideas thrown 
on a page, can also stimulate inspiration. Inspiration, when it comes – and we all 
have moments in life when the solution to some challenge suddenly comes to us – 
is rarely perfect and so we need then to carefully improve it (which will be much 
more likely if we are honest with ourselves). Last but not least, we need to persuade 
others of the value of our creative insight. The histories of both art and science are 
littered with innovations that were not appreciated for decades due to a failure in 
persuasion. Many other great ideas likely disappeared without a trace for the same 
reason. The point of all this is that we can teach people how to be more creative. Beyond 
formally teaching people the steps outlined above, and strategies for each step, we 
can create opportunities within our schools to practise creativity. Like any skill, cre-
ativity improves with practice. And success in small creative activities increases our 
confidence and thus prepares us for creativity on a grander scale. Small children are 
almost always creative, and we need to stop beating creativity out of the bulk of the 
human population in our schools.
Many futurists understandably urge us to teach about the future in our schools. 
Ignorance about the future encourages fear and a focus on the short term, while 
developing an understanding of the future can encourage both personal planning 
and the advocacy of long- term strategies. This book is meant to encourage the goal 
of teaching about the future. Though written with universities in mind, there are 
certainly core ideas that could usefully be communicated in high school. Though 
Future Studies is inherently interdisciplinary, history teachers may find it easiest to 
include elements of the future in their classes, since they already address key trends 
and are accustomed to taking students away from a focus on the present. A course 
about the future could be an invaluable component of degrees in education.
3.3 Interactions among strategies
We have taken great care in selecting strategies that are supportive of multiple goals. 
Special note can be made of how efforts both to enhance democracy and to encourage key 
values have a positive impact on the pursuit of all other goals.
It would be nice at this point to extend Figure 3.1 to cover all of the relationships 
addressed in this chapter, and thus parallel the exhaustive treatment provided in 
Figure 2.1. Such a diagram, though, would be both large and messy. The reader can 
usefully imagine a diagram three or four times the size of Figure 3.1, with arrows 
running all over the place.
Most of the relationships on that diagram would be supportive. We can use-
fully summarize these here (we ignore those that have already been captured in 
Figure 3.1):
• Strategies to enhance economic security, or restore faith in government by 
increasing honesty and transparency, or achieve international collaboration, 
will make it easier to expand carbon taxes.
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• Subsidies for environmentally friendly technological innovation can yield both 
environmental and economic benefits.
• Changes in the way we measure economic prosperity can facilitate the pursuit 
of environmental goals both directly by changing how we measure economic 
success and indirectly by facilitating the pursuit of leisure.
• Improvements in education, health, transport, and many kinds of technology 
have a direct positive impact on individual capabilities and freedoms, at the 
same time as they enhance economic prosperity. Educating about creativity, 
and facilitating part- time work, may be particularly important.
• Institutions that enhance competition pursue both justice and economic 
prosperity.
• Strategies to enhance economic security allow us to better pursue strategies of 
economic flexibility that encourage prosperity. Moreover, they reduce business 
cycles, which may encourage investment and training.
• Strategies that target disadvantaged groups can improve equity and justice (and 
thus sense of community) while enhancing economic prosperity.
• Voluntary strategies to reduce inequality avoid negative impacts on prosperity 
while increasing human happiness.
• Strategies to eliminate undeserved income, and close some tax loopholes, 
enhance justice and prosperity while reducing inequality.
• Public works programmes might enhance prosperity while reducing inequality 
and economic insecurity.
• Strategies to make legal immigration more attractive can enhance justice and 
equality internationally while also enhancing prosperity internationally.
• Strengthening democracy, and especially transparency, can support world peace.
• Strategies for increasing international trade support both peace and prosperity.
• Strategies to reduce inequality and economic insecurity reduce crime also. So 
also will strategies for addressing mental health issues.
• Strategies to collaboratively revisit drug laws may reduce crime rates while 
enhancing the sense of justice and community among those who use drugs 
(and their friends and families).
• We should stress the reciprocal relationship between strategies for encour-
aging ethical behaviour and institutions such as governmental transparency 
that encourage ethical behaviour.
• Education around interdisciplinarity and creativity enhances individual cap-
abilities, and thus supports both democracy and economic prosperity.
In Figure 3.1 we stressed the importance of better decisions around spending. We 
have had cause on several occasions since then to talk about how certain strategies 
might be pursued in a way that minimized their impact on government budgets. 
Some strategies would serve to reduce government expenditures. Since other strat-
egies require government spending, it is absolutely essential that we pursue each 
strategy as efficiently as possible. Though we have not been able to do a careful 
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cost accounting in this chapter, it would appear that the entire suite of strategies 
outlined is eminently affordable – but only if we are careful in implementing them. 
Care in doing so is in turn essential to restoring faith in democratic governance.
Nevertheless, some conflicts between our strategies and certain goals are 
unavoidable. Efforts to enhance the environment can have a moderately nega-
tive effect on certain measures of economic prosperity. In turn, certain types of 
increased economic activity will have negative impacts on the environment. Efforts 
to enhance economic security may decrease the work motive for some, and thus 
have a negative impact on economic prosperity – though increased security may 
have a much greater positive impact on the incentive to invest. Some strategies for 
reducing inequality likewise can have some negative impact on prosperity. Last but 
not least, the ethical challenge of our time pits respect for diversity against respect 
of core values.
Even where conflicts are unavoidable, we can identify strategies that minimize 
the conflict:
• Carbon taxes pose the smallest negative impact on economic prosperity of 
any programme to reduce carbon emissions. They may encourage beneficial 
changes in consumption choices.
• Requiring individuals and firms to donate may limit the negative incentive 
effects of “taxing the rich” while fostering innovations in social policy.
• Public works programmes may minimize the negative incentive effect associated 
with efforts to reduce inequality or enhance economic security, while enhan-
cing prosperity by producing results that people value.
• Justifying a manageable set of core values in terms of each of the five types of 
evaluation limits the conflict with respect for diversity. Importantly, this reduces 
the likelihood of a backlash against respect for diversity. Achieving a balance 
between respect for diversity and respect for core values is critical for our sense 
of community.
Readers should not be too surprised that the positive relationships far outweigh 
the negative relationships – though they should certainly look carefully that this 
result does not reflect authorial bias or naïveté. After all, these strategies were chosen 
with the idea of pursuing a range of goals very much in mind. The conclusion 
I would draw is that we can indeed pursue all of our goals simultaneously.
BOX 3.7: DELPHI AND SIMULATIONS AND GAMES
We noted in  chapter 1 that we would applaud but not apply some methods 
recommended in the Future Studies literature. We can usefully note a couple of 
these here. One approach is mathematical simulation. The challenge here is to 
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reduce the complexities of human interaction to a set of equations. Yet where 
possible, such simulations can give us some idea of the likely effects of certain 
policies, or even a mix of policies.
A quite different approach seeks to identify consensus among some group 
of experts. The most popular method here is the Delphi method (named after 
the ancient Greek Oracle of Delphi, but in fact a modern method). A group of 
experts are asked a series of questions, and their answers are shared anonym-
ously among the group. The same questions are asked again, with participants 
adjusting their answers in response to what others have said. The result is gen-
erally some sort of consensus. This consensus is often nuanced as participants 
take on board ideas and critiques from others. The Delphi method is often 
used in forecasting. There are possible class exercises here. Students might be 
asked to predict the results of any of the strategies discussed in this chapter 
(or other strategies they might suggest). Alternatively, they might be asked 
to choose their favourite three or five strategies. In either case, students will 
learn how others can bring a different perspective to an issue. More broadly, 
students will gain practice in achieving consensus.
The Delphi method may prove particularly valuable if a diverse body of 
experts is surveyed. They can thus bring diverse understandings to bear. And 
the participants then have a greater chance of gaining new insights from 
each other.
The Future Studies literature often also recommends the construction of 
games that can test how some strategy might actually work out in the real 
world. We might, for example, imagine that the class has been randomly 
selected to serve as a citizens’ assembly to address a particular issue. Particular 
students might undertake to provide “expert” advice to the assembly. Such a 
class exercise will serve to familiarize the class both with a particular issue and 
with the challenges and opportunities associated with a citizens’ assembly. As 
with the Delphi method, the results may be particularly intriguing if the class 
is diverse in terms of disciplines or social groups.
Some futurists (see Bibliographic reflections) have recently proposed a 
“backcasting wheel” exercise. We start with a societal goal, and then iden-
tify the changes necessary to achieve that goal. We then identify the changes 
necessary to achieve those changes. They recommend that groups of between 
five and 12 pursue this exercise. The group can identify likely challenges, oppor-
tunities, and signposts of success. Such an exercise can flesh out the analyses in 
this chapter, while preparing students for the challenges and opportunities to 
be addressed in the next – and for identifying elements of a complex societal 
project beyond those discussed in this book.
The backcasting wheel is a twist on the “future wheel” exercise that we will 
address in the next chapter. This involves diagramming the effects of trends 
going forward. A similar exercise can be performed for any strategy. What are 
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the likely effects of any strategy? How do these interact? What are the effects 
of the effects? How do these interact? Some (groups of) students may perform 
this exercise for one strategy and then integrate their diagram with an analysis 




4.1 How to identify plausible futures
We should begin by recalling two important points that we made in the intro-
ductory chapter. First, we simply cannot predict the future with great accuracy. 
Attempts to do so in the past have been very hit- and- miss. Not surprisingly, most 
forecasters get some things right but others wrong. We can, though, predict plaus-
ible futures. That is, we can project some existing trends into the future and imagine 
what the world would look like in a few years if these continued. Since the world 
is complex, we should try to look for trends across diverse phenomena and imagine 
how these might interact. We should doubt that the future will unfold exactly 
along the lines of any plausible future we may outline – in part because each trend 
is unpredictable, and in part because there will also be surprises (see next chapter). 
Yet we can be confident that the future will bear some important resemblance to at 
least some of the plausible futures we might identify.
Second, we can then investigate how we might nudge plausible futures toward 
the desirable futures that we wish. The great advantage of identifying plausible 
futures is that we can then essay to accentuate the characteristics of those futures 
that we like while mitigating their negative features. We will be far better able to 
bend our actual future to our collective will if we have thought in advance about 
how to deal with plausible futures.
One problem here is that humans value certainty and thus are attracted to 
prognosticators who pretend to an unattainable degree of confidence regarding the 
shape of the future. The laws of probability suggest that, if there is a sufficiently large 
body of forecasters operating fairly independently, one or two of these will just by 
chance get most of their predictions right. They may then be hailed as visionaries, 
but are highly unlikely to be able to reproduce this success in the next time period. 
Beware of those who predict the future with extreme conviction – even if they 
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have had some success in the past with predictions. It may be even more dangerous, 
though, to give up on trying to see into the future at all.
Our first task in this chapter is to identify trends that might reasonably be 
expected to extend into the future. As in the preceding chapter, we benefit from 
having a finite (but large) set of phenomena for which we can attempt to discern 
trends. We will proceed to identify a set of plausible trends.
Second, our interest in interactions leads us to ask whether the trends we have 
identified are likely to be supported or discouraged in future by interactions with 
other phenomena. Will existing trends in climate be exacerbated or attenuated by 
political and economic interactions? We will combine these first two stages of ana-
lysis as we discuss particular trends below.
We should appreciate that even in our world of change, some things do not 
change. We continue in most countries to drive on the same side of the road as 
our grandparents did. If we could be frozen in time for three decades, we would 
almost certainly awake in a world that was similar enough to our own that we could 
navigate it. We will not in this chapter enumerate the many ways in which society 
will likely change little (though note that changing little is still a trend of sorts), 
but readers should keep in mind that the trends we discuss must also interact with 
phenomena that do not change (much).
We should note here that systems thinking lies at the heart of the field of Future 
Studies. There is a shared assumption in the field that all phenomena are related, at 
least indirectly, to other phenomena. There is much talk of systems within systems 
(or systems- of- systems): that some subsets of phenomena interact powerfully with 
each other but more weakly with other phenomena. It makes sense, then, when 
investigating any one phenomenon, to ask which other phenomena it interacts most 
with, but not to lose sight of others which may occasionally exert an important 
influence (this will generally require a very interdisciplinary approach). We may not 
always have to worry about the effects of epidemics on economic output, but we 
should be prepared for instances where the effect looms large. There is a common 
recognition within Future Studies that the analysis of systems often generates sur-
prising and counter- intuitive results. We should be aware, then, that trends may 
unfold quite differently in future than in the past due to interactions with other 
phenomena. Of course, this simple fact makes predicting the future even more chal-
lenging. It is therefore even more important to do it right.
BOX 4.1: EMERGENCE
Properties may emerge from a system of interactions that are difficult to under-
stand in terms of the phenomena that interact within the system. For example, 
we do not fully understand how “life” emerges from the set of biological 
interactions among organs in any lifeform. Systems theorists often speak, then, 
of “emergence.” It could be that “sense of community” emerges from a complex 
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set of interactions in a way that is hard to attribute to particular phenomena. If 
so, it will be almost impossible to predict such emergence in advance. We will 
therefore recognize our limitations here and stick to the more prosaic task of 
discussing particular relationships among phenomena in what follows.
Third, we can close the chapter by investigating plausible futures. This will 
involve contemplating combinations of the trends we have investigated in turn. 
We will have a particular interest in trends in different phenomena that seem to be 
mutually reinforcing.
There are a few points emphasized in the literature that we should keep in mind 
as we proceed:
• We are limited in our ability to do reliable quantitative forecasts. These are gen-
erally only possible for some phenomena and short time periods.
• We should seek to identify both good and bad trends: That is, we need to 
examine trends that lead us toward desirable futures and trends that lead us 
away. We can then seek to foster the first kind and disrupt the second.
• We should not limit our attention to trends narrowly defined. It is equally 
valuable to identify phenomena for which cyclical behaviour is likely in future 
(such as business cycles).
• We should be alert to the likelihood that trends may be incompatible: If two trends 
cannot coexist, which is likelier to dominate and what are the plausible outcomes?
• We should always ask if/ when a trend is likely to end. This is especially 
important for trends that are occurring at an increasing rate, for exponential 
trends cannot proceed forever. People are, but should not be, surprised when 
an exponential trend ends. Nevertheless, we should worry about exponential 
trends for, while they continue, they can have disruptive effects on society.
• If we are incorporating commitments made by leaders in our projections, we 
should ask if these are plausible. It would be foolhardy to simply assume that 
governments will hit their carbon emissions targets, for example.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
How confident can we be that a particular trend will continue? How confi-
dently can we predict how fast the trend will develop over time? Will there be 
cycles within the trend? What phenomena will the trend interact with? How 
will these interactions affect the trend? Will the trend end at some point? Is the 
trend good or bad or mixed in its effects? How might we act to enhance the 
good and limit the bad?
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4.2 Particular trends
4.2.1 Climate
It will get warmer. And then warmer still. Maybe not every year or every place, 
but the trend is upward for the foreseeable future. This is perhaps the safest predic-
tion in this whole book. It is now abundantly clear – even to millions who were 
nay- sayers just a decade ago – that the world’s climate is warming at a historically 
unprecedented rate. There are no obvious natural causes of such a trend – the sun 
is burning about as hot as ever and the earth is orbiting much as it always has – and 
good theoretical reasons to believe that carbon dioxide and methane emitted by 
human activity is preventing heat from escaping the atmosphere. It’s possible that 99 
per cent of climate scientists might be wrong, but it is extremely unlikely.
We can also safely assume that at some point before we make the planet unlive-
able, governments will get serious about limiting carbon emissions. While we 
can despair of the sluggishness with which governments around the world have 
addressed climate change to date, we can take some solace in the fact that there 
have at least been international agreements, targets, some carbon pricing, many 
incentives for renewable energy innovation, and more. Some groundwork has been 
laid on which more determined efforts can build. There is some chance that we 
will wait too long to act decisively and will find the damage irreversible. It is prob-
ably more likely that we will wait long enough that action is feasible but far more 
expensive than if we had acted earlier. At some point, then, climate change will 
become so oppressive that governments are forced to act, and after some period of 
time temperatures will stop rising. It may even prove possible to pull temperatures 
back downward by reducing carbon in the atmosphere.
The rise in temperature is a trend that will end. It will end either because 
humans act to stop it, or because climate change acts to erase humans. Our efforts 
in this book will be more useful in the first scenario.
When will governments get their act together? How bad do things have to get 
before they act? One challenge here is a risk that the rate of climate change might 
increase dramatically due to positive feedback loops: Melting glaciers means that less 
sunlight is reflected back into space; melting permafrost releases methane into the 
atmosphere, which enhances global warming; climate changes may destroy forests 
in some regions that serve as a store of carbon. Another challenge is that climate 
change may proceed at different rates and with different effects in different coun-
tries. As luck would have it, Africa has seen more rapid increases in temperature of 
late than other continents. This is unfortunate in many ways. Climate change has its 
most dramatic effect on agriculture, and African economies rely more on agricul-
ture than is the case on other continents. Most African countries are poor, and thus 
limited in their ability to help farmers impoverished by climate change. If African 
governments are the ones with the greatest motive to fight climate change, they 
are also the ones that can have the least effect, for Africa contributes a whopping 2 
per cent of global carbon emissions. There is, of course, a global injustice that the 
continent that contributes the least to climate change would suffer the most from it.
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Canada might find slightly warmer temperatures not such a bad thing. Other 
countries might also find that they are spared the worst ravages of climate change 
for some time. Still other countries – like those in Africa – who suffer from climate 
change might appeal to the sense of duty and justice of those that are spared. I do 
not like their chances. International cooperation in fighting climate change may be 
hard to achieve.
It is hard to predict the precise regional impacts of climate change. Changing 
temperatures cause changes in wind patterns and probably ocean currents. Some 
regions will become hotter and wetter. Some will likely become hotter and drier. 
Some may become cooler. Climate change has weakened the jet stream and some-
times allowed polar air to slip farther south in both North America and Eurasia than 
it usually does, into regions ill- prepared for snow and ice. [This paragraph was first 
drafted before winter storms devastated much of Texas in March of 2021.] Beyond 
its effect on averages, climate change appears to increase climate variability: sharper 
seasons, and more nasty storms.
It should be appreciated that rainfall patterns may change – due to deforestation 
and urbanization, among other things – even if temperature stabilizes. The lesson 
here is that carbon is not the only threat to complex ecosystems.
Hotter and drier may turn farms into deserts, a process that has been proceeding 
for decades south of the Sahara. In many other regions, farmers will have to 
change their crops to reflect climatic change. This is quite feasible, for humanity 
has bred crops to grow in a wide range of climatic conditions, but will require 
that farmers learn a new set of crop- specific skills. We can expect agricultural 
productivity to decline temporarily during such transitions. And we may need 
to develop new strains of crops that are better accustomed to heat. Last but not 
least, we should appreciate that humans cannot work as hard in hot and humid 
temperatures: This means that not just farmers but construction workers and a 
host of others that spend much of the workday outside will be less productive as 
temperatures rise.
Climate change will have a less dramatic effect outside of agriculture, but will 
force factories, stores, and offices to spend more on air conditioning. The usage 
of air conditioning has been expanding for decades in developed countries and is 
becoming increasingly common in developing countries. Air conditioning presents 
two environmental challenges of its own: It requires a lot of energy, and the coolants 
used contribute to the weakening of the ozone layer (which may be responsible for 
increased rates of skin cancer in southern Chile). (Recall from above that we can 
design buildings to reduce the need for air conditioning.)
Climate change appears to increase the frequency of hurricanes, and perhaps 
tornadoes and even blizzards. Hurricanes already cause billions and billions of 
dollars in damages with some regularity, and this toll can be expected to increase 
with climate change. Climate change will also cause a slow but steady rise in sea 
levels as polar icecaps melt (This trend is mitigated a bit by increased evaporation.) 
This will cause costly evacuations or efforts to build sea walls in many parts of the 
world. We will return to the question of climate “surprises” in the next chapter.
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We have noted in  chapter 3 that efforts to prevent climate change may impose 
moderate costs in terms of economic prosperity. We cannot stress too much here 
that failure to stop climate change will impose huge costs on future economic pros-
perity. It is hard to quantify these costs. It seems clear, nevertheless, that the disease is 
indeed far worse than the cure: Failure to address climate change will cost far more 
than efforts to address it will.
We can again recognize that there will be transition costs as both consumers and 
producers shift from oil and coal to other sources of energy. These can be mitigated 
if we develop better alternatives. Some futurists predict that the costs of renewable 
energy will fall below the costs of non- renewable energy over the next decades. If so, 
this would render the transition away from carbon emissions relatively painless for 
most of society (we should recognize that carbon is an ingredient in some industrial 
processes such as steelmaking, not just a source of energy; also methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions are important sources of climate change). One potential challenge 
here is that one country, China, has come to dominate both the mining of “rare 
earths” essential to modern battery technology (and many electronic devices) and 
the production of solar panels and wind turbines. It may be prudent to encourage 
greater diversity in sources of both raw materials (“rare earths” are not all that rare, 
though they are expensive to mine) and finished products – though this may occur 
naturally as demand increases.
We might also worry about political disruption in countries that rely heavily on 
exports of oil or coal or natural gas. The political turmoil that has gripped Venezuela 
in recent years owes much to the decline in the price of the oil that it sells on world 
markets. That turmoil may be a harbinger of things to come in countries such as 
Saudi Arabia or Russia that also depend heavily on energy exports.
There are also non- economic costs of climate change. Humans are generally less 
healthy in hot and humid climates. Humans have less energy for a wide range of 
entertainments when hot. Our collective faith in democratic governance will suffer 
grievously if governments continue to fumble their response to climate change. 
There is now a large majority in favour of doing something in most countries, but 
that shared purpose has not translated into successful action.
We should not be too disheartened. As we have said earlier, governments have 
succeeded in limiting certain types of local air and water pollution. Globally, the 
world has succeeded in arresting the process of ozone layer depletion. We are not 
necessarily incapable of action. And we have outlined in the preceding chapter a 
set of strategies that can be followed if governments have the motivation to do so.
4.2.2 Population, disease, and nutrition
Just a few decades ago there were widespread concerns about a population explo-
sion that would soon outstrip the planet’s ability to feed people. Those concerns 
have receded as population has stabilized or even declined across much of the 
world. Population in the vast majority of countries is now expected to stop growing 
during this century. Concern is now localized and focused on several countries 
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in the Middle East and Africa where population growth rates remain very high 
(though even there these rates have declined significantly).
A handful of factors have contributed to declining birth rates in most of 
the world:
• Urbanization (so that children can no longer perform productive tasks on 
farms for their parents).
• Public education, and laws requiring children to go to school (which again 
reduce the ability of children to work and contribute to family income. 
Moreover, parents who want their children to excel at school may have fewer 
children so that they can focus their efforts on these).
• Pension plans and other social programmes that reduce the reliance of the eld-
erly on children for support.
• Maybe the range of alternative goods and services for parents to spend 
income on.
• Perhaps most of all increased female decision- making power within families, 
which in turn reflects female education and employment.
• Industrial chemicals that are shown to reduce fertility, especially in men, have 
been released into our air and water. The effect these have had on birth rates is 
hard to estimate, but there is a possibility that fertility rates could fall dramatic-
ally in future if we do not reduce chemical emissions.
It seems likely that all of these trends will continue. Population decline is indu-
cing some countries to use public policies to encourage childbearing, but subsidies 
for childbearing must generally be very high to counteract these other forces. One 
big question is whether female power will grow rapidly in those countries that still 
have rapid population growth. People who remain concerned about global popula-
tion growth are advised to support educational programmes for women in certain 
countries in the Middle East and Africa.
How might we evaluate population growth? In terms of consequences, we can 
still worry about pressure on the earth’s limited resources. Though prices of both 
food and natural resources have generally fallen even while population has risen – 
we have grown more or mined faster than demand has risen – this happy outcome 
need not last forever. There have indeed been sharp spikes in the price of food 
in recent years that have suggested to some that we are getting closer to resource 
constraints – though output per person and per acre is still far lower in developing 
countries than in developed countries. Within countries it appears that moderate 
rates of population growth – below about 2 per cent – have no impact on the rate 
of growth in per capita incomes, but population growth higher than that does have 
a negative impact.
What about population decline? We have had little human experience of slow 
rates of population decline: These have bad effects such as decreasing markets 
for local firms but may have advantages in terms of spreading capital and natural 
resources and infrastructure over fewer people. Though childrearing brings pleasure 
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(but surely not every minute of childrearing!), parents and societies are both happiest 
when children are healthy and happy and face promising futures. Declining rates of 
childbirth may be associated with increased levels of happiness, especially among 
women, who bear the costs of childbirth. Values and beliefs around both personal 
and social responsibility can encourage parents to limit the number of children to 
those that can be cared for. Perhaps most importantly, though, a decision to have 
a child is one of the most important that most humans ever make. Governments 
may strive to encourage or discourage the choice but should be incredibly wary of 
explicitly limiting it.
Disease
At the same time that population has been rising, human health and life expect-
ancies have been improving almost everywhere in the world. These results have 
reflected both an increase in average nutritional levels and a decrease in disease 
incidence. Both of these trends are likely to continue. Medical science continues 
to develop new ways of treating disease. And as poor countries grow rich, they 
can spend more on healthcare. Yet there are risks. New diseases may emerge, such 
as COVID- 19, that healthcare systems struggle to cope with (see  chapter 5). And 
healthcare systems in most of the developed world are under financial strain.
One major source of this financial strain is population ageing. Birth rates were 
unusually high in the decades right after the Second World War in most developed 
countries. Most developed countries as a result have a very high and growing pro-
portion of elderly citizens. And healthcare costs are much higher for the elderly. 
Population ageing is no surprise: Every year, without exception, people get a year 
older. Governments have nevertheless uniformly failed to plan well for it – since 
politicians and bureaucrats are incentivized to deal with today’s problems more 
than tomorrow’s. We can reasonably anticipate that healthcare costs must rise as 
the postwar “baby boom” generation ages. Healthcare costs may then fall after this 
unusually large generation passes away, though we can anticipate that life expectan-
cies will continue to rise and thus there will always be a greater proportion of the 
aged than in the past.
Public health systems could save some money by only performing procedures 
that have been shown to be effective. At present, in many countries, operations 
are performed that on average do no good: They may extend the patient’s life 
by a couple of months, but alternatively the patient may die from complications 
due to the operation itself. Some have estimated that a third of procedures do no 
good on average. Procedures that are not known to be beneficial should only be 
pursued as part of a recognized research programme. We might also make tougher 
decisions about whether it makes sense to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
on a treatment that can only be expected on average to extend a life by a couple 
of months, especially if the quality of life is poor. Politicians and bureaucrats nat-
urally shy away from such decisions – at least from making them transparently and 
openly – but society as a whole should be willing to make such decisions. It may 
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seem heartless, but we should reflect on what else could be done with that kind of 
money: Feeding hungry children with the same amount of money may accomplish 
far more good, for example.
We have elsewhere proposed citizens’ assemblies to address issues that politicians 
avoid, and that mingle practical and ethical concerns. Can a citizens’ assembly estab-
lish rules on which procedures to pay for from public funds, which will in many 
cases involve putting a price on the value of any extension in life to be expected? 
Or will even a citizens’ assembly prove squeamish? Is this a place to rely heavily 
on expert advice? Doctors are accustomed to making life- and- death decisions, but 
may be biased against defunding medical procedures.
BOX 4.2: PRICING LIFE
Many people cringe at the very idea of putting a price on life. Yet governments 
already need to do so in making a host of decisions. Should we turn a busy 
intersection into a traffic interchange? One of the key benefits will be the lives 
saved in traffic accidents, and we can only decide whether the benefits exceed 
the costs by putting a price on the lives saved. Decisions about drug regu-
lation, environmental protection, sporting rules, and a wide range of other 
endeavours also involve placing some value on human life. This is often not 
done explicitly, and thus the actual values attached to human life differ mark-
edly across different government activities. This leads to large inefficiencies in 
government expenditure (spending hundreds of millions to save a life in one 
area but only a million in another). We would thus be much better off if we 
faced up to reality and had one official governmental price on life – which 
would vary by age, and would likely increase over time as we become more 
prosperous – that would guide all government decisions. This can be seen 
as a particular kind of governmental transparency, and a reminder of why 
governments often avoid transparency.
Economists estimate that people in the United States place an average value 
on life of about $10 million, based on how much they are willing to spend on 
things like smoke detectors. Yet such an estimate was only rarely mentioned 
in debates about whether it was worthwhile shutting businesses to cope with 
the COVID- 19 outbreak. When estimates were that 2 million people might 
die from an unchecked outbreak, it clearly did make sense to shutter much 
of the economy if this could dramatically decrease mortality within a reason-
able time frame, whereas it does not make sense for the much lower fatality 
associated with the seasonal flu. (We will address the important question of 
whether alternative approaches might have lowered fatalities at a lower cost 
in the next chapter.)
While we must put a price on life for practical reasons, we need not and 
should not abandon a broader philosophical appreciation that each life is 
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precious. We would not, for example, allow a rich person to pay $10 million 
for the right to kill another. There is a broader lesson here, pursued throughout 
this book: We should pursue economic policies that can provide us with the 
best balance among prosperity, equality, security, and environment. However, 
we should not allow the values that guide economic decision- making, where 
competitiveness and selfishness serve economic goals well, to infuse our entire 
society. Adam Smith reminded us centuries ago that our sustenance depends 
on the self- interest rather than the kindness of our butcher and baker (sorry, 
vegetarians; it was a different time). Yet in our families and communities, we 
need our butcher and baker to be collaborative and compassionate. We are 
all economic agents, but we are all much more than that, and we each need 
to reflect on our full range of goals in order to behave appropriately in each 
aspect of our lives.
Healthcare costs also rise due to technology. Many of the drugs and treatments 
developed by modern medical research are expensive to administer. Governments 
might tweak their research funding supports to encourage the search for less 
expensive interventions. Some technologies may in future reduce healthcare 
costs: Information technology in particular may reduce the cost of diagnosis and 
the likelihood of misdiagnosis.
There is a final reason why healthcare costs rise as a proportion of total eco-
nomic output. Healthcare – and education – is a service that relies on face- to- face 
contact. We have come up with less expensive ways to produce most of the goods 
we consume but have not yet replaced the face- to- face delivery of medical ser-
vices. We should thus not be too shocked that healthcare absorbs an increasing 
share of society’s resources. There is some chance that technology will change this. 
People already feed their symptoms into online medical tools that can diagnose 
some ailments. (Online tools can also be very useful in some spheres of education.) 
The practice of family physicians may therefore be transformed so that they can 
concentrate on the most complicated cases, or at least those where symptoms can 
only be observed in person. Robots may one day replace emergency room doctors, 
but that is likely a far more distant prospect.
The danger to be avoided is that we make unwise cuts to healthcare expend-
iture. We should, as noted above, take steps to make sure that healthcare dollars are 
allocated wisely. However, we should not insist on doggedly keeping healthcare 
expenditures constant when there are understandable forces driving them upward.
Finally but importantly, we should as societies focus more on disease preven-
tion. If we are successful in improving the environment, especially in cities, we 
will improve health outcomes. Likewise, if we can change attitudes that encourage 
obesity and drug abuse, we will achieve much better health outcomes. We tend to 
see health as a problem for healthcare systems rather than seeing it as subject to 
diverse influences within a broader system.
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Ageing
We recognized above that populations are ageing in most developed countries, and 
discussed some strategies for addressing the healthcare needs of the elderly. It is 
useful to briefly consider some interactions between ageing and other phenomena:
• Most obviously, both governments and private pension plans should prepare 
for a future in which more people claim pension benefits. We have actuaries 
who estimate the contributions that are necessary now in order to fund future 
pensions. One problem is that both governments and private plans fail to meet 
actuarial targets. This should not be allowed. (It should be a crime, by the 
way, for a firm to raid its pension plan, but this happens all too often.) Public 
pension liabilities as determined by actuaries should be considered to be part of 
the government’s debt. A second challenge is that actuaries need to predict the 
rate of return that the pension plan will earn on its investments. If the actuaries 
are too optimistic, pension plan operators are tempted to gamble on riskier 
investments in order to avoid having to raise contributions. There should be 
transparency about the amount of risk that pension plans take on. A third 
challenge is that governments may be tempted to “invest” pension plan assets 
in pet projects. This should be recognized as an effort both to avoid transpar-
ency and scrutiny and to risk money that is not the government’s to allocate.
• While technological innovation has tended to raise the cost of healthcare, there 
are a set of innovations that may lower the cost of caring for the elderly. Smart 
homes may make it easier for the elderly to stay in their own homes. The 
internet makes it easier to hire the help they need when they need it. Robots 
may someday soon be able to socialize with the elderly.
• Still, ageing may have a beneficial impact on employment precisely because 
the elderly need assistance for many tasks. This employment effect will depend, 
of course, on pension plans or government subsidies being robust enough to 
allow the elderly to purchase the services they need.
• In most human societies in history, a small number of elderly have played 
an esteemed role in society, being sought out for their wisdom. They have 
often played an important role in the education of the young. We will be 
better able to (afford to) care for the elderly if these can play productive roles 
in society. Innovative programmes that place old and young in contact show 
much promise. And the elderly are more likely to remain happy and alert if 
they have useful roles to play.
Nutrition
Though there are still roughly a billion humans who do not get enough food to eat, 
that number reflects a dramatic improvement over the last decades (the dislocations 
associated with COVID- 19 have pushed that number upward, hopefully tempor-
arily). Food output has increased much faster globally than population. Transport 
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costs have fallen so that it is easier to get food to hungry people. And incomes have 
increased in most poor countries so that the poor can better afford food. This latter 
trend can be expected to continue in the absence of a major economic downturn 
(see below). The major danger on the nutrition front is thus that food output does not 
continue to rise faster than population. It must seem, though, that there is still much 
scope for increased production, especially in poorer countries. Both mechanization 
and chemical fertilizers could lead to increased output. Farmers should respond to 
higher demand by increasing production. Research on tropical crops may yield far 
better seeds – as research on rice and wheat and other temperate crops has done in 
preceding decades. There is also much that could be done to reduce food waste: As 
much as a third of the food that is produced in the world is thrown out rather than 
eaten (solutions include better storage, and giving slightly damaged foods to the poor 
or animals). But such transitions are not easy. And it could be that the easiest advances 
in agricultural technology have already been achieved. While a severe global food 
shortage seems highly unlikely, prudence calls for efforts to improve our agricultural 
technology. Prudence also suggests that we should pay more attention to poten-
tial dangers: that our use of chemical fertilizers may slowly deplete soil fertility, that 
pesticides and intensive farming may eradicate insects essential for pollination, or that 
increased homogeneity of the seeds used by farmers may expose us to the greater 
risk of a major crop disease. Governments are, it should be noted, insuring against the 
latter calamity by storing seeds that have been used in the past. Note, though, that it 
would still be costly to reintroduce old seeds on a large scale.
Climate change may have dramatic impacts on food output. These are hard to 
predict precisely. Climate change leads to changes in weather patterns. These have 
included, it seems, decreases in the power of the jet stream that normally separates 
arctic air from temperate air, with the result that arctic air has occasionally plunged 
much farther south than usual (an occurrence that gives climate change sceptics 
much to tweet about). So we cannot know precisely which areas will be afflicted 
by drought and which by flooding. Many areas may benefit from increased heat and 
humidity while others will suffer from those changes. Sadly, the tropics, home of 
most of the world’s poorest, may suffer the most from rising temperatures. The pru-
dent policy, of course, is to arrest climate change early. If not, the world may need 
to be prepared to see mass movements in crops and peoples.
There may be localized nutrition crises if food is not transported to people in 
need. Ironically, though, the best strategy in such a case may be to give those people 
money rather than food, for this will encourage local food production.
Looking ahead, the greater global calamity may be a shortage of water rather 
than food. It is harder to expand the world’s supply of drinking water. And climate 
change will likely yield dramatic changes in how rainfall is distributed across the 
world – though overall rainfall is likely to increase with increased humidity levels. 
Salt water is abundant, and desalinization plants are a proven technology in some 
dry countries. But desalinization is not cheap, and some dry areas may be a long way 
from salt water. Drilling for water may be possible but subterranean aquifers have 
limited capacity. We may need to either move people or pipe water long distances.
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4.2.3 War
Past trends in war- making are diverse. The two World Wars of the twentieth century 
were the deadliest in human history (in terms of total deaths, though the Mongol 
invasions of the Middle Ages may have killed a greater proportion of the world’s 
population). Yet there has been a downward trend since the Second World War in 
wartime fatalities. There has also been a downward trend in the total number of 
inter- state wars over the last few centuries. And some parts of the world – most of 
the Americas and Europe – have not seen war on their soil in decades. Yet there 
have still been horrific conflicts in many parts of the world in recent years, where 
civilian death tolls have often been in the millions: Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, 
Congo, and more.
One likely reason for the downward trend in fatalities in recent years has been 
the nuclear deterrent. Countries are naturally wary of attacking another that might 
respond with nuclear weapons. Yet this benefit comes with the risk that some future 
war might involve nuclear weapons, and this could be devastating and even apoca-
lyptic. This risk has risen in recent years with the fear that non- state terror groups 
might gain access to nuclear weapons. They might calculate that it is harder to 
retaliate against them with nuclear weaponry. States, that is, refrain from employing 
nuclear weapons out of fear of retaliation, but terror groups are dispersed among 
other populations. There is always also the chance that one country will gain a 
technological advantage that either accentuates their first- strike capability or limits 
retaliation; they might then seize the opportunity to attack. The possibility of some 
much deadlier future conflict can thus hardly be ignored.
Steps have been taken and could continue to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. 
This can reduce the risk of an accidental war where some missile is fired by error 
and triggers retaliation. However, countries will not eliminate nuclear arsenals as 
long as fear of retaliation remains an important deterrent. We can only eliminate 
the risk of nuclear war, then, by achieving a stable world peace. As we saw in 
 chapter 3, this will require acceptance of – and adherence to – a set of international 
institutions, as well as a high degree of cultural toleration.
Travel is enjoyable in large part because of cultural differences (and more travel 
by more people might serve to make us see cultural diversity as a good thing). Yet 
it is useful to recognize that the modern traveller can also see much that is similar 
in most parts of the world: similar markets, similar goods and services, similar trans-
port infrastructure, similar TV shows, similar medicines, and so on. It remains to be 
seen whether the many similarities in daily life encourage a greater sense of our 
common humanity. We might even appreciate that all countries celebrate their his-
tories, anthems, and flags in very similar ways.
We also mentioned democratization in  chapter 3, and noted that democratic 
countries are far less likely to go to war with each other than authoritarian coun-
tries. Democratization has likely been another reason that wars have become less 
common and smaller in scale in recent decades. In Europe, focal point of the 
deadliest wars of the twentieth century (though we should not forget that tens of 
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millions died in Asia too), democratic governments forged a lasting peace. But the 
dramatic expansion of democracy stalled in the earliest twenty- first century. Not 
only did fewer countries move toward democracy but authoritarian tendencies 
emerged across many democracies.
The various reforms urged in the preceding chapter to reinvigorate democracy 
are the best single way to encourage the further spread of democracy. Democracies 
that set a good example inspire imitation. Democracies that seem unable to grapple 
with the world’s challenges make it too easy for authoritarians to claim that they 
can do a better job.
There is also much scope for greater honesty in foreign policy. During the 
Cold War, it was common for countries on both sides, including democracies, to 
prop up dictators that they liked. Such strategies naturally struck residents of the 
dictatorships in question as hypocritical, and caused them to doubt the value of 
democracy. Though the Cold War has ended (but global tensions remain), dictators 
may still be supported by democracies in order to keep terrorists at bay. We should 
appreciate that such a strategy makes democratization much harder to achieve. 
Democracies should stand ready to support democratic movements in authori-
tarian states. They should make it clear that they wish to see democracy everywhere. 
They should seek peaceful relationships with authoritarian states, but urge these to 
democratize. If there are rare cases in which it is thought desirable to aid an authori-
tarian, the pragmatic reasons for doing so should be made explicit, with apologies 
to the citizens of the country in question.
BOX 4.3: THE COMPLEXITY OF SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY
There may have been an opportunity to support democracy in the earliest days 
of the Syrian civil war, but hesitation to do so allowed authoritarians and reli-
gious extremists to seize the day. People risked their lives in the name of dem-
ocracy, and were largely ignored by the outside world. Nobody can deny that 
this was a complex situation, but it is hard to argue that if a different strategy 
had been pursued things could have turned out worse than they did. And note 
that the failure to act in Syria will discourage others from risking their lives for 
democracy elsewhere.
It must be appreciated, nevertheless, that efforts to install democracy mili-
tarily have proved challenging in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Part of the 
problem may have been a distrust of the motives of occupying forces. Much of 
it, though, reflected the reality on the ground of a lack of sense of community, 
or experience of democracy, or toleration of other groups in the same country. 
These cannot be created overnight. The difference in Syria is that a group of 
democrats had gained credibility by standing up to an autocrat. We will never 
know if they could have gained support across ethnic and religious lines.
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It is getting ever harder to do foreign policy in secret. News speeds around the 
world. And NGOs operate globally that put pressure on governments to behave 
themselves. It is a good thing that it is harder for governments to act in a way 
that does not accord with their stated principles. Governments have been slow to 
respond to this new environment. Democracies are still willing to ignore authori-
tarian atrocities if they can benefit by selling military weapons to the authori-
tarian in question. We need to recognize that our foreign policy should reflect our 
principles. And democracies should be willing to shame other democracies that 
deviate.
Prudence demands that we try to encourage democracy and respect for inter-
national institutions. Sadly, it also demands that we prepare for war. International 
tensions might be exacerbated by climate change (imagine millions fleeing drought 
or rising sea levels), another pandemic, economic contraction, or a host of other 
phenomena. We should not be surprised by war, and will return to the question of 
war in  chapter 5.
4.2.4 Decreased faith in democracy
We mentioned democracy in the preceding section. We spent much time in 
 chapter 3 discussing strategies to restore faith in democracy. It should be stressed 
here that without some such efforts, confidence in democracy is quite likely to 
further erode. Distrust feeds on itself for a variety of reasons. For one, all humans 
tend to incorporate new information into pre- existing conceptions of reality. If we 
have decided that governments are not acting in our best interests, then any news 
of imperfections in government services serves to reinforce our opinion, while we 
ignore examples of government competence. Major crises – like the COVID- 19 
pandemic – may serve to temporarily restore some faith in government, for it will 
be hard to ignore any competent acts in such a situation. Yet even there the inevit-
able misjudgements along the way may stick in memory more.
We have stressed previously that faith in democracy depends in large part on 
confidence in government programmes. Once voters become convinced that 
governments are wasteful, they will take every example of waste as further proof 
of their conviction. They will disdain attempts to create new programmes – or 
even to reform existing programmes – even if these might in the long run restore 
some confidence in government. A lack of confidence in government may lead to 
underfunding (think here of crumbling public infrastructure in many parts of the 
world), which serves to further decrease confidence in government. Such positive 
feedback loops can lead to a steady deterioration in confidence in (and quality of) 
government programmes through time.
Distrust in democratic discourse encourages extreme partisanship and disres-
pect for the views of others (which not surprisingly often pits those who have 
lost confidence in government against those who seem to embrace every possible 
government programme). This too is self- reinforcing, for humans naturally respond 
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to disrespect with disrespect. The more that people do not attempt to understand 
others, the more they will vilify them. Democracy simply ceases to function if 
voters disrespect other voters. There has to be some shared sense of purpose to 
guide a democracy. If you come to think that a vast chunk of the electorate are 
moronic or evil, then an authoritarian who shares your enlightened perspective 
may seem like a good idea.
Extreme partisanship encourages politicians to attack the institutions on which 
democracy depends. If your opponents are evil then you (and your supporters) 
can justify filling the courts with biased judges, limiting freedom of the press, and 
filling the bureaucracy with loyalists. You can even justify efforts to make it hard 
for your opponents’ supporters to vote, draw constituency boundaries that limit 
their electoral success, and perhaps encourage electoral fraud. Such strategies will of 
course encourage your opponents to vilify you in turn and believe that they cannot 
achieve success through democratic means. Democracy has been eviscerated in sev-
eral countries in recent decades through such strategies.
A downward trend in our shared belief in democracy can easily be reinforced by 
other trends. Economic downturns can directly encourage doubts about the cap-
abilities of governments. Unemployment can encourage contempt for others who 
might compete for our jobs or seem to have access to better jobs. Technological 
innovations that benefit some more than others can also exacerbate tensions. Ditto 
changes in trade flows. As noted above, failure to address climate change in a timely 
manner will call democratic governance into question. Indeed, almost any change 
in the wider world has the potential to inflame partisan tensions once a shared sense 
of purpose has evaporated. And we live in a world of change.
We might worry particularly about further increases in inequality. At the bottom 
end, those who see their incomes declining – even just relatively to others – are far 
more likely to feel that the system is unfair and lash out at others. At the top end, 
increased incomes to the already rich make the system appear unfair. Moreover, since 
the rich find it much easier to get their wishes met politically, increased inequality 
may well in fact serve to make the system less fair. It could well be that democracy 
is only sustainable if inequality is maintained within bounds that most in society 
see as fair. Note that perceptions of fairness will depend both on the actual levels of 
inequality in society and on the ability of the rich to translate economic success into 
political influence. It may thus be in the collective financial interests of the econom-
ically successful to acquiesce in measures that reduce their political influence, for 
this will reduce the pressure to reduce inequality – but this happy result only holds 
if in fact the higher incomes are not dependent on the political influence. However, 
to the extent that the rich are rich because of their political influence, society has 
a collective opportunity to reduce inequality while enhancing both prosperity and 
justice – but only if reforms can be achieved that lessen the influence of the rich.
Inequality is particularly challenging when associated with racism. Disadvantaged 
groups will feel disenfranchised, and others will be tempted to vilify them. 
Political partisanship can become associated with ethnic divisions. Efforts to tackle 
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inequality are hampered while the deleterious effects of inequality on democracy 
are accelerated.
Democracies that have only been around for a couple of decades are most at risk. 
Citizens may recoil at partisan bickering and glorify an earlier era of authoritarian 
peace. Democracies that have been around for centuries have built up institutions 
that will not disappear overnight: courts that can protect the rights of citizens, 
bureaucracies accustomed to democratic oversight, and most importantly armies 
trained to respect orders from elected officials that respect the constitution. Yet such 
institutions are not immutable. For one thing, elected officials can appoint judges, 
bureaucrats, and generals who are not quite so dedicated to democratic principles. 
For another, we have argued at many places in this book that institutions only 
function well when supported by values, and if a society loses faith in democracy, 
then democratic institutions are imperilled.
One great risk is violence. When citizens disrespect each other, it is all too easy 
to move from yelling to hitting. Violence is particularly likely in times of stress – 
and again we live in an age of often stressful change – and especially if we come to 
think that others are acting unfairly. Yet violence is possible even for the mere sin of 
disagreeing with things that seem obvious. If I come to identify myself with a set of 
beliefs, anyone that disagrees with those can easily offend me.
Democracies celebrate their freedoms. Nevertheless, they must maintain peace. 
Terrorism has proven a great challenge to democracies precisely because it is hard 
to police terror while respecting freedom (see  chapter 5). Civil strife will likewise 
invite limitations on personal freedom. Yet governmental limitations on freedom 
may further reduce people’s support for democracy. Authoritarianism may prove 
self- reinforcing, with each step making the next step seem harder to resist. We may 
find ourselves facing a choice between caving in to increasing degrees of authori-
tarianism or desperately trying to reinvigorate democracy. We will wish in such a 
situation that we had set about fixing democracy earlier.
BOX 4.4: THE UNRAVELLING OF THE WEST
Donald Wood’s The Unraveling of the West (Praeger, 2003) must seem pres-
cient. He worried that rising anti- intellectualism and disrespect for democratic 
mores was threatening democracy and limiting our collective capacity to 
grapple with issues such as environmental degradation and inequality.
Wood identified four causes of this malaise. One of these we have devoted 
much attention to: a decreased belief that reason can govern human affairs, 
reflecting in turn disrespect of experts and polarized discourse. He also worries 
that occupational specialization has meant that each of us only understands a 
small part of how the world works. Third, we feel ourselves ignorant because 
we face information overload and know that we cannot master all relevant 
information (we have suggested elsewhere some strategies for improving the 
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access of citizens to reliable information). Lastly, we have become deferential 
to authority, and thus willing to accept unquestioningly advice from some 
leaders.
Wood urges us to reform both our educational system – to teach people 
how to participate in democratic discourse – and our political system.
Speaking of prescience, I should note that I first drafted the concerns above 
regarding violence before the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020: before 
a minority used those protests as an excuse for looting, and before armed 
militias appeared with some regularity on city streets in the United States. 
Governments faced the tough choice I spoke of, between maintaining order 
and respecting the right to protest. There are clearly many people willing 
to employ violence in the pursuit of political ends, and politicians willing 
to encourage them for their own purposes. I, like many, worried that the 
United States election of 2020 might be accompanied by mass acts of vio-
lence. I am deeply troubled that armed groups showed up at the homes of 
election officials after that election. I hope that the storming of the US Capitol 
on January 6, 2021, will serve as a warning that acts of political violence must 
not be allowed to escalate. Will we look back at 2020 as the beginning of a 
slide into political violence, or was this just a temporary glitch in democratic 
proceedings?
4.2.5 Freedom
Freedom House (https:// freedomhouse.org/ ) has reported declines in freedom for 
over a dozen years, after decades of steady improvement. In many countries that 
have become democratic only in the last few decades, governments have interfered 
with elections, hobbled media, and harassed opposition politicians. Freedom House 
suspects that democracy has often disappointed citizens in those countries, and thus 
a slide back toward authoritarianism is not opposed as strenuously as it might be. 
In countries that Freedom House had never considered free, dictators have often 
dispensed with the pretence of holding elections, since there has been less inter-
national pressure to do so. In many countries that have long been democratic, there 
have been efforts to limit constitutional freedoms, especially of the press, and to 
limit the independence of the judiciary. Freedom House blames rising inequality, 
which has fuelled the rise of nationalist parties that show disdain for democratic 
traditions. Immigrants have been widely blamed for society’s problems.
Freedom House stresses that these declines in freedom are small relative to the 
advances recorded in the last decades of the twentieth century. The world is far 
more democratic and free than it was in 1970. The question going forward, then, is 
whether recent trends will continue, or will they turn out to be a blip on the road 
to freedom. We can recall with some sadness the triumphalism of the 1990s when 
it seemed that the path to a democratic future was secure.
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The saddest backsliding has occurred in those countries that only became demo-
cratic in the latter decades of the last century. These countries often had little trad-
ition of legislatures or open debate. Their courts and armies were not accustomed 
to supporting democracy and freedom. Corruption was often rife, as there were no 
institutions to prevent it. These countries serve as a reminder that democracy is not 
easy to institutionalize. The world’s most solid democracies often emerged slowly 
with a gradual expansion of legislative authority.
Those of us with the good fortune to live in established democracies might 
usefully reflect on the fragility of democracy. Freedoms are hard- won over long 
periods. It may well be that they are far easier to lose than to gain. Freedom House 
appreciates that freedom depends critically on public support – both within a 
country and from other democracies. If people lose faith in democratic institutions, 
authoritarians will be all too happy to whittle these away. Those of us who have 
never had the misfortune to live under authoritarian regimes may underestimate 
the cost of sliding into authoritarianism: Immigrants who have fled such regimes 
might usefully tell us to smarten up. And for those who are confident that they are 
totally in sync with some authority figure, and thus need not fear authority, they 
might usefully learn an important lesson of history: that all authoritarian leaders in 
consolidating power cast away (imprison or kill) supporters who they either accuse 
of disloyalty or find to be inconvenient.
Freedom House blames recent trends on declining international advocacy of 
democracy, rising inequality, and the scapegoating of refugees. We have proposed 
strategies to deal with each of these in earlier chapters. We have also suggested strat-
egies for engaging with autocrats. Much of the course of freedom over the next 
decades will depend on how successfully democracies engage with autocrats: We 
want peace but also democratization.
4.2.6 Economic trends
Economic forecasters generally project recent trends into the future. Given the 
heaps of data available, this is one area in which quantitative predictions are feas-
ible, and considerable effort is devoted to refining these techniques. Firms and 
governments rely on such predictions in making medium- term decisions. Yet it 
remains a challenge to predict turning points. If economic growth is continuing, 
we can do a decent job of predicting whether it will be a little higher or lower next 
year. But is there a recession coming? That is often much harder to predict.
Economic forecasts become less reliable the farther into the future we attempt 
to peer. We can thus spare the reader of this book – in which we are in general 
trying to look decades at least into the future – from having to cope with estimating 
equations and numerical estimates. Rather we can speculate in words on how the 
next decades are likely to pan out.
Economic growth has been the typical experience in developed countries for 
decades or centuries, and has become almost as common in developing coun-
tries. Yet economic growth is irregular everywhere, interrupted by recessions in 
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which economic output declines for many months or perhaps years. In recessions, 
unemployment rates rise, sometimes dramatically. Some economists have detected 
in the past the alternation of decades- long periods in which recessions are very mild 
(the 1920s and 1950– 60s and 2010s) with periods in which recessions are severe and 
overall growth stagnant or negative (the 1930s and 1970s and …). We have not seen 
enough of these periods to be sure, and the theoretical reasons for them are unclear 
(though technology may be the main culprit; see below). Nevertheless, a reasonable 
prediction for the next decades would be growth in most years, recessions in some, 
and perhaps some lengthy period of sluggish growth with serious recessions. (We 
discount the likelihood of another Great Depression in the next chapter.)
How fast will growth be? One reasonable prediction is that growth will occur a 
bit higher in poor countries than in rich countries. This has perhaps been observed 
in the recent past (depending on what group of countries you look at and whether 
you give extra weight to populous countries; the dramatic growth of populous 
China alone in recent decades proves the hypothesis if China is heavily weighted 
in the calculations). And there are at least two good theoretical reasons for it: Poor 
countries can borrow advanced technology from rich countries, and capital should 
usually flow from countries with lots of it to countries with less. This prediction 
must come with important caveats. In particular, it depends on trade flows: Many 
poor countries have suffered grievously in recent years as the prices of raw- material 
exports have plummeted. Also, poor countries need a basic infrastructure and set of 
institutions in order to successfully absorb either capital or technology.
Average global growth rates will depend a lot on technological innovation. Will 
new goods and services be developed that will spur investment and consumption? 
Will new technologies allow us to produce goods and services at a lower cost, facili-
tating increases in per capita incomes? The answer is surely positive on both counts. 
Yet some pundits worry that the rate of technological innovation may be about to 
tail off, because most of the good ideas have already been discovered. They note 
that the dramatic increase in expenditure on research and development in the last 
half- century or so (by a factor of ten in the United States) has not been matched 
by a similarly dramatic increase in the rate of innovation (though this is hard to 
measure) or economic growth. Yet we should appreciate that such predictions have 
been common in the last centuries: We occasionally marvel so much at the latest 
innovations that we wonder how these could be topped. Looking forward, there 
seem to be many areas with innovative potential: biotechnology (which has been 
the next big thing for decades but may finally flourish with advances in genetic 
sequencing), artificial intelligence, the internet of things, and more.
Will the two types of innovation mentioned in the preceding paragraph – new 
goods and services on the one hand, and new processes on the other – occur at 
the same rate? If developments in labour- saving technology outstrip developments 
in new goods and services, we may see spikes in unemployment as workers are 
laid off and have nowhere to go. This was arguably the case in the 1930s: The 
interwar period was the scene of rapid adoption of three of the greatest labour- 
saving innovations of all time, the assembly line, electrification, and continuous 
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processing (for making homogeneous products continuously rather than one batch 
at a time). But there were very few new goods or services developed in the decade 
after 1925. In the 1970s too, advances in automation occurred while there was little 
new product innovation. Looking ahead, then, governments might be advised to 
stimulate innovation in general, and the development of new goods and services in 
particular (though recall that the outcome of research is often unpredictable).
We discussed various policies for enhancing economic prosperity in  chapter 3. 
Our predictions for future growth rates must depend on how likely we think it is 
that governments will pursue enlightened policies. We might in particular worry 
here about the future path of international trade. Most economists think that the 
Great Depression was worsened significantly by trade restrictions. And trade expan-
sion seems to have been a motor of economic growth in recent decades, especially 
in poor countries. Both nationalism and fear of pandemics may lead to contractions 
in trade flows in the future.
International trade has been liberalized dramatically in the postwar decades. 
Several rounds of negotiations managed by what is now called the World Trade 
Organization led to sharp drops in tariffs. These political moves coincided with 
the development of the humble container, which dramatically lowered the costs of 
moving goods internationally, and advances in telecommunications and air travel 
that lowered the costs of negotiating business deals. Further advances in trade nego-
tiations will be difficult. In part, this is because of public suspicion of complex 
deals negotiated in private, and fears that international trade enhances the power 
of corporations over workers as these can now move production globally. This is 
yet another case where greater governmental transparency could enhance soci-
etal outcomes – as could labour and consumer representation on trade negoti-
ating teams. There are also concerns about the environmental impact of trade, due 
both to the costs of moving goods and the possibility that goods production might 
become concentrated in countries with lax environmental standards. The first might 
be addressed technologically, or through policies that charge both producers and 
transporters appropriately for their environmental side effects. The second can best 
be addressed by international agreement on environmental policy. Public suspicion 
of trade negotiations also reflects that these increasingly engage with trade in ser-
vices rather than goods, and this requires efforts to harmonize national regulations 
of services (many countries, for example, try to encourage national production of 
music and theatre and television). This is yet another case where public policy needs 
to strive for a balance: in this case between the advantages of trade and the value 
attached to local culture. As always, we should seek a balance that reflects the public 
will, a balance that is particularly hard to achieve in secretive negotiations.
Our growth predictions might prove horribly wrong. The COVID- 19 pandemic 
provides an obvious example of how economies can be disrupted. Climate change 
will undoubtedly have economic impacts. Some of these will be direct as droughts 
or floods interfere with economic activity. Poor countries, with a heavier reliance 
on agriculture, have most to fear here. Some of the effects of climate change will be 
indirect as governments belatedly introduce policies to combat climate change. We 
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have argued in preceding chapters that the trade- off between economic and envir-
onmental goals need not be severe. But the trade- off becomes harder the longer 
that the world waits to act. Countries seeking rapid decreases in emissions may act 
in ways that cause economic dislocation.
Resource shortages may also disrupt economies. There have been predictions 
for decades that the globe would soon run out of key resources: metals or oil or 
rare earths. These predictions have so far not come to pass. Indeed the real price 
(that is, subtracting the effects of inflation) of most resources has fallen most of the 
time (though there have been occasional price spikes). For the most part, we have 
discovered new deposits faster than we have used up old. On the one hand, it is 
true that there is a finite amount of any particular resource on our planet. On the 
other, it is likewise true that we have barely scratched the surface in our efforts to 
discover resource deposits (though it becomes more expensive as we dig deeper). 
At some point we will run out of resources that we can find at a reasonable cost on 
our planet, but it is hard to know whether we are decades or centuries away from 
running out of particular resources. It is also very hard to predict whether mining 
for resources beyond our planet will ever prove cost- effective. If and when we do 
run out of resources, we will curse ourselves if we are not prepared. It thus seems 
prudent to encourage both recycling and a search for substitutes. We should appre-
ciate that people may reasonably differ in both their predictions and their tolerance 
for risk, and thus seek societal consensus on how strongly to encourage these things.
Particular localities may have economic experiences quite different from the 
global average. One characteristic of modern economic growth is change: It is not 
that the output of every firm and industry rises inexorably by a couple of per cent 
a year, but that some firms and sectors grow rapidly while others decline or dis-
appear. Entrepreneurs and workers can both suffer from being in the wrong place 
at the wrong time. It is tempting, then, to interfere with processes of economic 
growth in order to maintain economic security. We have suggested in  chapter 3 that 
it is generally better to enjoy the benefits of economic prosperity while creating a 
social safety net to address uncertainty. This should include some sort of support for 
retraining and/ or relocating workers in a declining firm or industry.
We should make note of one recent trend in labour markets: the rise of the “gig” 
economy, where workers are hired temporarily to perform one particular task. Its 
future depends a lot on how government regulators respond. One big question 
here is whether “gig” workers should receive benefits like regular employees. This 
is tied to a larger question about the incomes that “gig” workers earn. We should 
appreciate that both employers and workers can potentially benefit from gig work, 
for they both gain flexibility: Employers gain the flexibility to hire just for necessary 
tasks, and workers gain the flexibility to only perform tasks they like or are good 
at and at times they prefer. These advantages should not be sacrificed lightly. The 
entire economy benefits to the extent that workers otherwise would be paid for 
long periods in which there was little for them to do. Our arguments elsewhere in 
favour of a basic income might allow society to have the benefits of a gig economy 
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without forcing workers into penury. It may be that gig- specific protections are 
also called for.
BOX 4.5: MEASUREMENT AGAIN
We have worried earlier about the way we measure economic prosperity. 
We can note here that there are also challenges in the way we measure 
unemployment rates. Governments regularly perform surveys, asking people 
if they are working or looking for work. Note that respondents only count as 
“unemployed” if they are not working but are looking for work. Economists 
have long worried that some people just give up looking – they are called 
“discouraged workers” – and thus that we routinely underestimate the true 
unemployment rate. Another problem, which is becoming more important, is 
that part- time workers are counted as employed even if they would prefer full- 
time work. We have lauded people above who might pursue part- time employ-
ment on purpose, and argued that such a quest should be facilitated. Yet we 
can also worry about people pushed into part- time employment involuntarily. 
We need, yet again, a more subtle type of measurement, which would capture 
those who are involuntarily underemployed.
It is harder to predict whether another recent “trend” will last: low interest 
rates. Interest rates were at historically low levels before the COVID- 19 pandemic 
and were cut further in all countries that still had room to cut. Positive interest 
rates make some economic sense: People would generally prefer to have some-
thing today rather than a year from now, and thus must be paid interest to save for 
the future. Negative interest rates discourage saving. They thus disrupt the entire 
financial system on which economic prosperity depends. I have heard one econo-
mist compare the effect on the economy of a move from one per cent to minus 
one per cent in interest rates to the effect on water of moving from one degree 
above freezing to one degree below freezing. And near- zero or negative interest 
rates weaken the key weapon that central banks have for decades used to reduce 
unemployment: lowering interest rates to stimulate investment. Central banks have 
turned to a less familiar tactic of buying government bonds (“quantitative easing”), 
which may encourage some spending from those who now have cash rather than a 
bond, but we are much less familiar with the effectiveness of this strategy. Nor is it 
entirely clear why interest rates have remained so low for so long without encour-
aging inflation: Some suggest that technology may have been fortuitously lowering 
costs of production in recent years. We should recognize a risk that central banks 
and financial systems may both be less robust in future because of historically low 
interest rates. This makes policies around government spending that much more 
important. If a central bank cannot move to limit a spike in unemployment, we will 
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benefit even more from programmes such as a basic income that can act to limit the 
decline in consumption expenditure.
Though we have predicted that growth will likely continue, we should never-
theless prepare for the alternative. Many futurists indeed predict a no- growth future. 
What do we do if resource constraints or climate change or the drying up of techno-
logical innovation force incomes to stagnate? There is already considerable angst that 
the next generation may not have a life that is as good as or better than its predecessors. 
We have come to expect that economic prosperity should expand with each gener-
ation. Governments are judged by whether they produce economic growth. Investors 
seek companies with particularly auspicious growth prospects. So we would have to 
change our entire set of expectations to cope with economic stagnation. We can take 
some solace from the fact that through most of human history humans did not expect 
economic growth, for this occurred irregularly and slowly. Yet it will nevertheless 
not be easy for us to change our mindset. Economic stagnation will likely increase 
tensions around economic inequality: If growth will not meet our dreams, then we 
can only have more by taking from others. We might then see reductions in inequality, 
for much of the justification for inequality is that those with high incomes are driving 
growth. We might also see improvements in job security if economies cease to change 
so much. Yet possibilities for social strife remain. If we cannot all see increases in our 
incomes, social peace may require us to collectively downplay income as a source of 
human happiness. This may be no bad thing to pursue, even in times of economic 
growth. Efforts to decrease inequality now, and to encourage alternative sources of 
meaning in life, are the best possible preparation.
With respect to inequality we should appreciate that there is some natural ten-
dency for “the rich to get richer.” They have money to invest, and earnings from 
investment can be passed down (and grow) through generations. Income inequality 
may then increase because the rich become richer while others continue to rely 
primarily on income from work rather than investment. Systems theorists worry 
about this sort of positive feedback loop in which a particular process seems to nat-
urally grow through time. We discussed in  chapter 3.2.4 some strategies for redu-
cing inequality, and can note here that we may have to struggle just to prevent 
worsening inequality. We have seen that inequality is a threat to both economic 
prosperity and political stability.
4.2.7 Advances in science and technology
It is in general foolhardy to predict the course of technological innovation. Decades 
ago, it was common to think that we would be flying around with jetpacks by 
now. Nobody imagined that we would be constantly sharing pictures on our cell 
phones. (Note that the jetpack prediction may have simply been an extrapolation 
of trends in increasing the ease and speed of transport, while the cell phone selfie 
required the combination of multiple technologies: We find it hardest to predict 
novel interactions.) The safest bet is that the future will be as full of surprises as 
the past.
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It is a little bit safer to extrapolate a couple of changes that are already underway. 
The first of these is artificial intelligence. We can first wish that a different title had been 
chosen for this technology. Computers are not intelligent in the same way humans are, 
but they can do a better job of recognizing patterns in huge amounts of data. If you 
feed a computer observations of millions of games of chess or Go, it can identify the 
move most likely to lead to victory in any situation. It follows a fairly stupid decision- 
making process, but wins because it scans more data than a human ever could.
One fear these days is that a host of middle- management jobs are similar 
to playing chess in the sense that they involve making decisions based on large 
amounts of data. If an organization has an ongoing goal such as increasing sales, a 
computer may be able to give good advice on what strategies worked in similar 
situations in the past to achieve that goal. Computers will struggle, at least for the 
foreseeable future, to give good advice on achieving novel goals – though they may 
spot hidden patterns in data that a human can then make novel use of. It could 
then be that there will be substantial job losses in the service sector over the next 
decades. (Will computers do a better job than loan officers in identifying deceit, 
or will they develop biases that are hard to identify?) Many of these are well- paid 
jobs at present. Technology has mostly replaced manual labour in the past. There 
may even be effects on the professions: Computers may be able to make medical 
diagnoses too if fed data on a person’s symptoms. Some symptoms, such as der-
matological complaints, may prove to be recognizable by a computer from a good 
photograph. AI might perform much of the work of pharmacists and auditors, and 
might replace baseball umpires. At the moment, we should be cautiously aware of 
these possibilities: AI is still new enough that it is hard to predict how successfully 
it can overcome particular challenges.
It should be appreciated that computers have to be carefully programmed to per-
form particular tasks. Computers did not one day decide that they wanted to play 
chess, and figure out how to get good at it. There are already, then, many jobs for 
computer scientists and engineers in the field of AI. These jobs will almost certainly 
expand in number over the next decades. We might worry, nevertheless, that one 
computer scientist can program a computer to replace numerous employees. We 
can note again that artificial intelligence may often identify patterns that humans 
then have to interpret and act upon, and thus it can have employment- creating as 
well as employment- reducing effects. Moreover, it will almost certainly be the case 
that artificial intelligence will not just perform existing tasks but will be designed 
to do things that are impossible now. If we feed a computer a host of healthcare, 
child welfare, and justice system data, can we predict which children are at risk and 
remove them from dangerous situations before some disaster happens? There are, 
to be sure, important privacy issues to be navigated, but artificial intelligence may 
allow us to do many useful things that we have not yet begun to imagine. If we are 
truly worried about the employment effect of artificial intelligence, we might wish 
to encourage the development of new services.
Most of the analysis of the effects of artificial intelligence focuses on the pri-
vate sector. It could well be, though, that artificial intelligence streamlines many 
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government services. The government has many managers whose task is to analyse 
large masses of data. Moreover, governments struggle to deliver the right services to 
the right people and places: This is largely a data management problem. We might, 
then, improve the quality while lowering the cost of some existing programmes. 
We will also, as noted in the preceding paragraph, likely identify new tasks for 
governments to perform.
Linked to appropriate sensors, artificial intelligence can also replace manual 
workers. There will almost certainly be a dramatic reduction in the number of 
long- distance truck drivers as a result, for computers can exceed the safety record 
of human drivers. Computers can also drive longer hours and even achieve modest 
savings in fuel. If we can solve the environmental issues around trucking, we may 
see an expansion in the range of goods transported. Simultaneously, driverless cars 
and buses might expand human freedom dramatically. Job losses in truck driving 
might be more than compensated by increased opportunities in trade and vacation 
services. Or not: We should not too casually dismiss the possibility that it may be 
hard to generate new jobs for those replaced by technology.
In the very long run we can hope that computers and robots take on a range of 
fairly repetitive tasks. For the foreseeable future, we need not worry that humans 
will not be left with tasks that require leadership, people skills, and creativity. There 
may be transition problems in getting to this bright future. To avoid these, we can 
try to guide the technology toward job creation, and pursue strategies that provide 
for both employment flexibility and economic security.
Some futurists worry about a more distant future where computers are able to 
do everything better than humans. It should be stressed that present AI technologies 
do not mimic human intelligence and thus do not run the risk of making humans 
obsolete. We may indeed have a collective future in which humans are freed from 
mundane tasks in order to focus on various types of creativity. But it is worth 
reflecting on what makes humans special if machines come to encroach on many 
activities that we value.
Others worry that computers given broad instructions may pursue strategies 
that threaten human survival. Few worry about the sort of chaos unleashed in the 
Terminator movies (though the popularity of such movies may reflect a human fear 
of creating machines that are more powerful than us). But a computer programmed 
with some environmental goals might decide to erase certain human activities. The 
answer here seems to involve giving careful instructions and requiring computers 
to check with humans before acting.
In our daily lives, AI algorithms will likely come to play a bigger role: guiding 
our career choices, suggesting what movies we might like, and so on. (Will we 
become better able to ignore advertising, or will advertisers become better able to 
appeal to our subconscious yearnings?) This advice can be very beneficial, but again 
we may lose some sense of self- efficacy if we let machines make our decisions for us.
A second technology worth looking at is genetic engineering. We now have 
the capability to insert genes into organisms. Humans have bred plants and animals 
for thousands of years through a time- consuming process of physically combining 
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different plants or animals. It is now feasible to take a gene from one organism and 
implant it in another. Debates rage about the use of this technology on plants or 
animals. These will seem mild in comparison to the coming debate over genetically 
engineering humans. The good news here is that scientists are slowly identifying the 
genes responsible for a large number of genetic diseases that each affect small numbers 
of people. There are promising therapies emerging for some of these diseases. It may 
one day soon be possible to edit the offending gene and cure the disease. Few will 
likely object to “playing god” in a way that allows afflicted people to live a normal life.
What, though, about deliberately inserting genes that would make humans 
smarter or stronger or more honest? (Or inserting electronic sensors into our brains 
that enhance our abilities to detect sounds or emotions or that connect our brains 
to computers?) Such initiatives might have good consequences: We could more 
readily create a better world if we were smarter, stronger, and more honest. But 
such initiatives go against our very sense of what it means to be human, and perhaps 
our respect for human life. There is also the risk that we might unwittingly err and 
create beings that are not really “human” in some important way. The history of 
human efforts to breed better humans – the eugenics movement of the early twen-
tieth century, and its abusive application by Nazi Germany in the 1930s – is horrific.
This is an ethical issue that deserves lengthy and broad- based debate. One 
problem with eugenics was that it invited a massive abuse of power. We should be 
on guard in particular against only an elite being able to create super- babies. Yet we 
may not have time for lengthy debate. As the technology develops, autocrats may 
be tempted to employ it even while democrats debate it. Reflect on this: A future 
where autocrats breed super- people is worth avoiding, but there may be no easy 
way to do so.
What if we are able to make humans immortal? What if we can only afford for 
a while to make some humans immortal?
Some futurists are excited by the prospect of “democratizing” technological 
innovation (including some kinds of AI though not perhaps genetic engineering). 
Open- source software has surprised many: Many innovators have proved willing to 
donate their efforts to the world, and software developers have built on each other’s 
work to produce a range of freely available programs. 3D printers allow innovators 
to produce complex pieces from plans uploaded to the internet – and then modify 
those plans to serve particular needs. We still live in a world where much innov-
ation occurs in corporate or government research labs. But there is a large and 
perhaps growing scope for individuals or small groups to produce socially valuable 
technologies. We might encourage such efforts with our educational policies and 
perhaps with some financial support.
4.2.8 Decreased sense of community; backlash against diversity
We have suggested before that social strife can be self- reinforcing. Once we demonize 
others, then every move they make serves to reinforce our negative stereotype. It is 
all too easy to ignore any good things they might do and focus on the bad. If we are 
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decided that they are hopelessly misguided, we stop listening, and lose our capacity 
to understand and seek common ground. If, as we have feared above, we move from 
yelling to hitting, our capacity for understanding can be erased.
Increasing inequality is less likely to unite the masses against the rich than to turn 
the poorer members of society against each other – unless they can be convinced 
of strategies (such as those outlined in  chapter 3) for addressing inequality that do 
not imperil prosperity. Alternatively, any social movement that gathers people from 
across political or cultural divide in pursuit of any of the goals outlined in  chapter 2 
can potentially do much to restore a sense of community.
A war against a reviled foe can restore some sense of community. The COVID- 
19 pandemic did some good in this respect, at least in countries where political 
leaders roughly agreed and clearly followed the advice of health experts. This is, of 
course, a costly way to achieve community.
A declining sense of community will likely unleash a backlash against respect 
for diversity. If life seems a battle between “us” and “them,” then it is only natural 
to urge everyone to behave more like “us.” A decreased respect for diversity can in 
turn encourage discrimination of various kinds, an attractive strategy if life seems 
to be a battle for scarce jobs. Discrimination will naturally offend those who are 
discriminated against, and further detract from a shared sense of community.
There is good reason, then, to fear that sense of community will decline in many 
countries. Concerted efforts at collaboration can reverse this trend, especially if 
focused on decreasing inequality or transcending negative stereotypes.
4.2.9 Attitudes toward discourse and evaluation of evidence
Will the COVID- 19 pandemic restore some confidence in expert advice? Or will 
many soon forget the risks we faced and doubt that the advice to self- isolate and 
socially distance was really necessary after all? It is too early to know for sure.
It is unlikely that COVID- 19 alone will halt a worrying trend away from 
believing in the value of careful evaluation of argument and evidence. It is already 
all too common for political leaders to vilify those with the temerity to disagree 
with them, and for political pundits to ignore clear evidence. Many citizens absorb 
information from highly biased sources and seem not to question what they are 
told. Jointly believing in untruths can be a powerful marker – and perhaps source – 
of group identity. There have been biased sources of information for centuries, but 
social media and the fragmentation of broadcast media make it much easier for 
people to find only congenial opinions. These trends in turn reflect and reinforce 
trends discussed elsewhere of decreased respect and decreased sense of community. 
They are encouraged by increases in inequality, and decreased faith in government 
policy and democratic decision- making.
The French philosopher Michel Foucault spent much of his career warning of 
biases in both scholarly analysis and political discourse. Yet he warned us that if we 
lose faith in our ability to engage in constructive discourse that seeks to carefully 
evaluate argument and evidence, then we have no answer to authoritarianism. If 
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one argument is as good as another, then we might as well have a ruler who gets 
things done: The ruler’s views are as good as anybody’s.
We have a choice to make. Present trends pose an existential threat to dem-
ocracy. It is not clear how long democracy’s death throes might last. It is hard to 
predict when we might reach a point of no return. But it is clear that democ-
racy will not survive if we give up on careful dialogue and evaluation of policy 
proposals. It should also be clear that it will be easier to reverse this trend if we act 
early rather than late. We have suggested in  chapter 3 strategies both for enhancing 
the institutions of democracy and for reinvigorating the values on which democ-
racy depends. These strategies are mutually reinforcing and thus best pursued in 
concert.
4.2.10 Happiness and sense of purpose
We have noted above that surveys show little if any sign of increased happiness in 
rich countries in recent decades. Rising incomes and a wave of new gadgets have 
not made people much happier. It appears that the pleasure we get from most 
purchases is transitory. It is thus reasonable to posit that humans will not become 
appreciably happier in future decades either. We should confess that we have no 
direct way of measuring happiness by scanning people’s brains and so must rely 
on the imperfect method of asking people how happy they are. Since there is no 
objective measure of happiness, people likely compare themselves to others. It is 
possible, then, that everyone is getting happier but we do not realize it because we 
compare ourselves to the ever- happier people around us. Yet it seems likely that 
overall levels of happiness are indeed rising sluggishly if at all.
If individuals take earning money and buying stuff as their main goal in life, 
and compare their success to those around them, then we may be doomed to a 
future of stagnant happiness. Average incomes may increase, but nobody really feels 
better off. The answer is for humans to recognize that there are multiple sources of 
meaning in life, as we outlined in  chapter 2. While competition and individualism 
serve us well in the economic realm, other sources of meaning depend instead on 
collaboration. If we can enhance our sense of community, we can make everyone 
a bit happier as a result. Surveys do indeed suggest that a sense of community (and 
especially volunteering in our community) does make people happier.
The trick, then, is for people to see economic prosperity as not entirely a goal 
in itself but as a means to other goals. We have greater leisure time and greater 
spending power than our great- grandparents could have dreamed of. We can devote 
these to raising children, building community, helping others, communing with 
nature, innovating, and engaging in artistic practices. We will be best able to find 
the right balance for ourselves among diverse goals in a society that values freedom 
and respects diversity. We will be happier if we evaluate our happiness in terms of 
these diverse and attainable goals.
We need to change the way we interact. It is no surprise that one of the first 
questions we ask a stranger is “what do you do?” which always means what is your 
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job, or what are you studying. The world would be a better place if we more readily 
engaged questions about their interactions with nature, or art, or which groups they 
were attached to. We need to appreciate the multifaceted uniqueness of each indi-
vidual. We will all be happier as a result.
Some researchers have tried to track people’s happiness through time. They 
get the not- surprising result that people are happier during some activities than 
others. People tend to dislike commuting, and so reducing commuting time might 
make people happier. Ditto housework. Interactions with friends and family often 
produce the greatest happiness. Childcare is ambiguous, producing moments of 
drudgery and moments of wonder. Is it possible to have the latter without (so 
much of) the former? Worktime is also mixed: Can we increase the rewarding 
parts of jobs while decreasing routine, office politics, and unnecessary meetings?
Reflection on the meaning of life – both by individuals and in public discourse – 
becomes increasingly important in a world of great change. In a fairly static world, 
as most human generations have faced, individuals can absorb lessons about meaning 
subconsciously as they grow up. Over time, communities develop a set of practices 
that bring satisfaction to community members. In a world of rapid change, we no 
longer have the luxury of developing and learning about meaning so gradually. The 
one thing that we can be most confident of is that our children will inhabit a world 
that is different in many ways from our own. They cannot just absorb our sense of 
meaning even if we have developed this clearly. Change can be exciting, and can 
provide us with wonderful opportunities, but change is necessarily disorienting. We 
must adapt to rapid change, and this requires conscious reflection. Happily, self- 
awareness is also identified in surveys as an important source of happiness.
Happiness levels will likely fall due to the pandemic – though many of those 
who have kept their jobs have found that they quite like working from home. 
Happiness can fall dramatically in future in the event of war or civil strife (or 
many of the negative surprises such as natural disasters to be addressed in the next 
chapter). Those who are unsatisfied with the present state of democracy will look 
back on the contemporary state of affairs sentimentally should it give way to vio-
lence and authoritarianism.
In sum, happiness is mostly likely to stagnate going forward, but could drop 
sharply in response to other negative trends or shocks. Yet happiness can poten-
tially rise if we are able to work together toward shared goals. Happiness can also 
increase if we spend less time in unpleasurable activities. And individual happiness 
can increase if people engage in more reflection about their goals in life.
BOX 4.6: ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR REFLECTION
I have attempted in this chapter to identify key trends across each of the cat-
egories of phenomena identified in  chapter 1, and identify how these trends 
will interact with other phenomena. I have not, of necessity, surveyed every 
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single change going on in the world. The reader is invited to reflect at this 
point on what I may have missed, both in terms of trends and interactions. 
They might in particular reflect on some technologies that I have only touched 
on in this book: robots, the internet of things, social media, autonomous 
vehicles, new manufacturing materials, and 3D printing among them. Or they 
might stress trends in education itself: Will COVID- 19 lead to a permanent 
change in the way education is provided? They are then invited to reflect on 
how important such omissions might be, and how they might interact with 
the trends surveyed above. Instructors may well detect an opportunity for an 
assignment or group project here.
We suggested a “backcasting wheel” exercise in  chapter 3. This exercise 
reverses a long- standing practice in Future Studies of developing “future 
wheels.” In a future wheel, one first identifies an important trend. Then one 
identifies (in a surrounding circle) the key effects of that trend. Then one 
examines (in the next circle) the implications of those effects. Students can 
usefully perform a future wheel exercise for any of the trends discussed in this 
chapter, or any other trend they wish to examine. This can be done individu-
ally or in groups.
Future wheels can be combined. One key lesson of this book, after all, is 
that we need to stress the interactions among trends (or strategies or goals). 
Though the diagram gets a fair bit messier, it is possible to combine two or 
three future wheels, exploring the interactions among their effects. One pos-
sibility here is that students first individually (or maybe in a group of two) 
develop a future wheel, and then collaborate with another student (or small 
group) that has developed a future wheel around a different trend to identify 
interactions.
4.3 Plausible futures
What do you get if you mix climate change, increased inequality, and decreased 
faith in democracy? Each of these can reinforce the others. Dysfunctional democ-
racies will fail to address either climate change or inequality, and this will further 
discredit democratic governance. The rich may prove better able to withstand cli-
mate change (or not; recall that income inequality has sometimes fallen dramatically 
during crises); some of the poorest may be pushed into extreme poverty or worse. 
Social strife, widespread hunger, and a lurch toward authoritarianism are all plaus-
ible outcomes. The progress in recent decades in achieving respect for diversity 
will surely collapse in such an environment. And, yes, war may seem tempting to 
authoritarian leaders.
We might devote particular attention to the possibility of decreased food pro-
duction as a result of climate change. When food security is threatened, people tend 
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to riot. The ability of governments to maintain order depends on whether people 
trust (or fear) them. Given a choice between security and freedom, most people 
will opt for security. Those with food will take steps to protect it, in the absence of 
trustworthy mechanisms for sharing. In the early days of the COVID- 19 pandemic, 
store shelves were stripped clean of toilet paper by worried citizens. What sort of 
actions might be anticipated in a time of real shortage?
We should be careful of focusing entirely on the worst case scenario, where 
all trends are bad and reinforce each other. It is unlikely that everything will turn 
out as badly as in Figure 4.1. There are many other plausible scenarios: Climate 
change might force us finally to work together and in so doing restore some faith 
in collective decision- making. Any success we have in improving decision- making 
processes may help us to collectively address negative trends such as climate change 
and increased inequality.
Figure 4.1 highlights the role that public policy may play in determining our 
future. This is an important lesson: We have the capability of changing ugly plaus-
ible futures toward desirable futures. Still, there are other possible sources of more 
benign futures. Most obviously, there may be technological innovations that solve 
or at least alleviate the climate challenge. Other innovations may enhance pros-
perity (some may do both). There may be changes in values or attitudes driven by 
social activists. We have in this (and the preceding) chapter suggested a variety of 
strategies for mitigating undesirable negative trends and enhancing desirable trends. 
The point to stress here is that undesirable trends can be mutually reinforcing and 
thus any societal effort to reverse one undesirable trend will have a further indirect benefit in 
not reinforcing other undesirable trends.
From the perspective of world history, all human civilizations have eventu-
ally disappeared (at least if we define “civilization” and “disappear” in particular 


























FIGURE 4.1 A dystopian future.
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the height of the Roman Empire who could have thought that it would eventu-
ally fall apart? It could well be that liberal democracy will prove to have greater 
staying power than all previous forms of economic or political organization. Or 
not. But historians often observe that complacency is a characteristic of societies 
in decline. Those in positions of power or influence do not imagine that their 
situation is endangered and do not take steps to stabilize the situation. This is not, 
we should stress, just a case of individual myopia, but of systemic myopia. Societal 
decline in history has often been encouraged by economic elites managing to 
extract ever- higher proportions of societal incomes, and using their influence to 
limit governmental authority. No single person can arrest such a process once it 
is well underway.
BOX 4.7: HISTORICAL ERAS
Both historians and futurists speak a lot about “historical eras.” They feel that 
humanity transitions from era to era, and that each era has its own internal 
logic and emergent properties. They thus imagine that there are key turning 
points in history where one era gives way to another.
There is some logic to this line of reasoning. We have mentioned before that 
systems of interaction can have emergent properties. It is thus quite possible 
that the interaction of one set of economic, political, cultural, technological, 
and other phenomena produces some overall zeitgeist – an overall mood of the 
times – that is eventually replaced by changes in economic, political, and other 
phenomena. We should thus be cognizant of the very real possibility that the 
various trends surveyed above may interact in ways that we cannot foresee, 
instantiating a new zeitgeist.
Yet we must beware of the dangers of oversimplification in this idea of 
historical eras. In writing Making Sense of World History, I often cringed at the 
efforts of other historians to define the essence of particular eras and demarcate 
precise turning points between eras. Historical eras (think “classical period”) 
are better viewed as a shorthand that captures at best some key features of a 
particular time and place. Yet a world historian must always appreciate that 
there is much change within eras, and also much diversity in experience across 
places during any era. If the idea of eras risks oversimplifying the past, then the 
risk is even greater as we turn toward a future that will undoubtedly witness a 





We can be sure that the world will not unfold entirely as predicted in the preceding 
chapter. Rather, we can expect that there will be “surprises” (often called “wild 
cards” in the Future Studies literature). Many futurists argue that such surprises 
are collectively more important than the trends that we engaged in the preceding 
chapter: They see a world of frequent shocks in which those trends reflect merely 
our limited capabilities at responding to shocks. Some suggest that humans have 
a psychological bias toward thinking that we understand our world, and thus we 
collectively devote great effort to explaining occurrences after the fact that we in 
no way saw coming. Having just written a world history text, I naturally think 
that both history and future are more comprehensible than they do, but join them 
in appreciating the importance of grappling with surprises. The task of predicting 
surprises may seem impossible – they would hardly be surprises if we saw them 
coming. Yet in practice, we will often find ourselves after a surprise musing that “We 
should have seen that coming.” I do not think that this is entirely because we are 
guided psychologically to impose a false order on a random universe.
The COVID- 19 pandemic that began in 2019 provides a perfect example of 
a “surprise” that could have been foreseen to some extent, and where the world 
would have benefited if steps had been taken in advance to deal with it. While 
the precise virus was unpredictable (though it bears a family resemblance to some 
earlier epidemic viruses), the world had experienced several epidemics in recent 
years: Ebola, SARS, MERS, and others. Some of these were deadlier than COVID- 
19 and others were more contagious; COVID- 19 was distinguished by a more 
unfortunate combination of contagion and mortality, and thus killed more people 
than these earlier epidemics. It had long been recognized that such a combination 
of contagion and lethality was possible, though it was of course difficult to attach a 
precise probability to such an outcome. Why, then, did health providers around the 
world suffer from a shortage of protective masks and ventilators in the early months 
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of the pandemic? Surely, a minimal degree of prudence would have stockpiled 
masks for such an eventuality? It is of course always easy to criticize policy in hind-
sight, but this seems a dangerous lack of foresight. We had long ago recognized the 
possibility of large pandemics. Stockpiling masks is a very inexpensive precaution 
to have taken. Even having more ventilators than is needed on a daily basis would 
seem a relatively inexpensive precaution.
It is not hard to identify deeper reasons for unpreparedness. Healthcare systems 
face budget constraints, and will always be tempted to devote their limited resources 
to taking care of today’s pressing problems rather than preparing for tomorrow. 
Politicians (and authoritarian leaders) face few rewards for prudence and will have a 
natural bias toward spending money in ways that are visible today. There seems scope 
here for some sort of governmental body that would warn of possible surprises 
and advocate for precautions to be taken in advance. This body needs to be more 
influential than the many government agencies that may already warn of future 
dangers. Such a body need not be hugely expensive: Indeed, it might largely collect 
and evaluate concerns forwarded from other government departments and non- 
governmental agencies. It will soon pay for itself if it can encourage governments 
(and others) to prepare successfully for a surprise.
Behind the institutional reasons for unpreparedness, we should recognize a psy-
chological predilection. We have evolved as humans to respond emotionally to 
immediate threats, but have a limited desire to prepare for distant threats. This pre-
dilection is displayed by the many individuals with healthy incomes who never-
theless fail to save for a rainy day and find themselves unprepared for illness or 
job loss. It is displayed socially by collectively ignoring long- standing warnings 
by scientists about both pandemics and climate change. We must try to structure 
our institutions to overcome a natural human tendency to not plan for the distant 
future.
Preparing for the future will be particularly difficult in an environment in which 
both governments and experts are widely distrusted. Again, the COVID- 19 pan-
demic is instructive: While politicians received mixed scores from their citizens, 
public health officials were widely (though far from universally) lauded for their 
efforts. Governments might be encouraged to devote some small share of their 
budgets to preparing for surprises, and then the debate could focus on which 
surprises to devote the most resources to.
There is an oft- heard saying: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” For the pro-
ject of this book – guiding the world toward desirable futures – there is a crucial 
further advantage to being prepared for surprises. We can then potentially introduce 
policies to address a surprise that also serve longer- term goals. As the COVID- 19 
pandemic led to job losses across many sectors, there were calls in many countries 
for the introduction of a basic income. These calls were only possible because the 
idea of a basic income had been percolating in many societies for many decades. 
Yet these calls gained limited traction in most countries because there have been 
few detailed experiments that could inform estimates of the costs and benefits of a 
basic income.
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The chances of introducing many of our strategies may be much higher during 
and right after a surprise than at any other time. We are well aware that innocent 
people suffered from a surprise such as COVID- 19 – and perhaps even appre-
ciate that it might have been us – and are thus more willing to address inequality, 
injustice, and insecurity. Yet we should also appreciate that surprises present an 
opportunity for backsliding. As we have noted previously, people who are afraid are 
more tempted to wink at injustice and support authoritarianism, and surprises like 
COVID- 19 can scare people. Moreover, powerful people may seize upon surprises 
to increase inequality: While much of the relief funds provided during COVID- 19 
lockdowns went to the poorest (and temporarily reduced poverty rates in many 
countries), some also went to aid wealthy individuals and corporations who were 
well accustomed to lobbying for government support. Surprises shake up the world, 
and can knock us backward at least as easily as they might push us forward.
The punditry exploded in 2020 with predictions about how COVID- 19 might 
change the world forever. Would the increased sense of community survive the 
crisis? Would new- found respect for experts survive? Or would both subside in the 
inevitable post- pandemic finger- pointing? To what extent will people continue to 
work from home and shop online after the pandemic ends? Would we recognize 
what we have known for decades: That the quality of care in some elderly care 
residences is appallingly low? Would we spend money to do something about it? 
Would we, in particular, provide full- time jobs with benefits to healthcare workers 
so they need not spread disease across facilities in trying to stitch together a living 
from part- time work? Would we, more generally, appreciate that a lot of low- wage 
workers such as cashiers and warehouse workers play an essential role in our society, 
and maybe be a bit more open to enhancing incomes at the bottom end of the 
income distribution?
We can draw a few lessons from this explosion in predictions. First, humans 
expect a crisis like a pandemic to change things. Second, it is possible to imagine a 
quite diverse range of effects from any one surprise. We need, then, to treat surprises 
with the same broad interdisciplinary examination that we have applied to goals 
and strategies and trends in preceding chapters. We need, that is, to attempt to pre-
dict surprises and the effects they may have. Only then can we be prepared to build 
desirable futures while reacting to surprises.
5.1 How to identify surprises
How can we identify surprises? It may seem that surprises can come from any-
where, and that there may thus be an infinite number of possible surprises out 
there. While we must accept the possibility that we will not identify all surprises 
in advance, we can be heartened by the fact that there are mere hundreds of key 
phenomena studied across the scholarly enterprise. Surprises when they happen 
are generally unexpected realizations of the phenomena we study – particular 
diseases or technological innovations or business cycles and so on – rather than 
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new phenomena that we were completely unaware of. We then have a finite (albeit 
large) set of phenomena to query: “what possible surprises are possible with respect 
to this phenomenon?”
Throughout this book, we have stressed that phenomena operate within systems. 
This guides us to a second key question: “How might a change in this one phenom-
enon affect other phenomena?” COVID- 19 was ugly just for its effects on human 
health, but it had further repercussions across many spheres: economic, political, 
social, cultural, and more. Surprises are more likely to be important if they involve 
multiple phenomena. History bears this out: In my Making Sense of World History, 
almost all of the major transformations or key events in world history (which 
would generally have been surprises at the time: “Whoa, agriculture; who saw that 
coming?”) involve interactions among phenomena studied by multiple disciplines. 
However, given that most scholarly research – and thus understanding – is organized 
around disciplines, we are most likely to be surprised by the effects of a phenom-
enon studied in one discipline on the phenomena studied in others. We should 
stress this unfortunate combination: Surprises are most likely to be important but 
least likely to be foreseen if they involve interactions among phenomena studied by 
different disciplines.
We can proceed in what follows to investigate each major category of phe-
nomena in turn. We can ask what kind of surprises are possible, and how these 
might be generated by interactions with other phenomena. When we identify pos-
sible surprises, we will ask which other phenomena they are likely to affect. We 
can then ask what sort of precautions societies might take to mitigate the surprise 
and its effects. We can also ask how reacting to the surprise might actually move us 
toward desirable futures.
We need not imagine that the list provided below is exhaustive. It is a start, 
and we can reasonably hope that if the right questions are widely asked, we can 
be prepared for most of the surprises to come. There is, yet again, a role for cre-
ativity here: We are, after all, imagining futures quite different from the present 
in important ways. As with all instances of creativity, we can prepare ourselves by 
thinking about how the world works, how our trends might be interrupted, how 
phenomena interact, how minor surprises today might presage bigger surprises in 
future, and so on. The more we reflect on such questions, the more likely we are to 
have a “What if?” moment. We can then pursue the hard work of analysing whether 
our inspiration is worth worrying about and planning for.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
Is the surprise likely? What effects might it have? How might we prepare our-
selves for the surprise? Can we act to prevent the surprise? Can we be prepared 
to respond to the surprise in a way that takes us toward desired futures?
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5.2 Particular surprises
5.2.1 Disease
There will be other pandemics. The precise disease may be a surprise, but there can 
be no doubt that there will be others. Some of these may have a more deadly com-
bination of contagion and lethality than COVID- 19. While this pandemic is fresh 
in our minds, there are a host of steps we can take:
• Stockpile masks and other protective equipment. The problem with 
pandemics is contagion, and we need to protect at the very least our healthcare 
workers. Hopefully we have learned that these must remain healthy both so 
that they can treat the sick and so that they do not themselves spread the dis-
ease. Since pandemics quickly become global, it is in the interest of rich coun-
tries to help poor countries stockpile.
• Stockpile ventilators. Many though not all pandemics affect respiration.
• Act against deforestation. Did you see that argument coming? Most 
pandemics occur when a disease endemic in some animal species mutates so 
that it affects humans. There is some speculation that some pandemics may 
have resulted when animals were forced into human environments by the 
destruction of their normal habitat. This is just a scientific hypothesis at the 
moment, but it provides yet another rationale for maintaining natural habitats.
• Stop living so close to disease- bearing animals. That is, we need to dis-
courage at a global level humans from living in extremely close contact with 
animals that are most likely to carry such diseases. Bats and ducks may be par-
ticularly important here. Note that we need much more research into how 
pandemics have originated.
• Reinvigorate principles and institutions of international collabor-
ation. In the depths of the COVID- 19 pandemic, some countries interfered 
with international trade of masks and ventilators. We want to prepare ourselves 
for pandemics as cheaply as possible, and it would be quite expensive for every 
country to have to develop domestic manufacturing capacity for all healthcare 
equipment. A combination of stockpiling and international collaboration is far 
preferable – if achievable.
• Provide greater economic security. It will be far easier in future pandemics 
to encourage isolation if programmes such as a basic income are in place. We 
may even be able to imagine public works programmes that do not offend 
social distancing requirements.
• Support research. Advances in genetic engineering may allow us to develop 
vaccines and antidotes much more quickly. This will be particularly important 
if some future pandemic has much greater contagion and lethality than 
COVID- 19. It may be possible to identify diseases in animals that are par-
ticularly likely to leap to humans, and work on vaccines before this happens. 
It is worth noting that the amounts spent on vaccine research have ballooned 
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during the pandemic but are still small relative to what governments have spent 
supporting individual and business incomes. The benefits of more research 
could far outweigh the costs.
• Reinvigorate public faith in and understanding of expert advice. 
Contagion can only be stopped by the actions of the entire community.
• Make sure that the entire population has access to healthcare. We all 
potentially suffer if a minority of the population gets sick among us.
• Address disadvantaged populations. Groups such as the homeless are at 
greatest risk of getting and spreading disease. We have suggested above that 
providing homes for the homeless may be a cost- effective strategy even outside 
of pandemics.
• Inspect our elderly care facilities more often. We should also require 
them to hire most workers full- time, since part- time workers spread disease 
between facilities. We can also improve home care so that more elderly people 
can remain independent longer (technology may be helpful here in making it 
easier for the elderly to look after themselves).
If we cannot institute all such policies before the next pandemic, we should be 
prepared to lay the groundwork for them during the next pandemic, when both the 
public and politicians will be motivated to act.
The question of lockdowns was an inherently interdisciplinary question that 
blended public health estimates of benefits in lives saved and economic and psy-
chological estimates of the costs imposed on society. These understandings evolved 
as the lockdown proceeded. It made sense to shut down much of the economy 
if this could eradicate or nearly eradicate the disease. Yet lockdowns on such a 
scale become increasingly costly as time passes. Governments struggled to provide 
aid to those thrown out of work (and to businesses shuttered) and incurred huge 
debts in doing so (taxes might have been increased to those like myself who kept 
their jobs, but politicians shied away from that option). Lockdowns were thus eased 
before the disease was eradicated. What to do when infection rates rise again? More 
selective measures seem in order where we worry a lot about high- risk venues like 
residences for the elderly and meatpacking plants and bars, and encourage social dis-
tancing more broadly, but allow most of the economy to proceed as usual. The exact 
policy balance will depend on whether infection rates are at a level with which our 
health systems can cope. This balance is hard to strike because the virus tends to 
expand exponentially as each infected person infects multiple others: Unless it is 
completely eradicated, it bounces back in a big way over time. (Japan and Taiwan 
appear to have been able to have less severe lockdowns because of greater social 
commitment to social distancing; the role of values in fighting a pandemic should 
not be ignored.) We have learned a big lesson – to target our measures strategic-
ally where the benefits exceed the costs – and a number of smaller lessons about 
where the greatest risks lie. It took far too long to appreciate that some workers 
faced far higher risks – meatpacking plants, delivery services, taxis – and that these 
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should have been prioritized for health measures, contact tracing, and vaccination. 
(Discreditably, the fact that such workers were often poor and from ethnic minor-
ities likely contributed to their neglect by authorities.) We have not, but should 
have, learned another lesson: that subsidies to businesses need to be transparent lest 
politicians seize on a pandemic as a glorious opportunity to reward their donors 
and friends. We might usefully plan in advance for transparent disbursements during 
the next pandemic. We also should have learned that we need to structure our 
support for individuals in a way that maintains their incentive to seek the jobs that 
are available.
As stressful as the COVID- 19 pandemic has been, it may have some beneficial 
long- term effects on society. More people have biked to work in order to avoid 
public transport. Many have worked from home. Many cities have expanded areas of 
outside bars and restaurants. These changes have beneficial environmental impacts. 
These can be encouraged by a variety of government policies after the pandemic 
ends (and future pandemics will likely encourage similar activities in future): bike 
lanes, tax deductions for home office expenses, perhaps better treatment in our 
benefits plans of part- time workers, creating more pedestrian- only and patio space 
in our cities. The challenges that governments faced in supporting individual 
incomes have likely advanced conversations around basic income by decades. Yet 
these changes create challenges too, especially for urban planners: What happens 
to city centres if firms and government agencies decide that they really don’t need 
all that office space? What happens to restaurants if workers stay home? Can office 
space be repurposed for residential or public use? There are opportunities here for 
reimagining our cities.
5.2.2 Refugees
In the early decades of this century, the world has not known what to do with 
millions of refugees from civil wars in places like Syria or South Sudan. Yet future 
refugee flows may be much larger. Climate change may submerge some islands and 
coastal areas. Other areas may experience shortages of food or drinking water. Wars 
may be fought over access to water. Refugees may flee authoritarian regimes, per-
haps especially when democracies backslide into authoritarian rule.
Will the world turn away if an idyllic Pacific island disappears under the waves? 
Will refugees be stuck in some hellish refugee camp for decades on some slightly 
higher island? Such an act would violate principles of caring and justice and social 
responsibility: It is not at all their fault that their island disappeared. If refugees are 
allowed to settle elsewhere, will they spark concerns about employment and wel-
fare spending, and intensify critiques of diversity and social spending? Will refugees 
spark border conflicts?
Or will we develop strategies for integrating refugees into a new life? Will we 
explain the new cultural environment to them, help them find jobs and homes? 
Will we encourage them to contribute their own cultural ideas and cuisines, while 
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forging bonds in their new homes? Will we act in a way that is both ethical and 
prudent, so that refugees become neighbours rather than a threat to world peace?
It is quite possible that we will see future refugee flows that will dwarf those we 
already fail to cope with. Yet these likely will still be small relative to total global 
population. If refugees are shared across countries, the burden on any one country is 
reduced. Rich countries can pay poor countries to take refugees. Families and com-
munity groups can sponsor individual refugee families, providing them with a ready 
source of advice on the diverse challenges associated with moving to a new land. 
(Some of the most touching videos on Canadian television during the COVID- 19 
pandemic were of refugees leaving food on the doorsteps of former sponsors forced 
to self- isolate.) A world of several billion people can absorb millions of refugees if 
it has the will to do so.
We will of course need to be careful that our actions do not encourage even 
more refugees. Yet it is fairly easy to identify situations where people have little 
choice but to flee. These people deserve to be helped. A prudent strategy is to 
address these situations before they flare up: to arrest climate change before islands 
are flooded, to support democracy throughout the world, and to use aid and dip-
lomacy to lessen social strife in poor countries. Both those who fear refugees and 
those who are ready to embrace them should be able to combine in support of 
policies that address the root causes of refugee flows.
5.2.3 Climate change
We have discussed gradual changes in climate in earlier chapters. Yet climate scientists 
worry that there may be tipping points at which the speed of change accelerates. We 
might see fairly dramatic but sustained changes in weather patterns, so that some 
regions become much hotter or drier (or, yes, colder, or wetter) fairly suddenly, and 
this becomes the new normal. Gradual climate change allows gradual adjustments, 
which may involve phasing out agriculture in some regions of the world. Sudden 
climate change may suddenly impoverish entire agricultural regions. Rich coun-
tries can be prepared to offer income support and relocation grants – as we have 
suggested elsewhere for sudden changes in the location of industrial production. 
Poor countries may have limited capacity to prevent sudden mass migration or star-
vation. The world should be prepared to provide massive income support.
A more readily imagined disaster involves a sudden rise in sea level as ice sheets 
slide off Greenland or Antarctica into the ocean. Incredible as it may seem, it is 
quite possible that sea levels could rise by several inches. This may not seem a 
lot, but many low- lying areas would then become subject to flooding. Since we 
can be sure that sea levels will rise slowly over the next decades, it would be pru-
dent to encourage people to move away from such areas now. It is the height of 
imprudence to casually allow further construction in such areas, when such con-
struction might easily be located on higher ground. A more complicated challenge 
emerges on low- lying islands where there may be no alternative to relocating entire 
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communities (or Pacific nations). In some cases, it may be possible to save low- lying 
areas by building a sea wall around them. Much of the Netherlands has survived 
below sea level behind such walls for decades. Where it is possible, it will be better 
to build such walls before the land behind is flooded.
We have seen in recent decades an increase in the frequency of devastating 
storms in many parts of the world. It very much appears that this is the new normal. 
The financial costs associated with storms (and other disasters) have skyrocketed, 
because of both increased storm frequency and increased density of structures in 
storm- prone areas. We should thus be careful of building on the floodplains of any 
river or along coastlines. Since weather patterns may shift, we must worry about the 
floodplains of rivers that have not flooded in decades. We should certainly expect 
that rivers that have flooded recently may flood again fairly soon. Yet flood- relief 
programmes often assist flood victims to rebuild on the spot. We will collectively 
reap the cost of such policies. However, individuals should be warned not to expect 
public relief if they build on a floodplain against the advice of the government. The 
balance we have often sought in this book between social and personal responsi-
bility would indicate that the public should help those guided by stupid govern-
ment policies but not those guided by their own stupidity.
We have also seen an increased incidence in recent years of devastating forest 
fires. This reflects both climate change and the steady encroachment of humans 
onto forest land. Humans can be lauded for liking to see trees out their windows. 
But houses are much less likely to burn if separated from forests by farms or parks or 
golf courses. And we can build houses out of materials that are less likely to burn for 
not much more than it costs to build with flammable materials. We can (at some-
what greater expense) also bury electric wiring, which often sparks fires.
5.2.4 Natural disasters
Along with those disasters resulting from climate change, humanity may face a wide 
array of natural disasters that are not our fault. The most obvious are earthquakes 
(and resulting tsunamis) and volcanoes. Humanity is powerless to stop such events 
(at least for the near future). We are, however, increasingly good at predicting them, 
at least hours or days in advance. Rich countries could usefully help poor coun-
tries establish the necessary sensors. Even a few hours’ warning can result in many 
lives saved.
We also know how to construct buildings so that they can withstand an earth-
quake. Rich countries have improved building codes in areas that are most likely to 
experience an earthquake. It is worth devoting a little extra expense in construc-
tion to save structures and lives during an earthquake – if we have good reason 
to suspect that there may be one in the next decades. Still, it appears that we 
under- invest in initiatives to protect our buildings and infrastructure, for we fail 
to take into account the full costs of destruction. Poorer countries naturally find 
it harder to insist on extra expense up front. Yet if political leaders there were less 
present- focused they might also toughen – and enforce – building codes. Poor 
 
Coping with surprises 139
neighbourhoods in rich countries often also struggle to abide by building standards 
set centrally. Yet the poor often suffer disproportionally from disasters, because they 
are often located in places that are more dangerous and live in flimsier buildings. 
Our disaster mitigation policies should take into account the challenges faced by 
the poorest communities both before and after disaster.
The efforts of some locales to prepare for earthquakes is a laudable instance 
of human prudence. We are less prudent with respect to other scenarios. Some 
scientists worry that a solar flare might wipe out the electrical and communications 
grid across a huge swathe of earth facing the sun at the time. It would take weeks or 
months to repair these systems, and in the meantime water supply and food supply 
might both be threatened. We should strive to insulate our systems from such a 
calamity. We have developed satellites that should give us a half- hour warning of 
a massive flare; this might allow us to protect some systems. But we have no real 
backup plan. We should ensure that essential services have backup generators. Last 
but not least, it is probably a good idea to have local food and water stockpiles.
The earth is visited regularly by space debris. Every century or so a meteorite 
strikes that is large enough to do damage if it hits a populated area. With far 
less frequency the earth is struck by an asteroid that wreaks devastation on the 
entire planet. It may be too simple to say that one single asteroid killed all the 
dinosaurs, but it is clear that the asteroid in question (we think it struck the Yucatan 
Peninsula) annihilated many species. The geological record provides evidence of 
several other asteroids with a global impact. We should have little doubt that it 
will happen again, though it is hard to predict whether this will happen years or 
millennia from now. How much effort should we put into worrying about this? 
The probability of an asteroid strike in the next decades is close to zero. Yet such a 
strike could destroy the human race. We at present monitor the cosmos unevenly 
and so will see asteroids coming from some directions much earlier than others. 
Still we can take solace that astronomers have not identified any large body headed 
in our direction. Could we do anything about it if we saw an asteroid coming 
toward us? We have the capability of launching craft far into space, but these could 
not easily carry a payload that might deflect the course of an asteroid. (NASA is 
experimenting with a rocket that might deflect a smallish asteroid.) The beauty 
of asteroids is that – unlike volcanoes or earthquakes – we could potentially have 
years of warning that one was headed our way. It might be worth a few bucks to 
scan the near universe a bit more carefully. An approaching asteroid would focus 
minds wonderfully on how we might deal with it. (And yes, it might enhance our 
shared appreciation that we all depend on the survival of our planet, and indirectly 
of our shared humanity.)
5.2.5 Nuclear disaster
We know that disasters are possible at nuclear power plants. We know that these 
can have dire consequences for local populations. We know that they can generate 
clouds of radioactive particles that can endanger distant populations.
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We also know that climate change threatens our way of life. Nuclear power 
provides one alternative to generating power with oil and gas and coal. We need 
to carefully evaluate the risks associated with these alternatives, and compare the 
overall costs (including these risks) of different ways of generating energy. There is 
much scope for expert advice on these questions. Yet the broader citizenry needs 
to be involved in these discussions, for they need to decide which risks they are 
willing to take.
We do already demand stringent safety standards in nuclear power plants. We 
still have no good idea of what to do with nuclear waste produced by such plants. 
We have evacuation plans but these are likely to prove inadequate in an emergency. 
We have treatments for radiation poisoning but are not capable of treating large 
numbers of victims simultaneously. We know that even the most stringent engin-
eering standards cannot reduce the risk of disaster to zero. We must also attach some 
risk to a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility. We should likely be better prepared 
for disaster.
5.2.6 Terrorism
I argued in Making Sense of World History that terrorism rarely if ever works. Indeed 
terrorism has in many cases made it more difficult to achieve the goals that terrorists 
were pursuing. Some might be tempted to justify some terrorist acts if these achieve 
certain social goals. But if terrorism does not work, then this dangerous argument 
falls apart. Terrorism is then something we should all oppose.
Modern technology facilitates terrorism. It is all too easy to kill large numbers 
with modern weaponry. It is not possible to protect every possible terrorist target. 
Moreover, there is a significant risk that terrorist groups might get their hands on 
even worse weapons in future, whether nuclear or biological in nature. We depend a 
lot, then, on police and intelligence services to identify terrorists before they strike. 
We must take care that these services have the necessary resources. We must be 
careful, though, that we spy and interrogate in ways that respect human rights. We 
can easily incite terrorism with our efforts to eliminate it.
Democracy thrives on freedom and respect for human rights. Democracy 
works best when the vast majority act with a basic respect for the state and its 
laws. Democracies must always struggle to police those who disdain these rights. 
Terrorism is an existential challenge to democracy, for it is hard to strike the best 
balance between respecting rights and achieving security. A concerted terrorist 
threat will force the most dedicated democrats to abandon cherished principles.
It is critical, then, that we not exaggerate the dangers of terrorism. The numbers 
killed in terror attacks are dwarfed by the numbers killed in car accidents every 
year. We manage to live our daily lives despite the knowledge that some reckless 
driver may crash into us at any moment, and should not allow fears of much- rarer 
terrorist attacks to paralyse us. Of course, the possibility that terrorists might gain 
access to weapons of mass destruction is worth worrying about. We should focus 
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our intelligence efforts on preventing large- scale attacks (and we could likely do a 
better job of policing supplies of plutonium or biological agents).
Many of the strategies and goals pursued in this book should act to limit the 
causes of terrorism. We cannot stop every loser who somehow thinks they have 
a right to kill others, but we can achieve much by enhancing faith in democracy, 
encouraging respect for diversity, encouraging international peace and collabor-
ation, encouraging self- knowledge, and reducing inequality and uncertainty. These 
can work against both domestic and global terrorism.
We have found out the hard way that global terrorist movements are a threat 
to everyone. It should then be a no- brainer that rich countries should help 
governments everywhere in the world to battle terrorist threats. Yet it seems quite 
possible that in the next decades swathes of West Africa will come to play the role in 
fostering international terrorism that parts of the Middle East have played in recent 
decades. African governments are receiving some aid in fighting terrorist insurgents, 
but not enough to achieve victory. We should care about the terror being unleashed 
against innocent Africans – as when schoolgirls are kidnapped and forced to marry 
fighters. We may well find that we have more personal reasons for regret in the 
decades to come.
BOX 5.1: IMMIGRATION AND TERRORISM
I have skirted a thorny issue of whether we should reduce the immigration of 
people from religious or ethnic or ideological groups that have a higher pro-
pensity to commit acts of terrorism. The first point to stress here is that terrorists 
are an exceedingly small minority of any group. We would probably have no 
qualms about restricting migration if half a group were terrorists. However, 
if the propensity to terror is minuscule then we face a conflict between our 
desire to achieve security and our belief in rights and respect for diversity. 
We have, for good reason, laws that prevent discrimination, including by our 
police forces. We do not (officially) allow police to target particular groups. 
Should we give different instructions to our immigration authorities?
This is the sort of question that modern societies should be able to talk 
about. We should be able to appreciate that people may disagree, and feel 
very strongly about their reasons for disagreement. Human rights are not 
negotiable for some. Security is not negotiable for others. This may be yet 
another place where a citizens’ assembly might be useful, though we should 
not imagine that everyone will be satisfied with its findings.
While this particular issue may be contentious, there are related issues that 
most people might agree on: that we should help immigrants integrate into 
the wider society, that we should pursue a transparent foreign policy, and that 
we should actively pursue respect for diversity.
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5.2.7 Civil strife
We have in this book stressed a set of strategies and policies that can benefit most 
members of society. Yet democratic decision- making can easily descend into a 
battle over resources where policies are advocated that benefit some at the expense 
of others. In such an environment resentment can simmer for a while, but may 
explode into civil strife over even fairly trifling disagreements. That outcome may 
still be distant, but there have already been some frightening events where ideo-
logical zealots have assassinated politicians, conspiracy theories have led to attacks 
on innocent people, and demonstrators have clashed on the streets of democracies. 
Social media is rife with hateful commentary and threats, mostly inspired by cow-
ardice but occasionally motivating readers to action.
One does not want to engage in fearmongering. Nevertheless, can we rule out 
large- scale riots? Can we rule out violence targeted at political opponents? We 
discussed a slow slide into violence in  chapter 4, but a sudden uptick in violence is 
perhaps even likelier. We can imagine a variety of triggers:
• A very close election result, especially if there are concerns about electoral 
wrongdoing, or doubts about the fairness of electoral procedures. (Any elect-
oral system that does not ensure that the person or the party or coalition with 
majority support wins an election is a ticking time bomb.)
• An economic downturn in which aid appears to be lavished on some groups 
more than others.
• A foreign conflict that is supported by some but opposed by others
• Any government policy which appears to reward one minority or punish 
another.
• Any of the surprises we have addressed above that are handled badly or in a 
biased manner.
In a hyper- partisan environment, the exercise of violence by one side can easily 
trigger a violent response. Each side will feel aggrieved. Compromise will become 
ever harder to achieve as attacks continue. Note that it only takes a small minority 
on each side to begin a process of violent retribution that becomes hard to stop.
As noted previously, governments must strike a balance between protecting 
freedom and maintaining public order. They will necessarily adjust that balance 
in response to violence. Some limits must be placed on violent acts, even if that 
means limiting rights to demonstrate and even to speak. Yet these actions will in 
turn weaken support for democratic governance. [Again, these words were first 
drafted before the Black Lives Matters protests of 2020, and the intense debates 
these sparked about how to limit a violent minority while respecting the peaceful 
majority of protestors.]
The simple fact is that we may not have a lot of time in which to correct demo-
cratic deficiencies. Democracy is like a balloon: Once it is popped, it will prove hard 
to put back together. Sadly, we may have to teeter on the edge of disaster before 
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recognizing the danger. Hopefully, we will be so lucky as to be able to back away 
from the edge.
5.2.8 Another depression?
Decades ago, I wrote a book about the Great Depression of the 1930s. I argued 
that that catastrophe owed much to an abundance of labour- saving process 
innovation at the time, and a very limited amount of new goods or services 
being developed. I noted then that such a severe mismatch between the two 
types of innovation was unlikely to occur again. Industrial activity and innov-
ation was then focused on a small number of sectors (with automobiles alone 
accounting for one- eighth of industrial employment in the United States). Both 
economies and the research enterprise have become much more diversified 
since. Nevertheless, the downturn of the 1970s arguably reflected similar forces, 
and I have thus urged governments to encourage the development of new goods 
and services in  chapter 3.
I worried in my book that economic theory had become sceptical of the 
government’s ability to fight unemployment, and that governments might therefore 
react sluggishly to a sharp downturn in economic activity in the future as they had 
in the 1930s. Yet in both the financial crisis of 2008 and the COVID- 19 pandemic 
of 2020, governments have proven quite willing to spend vast sums to maintain 
economic activity. The perceptive reader may take this as evidence that my own 
ability to predict the future has limits. I worried too much about what economists 
were thinking, whereas the broader public still expected governments to try to fight 
recessions. Governments regardless of ideological stripe responded to these public 
expectations – a sign that political bickering can be set aside when a societal goal is 
brought into sharp focus.
I would thus have confidence that we will not see another period of eco-
nomic contraction as severe as the Great Depression – unless triggered by a pan-
demic or sunburst or some other calamity from far outside the economic system. 
Nevertheless, prudence suggests that we have policies in place – like a basic 
income – that support incomes quickly in the event of a sharp economic contrac-
tion. Otherwise, contractions are self- reinforcing for a while as those who lose their 
jobs decrease their expenditures and cause further job losses.
The reader may be tired of how often a basic income gets mentioned in this 
book. Yet this one policy supports goals of reducing both inequality and insecurity 
while preparing society to cope with a wide range of surprises. We set out in this 
book to identify strategies that support multiple goals and have identified a strong 
possibility. We still need to estimate its cost – and thus the degree to which it 
detracts from our goal of economic prosperity. Yet if it turns out that a basic income 
replaces other government programmes that are costlier to administer (and may 
have even worse incentive effects than a basic income if they discourage people 
from working), and serves to limit the size of recessions, it may be that the effect on 
economic prosperity is either limited or positive.
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5.2.9 Dramatic increases or decreases in the price of food or water
We noted in  chapter 4 that food output has risen faster than population over the 
last several decades, and can be expected to do so into the future. Yet there have 
been sharp spikes in the global price of foods in the twenty- first century. Harvest 
failures in just a couple of key growing regions can lead to dramatic increases in 
price. There is a simple reason for this: People need to eat and will devote most or 
all of their income to eating if they have to. Yet demand and supply in global food 
markets is roughly balanced, and so a shock to supply causes prices to surge.
Climate change may increase the frequency of harvest failures from both drought 
and flood. Natural disasters can also disrupt agricultural production: A major vol-
cano, in particular, can block sunlight for months or years (as Krakatoa did in the 
nineteenth century). We started this chapter with a discussion of pandemics; we 
should appreciate that diseases can and do strike our crops and farm animals with 
devastating consequences. Civil strife can also interfere with agricultural production.
Human societies have dealt with the challenge of volatility in food prices for 
millennia. Sometimes, states did little and the poorest people suffered extreme 
hunger and even starvation. Often, states held stockpiles of non- perishable foods 
and released these if prices rose high enough to cause distress. The states that did 
so often found that the strategy was not too expensive. They bought grains when 
prices were low and might then sell these at a higher price – but still one that 
people could afford.
We need not stockpile huge amounts of food to insulate ourselves against 
most price spikes. A decrease of just a per cent or two in world food production 
can send prices very high. Since governments often try to support farmer incomes 
when prices are low, it may not be costly at all to buy enough food during abundant 
harvests to see us through one year of bad harvests.
Note that we do not want to totally erase price volatility. We need to encourage 
farmers to grow, and so must allow them to benefit to some extent when prices 
rise. A moderate policy of stockpiling, that serves to raise prices a bit when food is 
cheap but lower prices a lot when food is expensive, can strike a balance between 
rewarding farmers while preventing hunger.
Climate change may disrupt agriculture production for years. Population may 
grow faster than food output (though this has not happened yet). Humanity has 
never in the modern era dealt well with several years in a row of insufficient harvests. 
It may be prudent to stockpile more than enough for a year or two. Yet it would 
be even better to reduce the likelihood of multiple years of bad harvests. The best 
strategies here are those we have discussed previously for arresting climate change 
and limiting population growth. We need also to be careful that we are not slowly 
destroying the fertility of our soils with chemical fertilizers and insecticides.
Water is not traded globally in the same way that food is. Spikes in the price 
of water will thus be more localized than spikes in the price of food. They will 
reflect changes in rainfall patterns, or perhaps wars that interfere with access to 
fresh water. Humans need water even more desperately than they need food. At 
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present, humans consume more water than global rainfall, and thus aquifers are 
being drained in many parts of the world. There is, again, scope for stockpiling 
during good times. The costs of transporting water indicate that there need to be 
stockpiles in all regions of the world, and some regions already have limited scope 
for this. The world might still find itself needing to transport large amounts of 
water to a region suddenly afflicted by drought or war. Prudent strategies include 
decreasing water consumption (which will in some cases involve charging big users 
more for it, while recognizing that people need water), water retention (including 
fixing our pipes: it is estimated that 10 per cent of the globe’s clean water is lost 
through leakage), limiting deforestation, managing aquifers (which in many cases 
will involve international agreement), and researching technologies such as desal-
ination and recycling.
5.2.10 War
We have in earlier chapters proposed strategies for encouraging peace. Yet we 
should nevertheless be prepared for some future war. Authoritarians can whip up 
public support for a war by arguing that this will gain resources or people with 
whom locals either have an affinity or a desire to punish. Many of the world’s 
borders are arbitrary – especially those drawn by colonial governments in Africa. 
Lacking any sensible international protocol for revising borders – which might 
involve some combination of international arbitration and referenda among people 
in contested regions, and maybe international funding of some land swaps where 
peoples are interspersed – governments may feel justified in taking matters into 
their own hands.
In the past, leaders have often miscalculated the costs and benefits of war, and 
some future war may also result from some leader underestimating the horrors of war 
while exaggerating the benefits. Wars can also be fomented by misunderstandings: If 
one side comes to feel threatened or insulted, a war may result that nobody wanted. 
International collaboration and adherence to rules of international conduct can 
reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation.
As noted above, modern warfare can be brutal, with great suffering inflicted 
on civilian populations. What should the rest of the world do when war erupts in 
some part of the globe? This is not a question easily answered in the abstract, for it 
depends in turn on the answers to a set of ethical and practical questions. It is never-
theless valuable to know those questions in advance. Is there one side in the war 
that has broad public support? Is there one side that seems dedicated to democracy 
and human rights? Can a peacekeeping force limit hostilities? Will locals welcome 
a peacekeeping force? Is there a feasible and obvious end goal? If the answer to all 
of these questions is positive, then a case can be made for stepping in. If the answer 
to some questions is negative, then the ideal policy is much harder to determine.
Will nuclear deterrents continue to prevent nuclear war? Probably. Yet there is 
always a danger that some country gains a technological advantage and then thinks 
that they can either take out an opponent’s entire arsenal or completely defend 
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against reprisal. The temptation to attack may then be great. The side with the 
new- found technological advantage may decide that there is a narrow window of 
opportunity before the technological gap is closed. This risk will not go away until 
all countries with nuclear capability are democratic, but can be attenuated by efforts 
at international collaboration politically, economically, and culturally.
5.2.11 Contact with extraterrestrials
It is increasingly likely that humans will discover clear evidence of intelligent life on 
other planets. We have already identified numerous planets circling distant stars that 
appear to have the potential of supporting life. Since we have only the vaguest ideas 
of how we might ever travel beyond our solar system, the probability of contact 
with extraterrestrials is much lower. Yet we cannot dismiss the possibility that some 
extraterrestrial species has developed far superior technology to our own. While 
visitation by extraterrestrials is still unlikely, the effects would be so huge that it is 
worth speculating on how humanity should prepare for such an eventuality. (I have 
for decades had exam questions in which students were asked to speculate on the 
impacts on various phenomena of visitation by emissaries from the planet Zorbon.)
The most obvious precaution, perhaps, is that earth should negotiate with 
extraterrestrials in unison. We do not want extraterrestrials negotiating landing 
rights or military bases with one rogue earthly state. We can be reminded how 
human empires of the past sowed discord among subject peoples in order to main-
tain their power. Though the United Nations has limited legitimacy – because 
so many members are undemocratic, and decision- making in the bureaucracy is 
opaque – there is no present alternative to endowing that body with the sole right to 
negotiate with extraterrestrials. We should, at the same time, strive both to enhance 
democracy globally and to increase the transparency of UN decision- making.
Some may be tempted to hide from extraterrestrials, at least until we can develop 
technologies to defend ourselves against a fleet of starships. If we stop beaming 
radio signals into space, maybe they will not know that we are here. Yet this seems 
a foolhardy strategy: If there is a species out there with the ability to travel between 
stars, it will find us. We had best hope that they are friendly. If they are not entirely 
friendly, our best hope is unified defiance.
Whether they are friendly or not, contact with extraterrestrials will likely cause 
humans to reflect on our common humanity. We tend these days to be more con-
scious of the differences between groups than of our basic human commonalities, 
but our differences may seem trivial if we come to converse with other life- forms. 
We may be far less likely to war with each other if we need to focus on how to deal 
with others. Even the task of reflecting on how we would deal with extraterrestrials 
may have salutary effects on international relations and cultural toleration.
It is harder to predict the cultural implications. When Europeans (and by exten-
sion Asians and Africans) encountered the then unknown Americas in the late fif-
teenth century, this sparked a great deal of soul- searching. Many questioned the 
wisdom of both religious prophets and secular philosophers who had been unaware 
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of half the globe. In the Americas, cultural change was even more dramatic as both 
epidemics and military conquest drove many locals to abandon local deities that 
seemed to have forsaken them. What sort of cultural changes might unfold as a 
result of extraterrestrial contact? Europeans and Native Americans each marvelled 
at the strange customs of the other. How would we react to the undoubtedly 
strange customs of extraterrestrials? Would cultural attitudes change so dramatically 
as to cause cultural dislocation, as happened with many indigenous groups in the 
Americas? Or can we develop enough shared sense of what it means to be human 
that we can survive any surprise?
Even if there are not extraterrestrials out there waiting to meet us, it may be 
useful for humanity to reflect on what it would mean if there were. It might 
prove wonderful to gain better evidence of life on other planets. We might then 
gain a better understanding of ourselves and a greater appreciation of our global 
community.
Indeed there is an important puzzle at our present stage of seeking intelligent 
life on other planets. As noted above, we have in the last decades identified a vast 
number of planets that seem capable of supporting life. Yet we have found abso-
lutely no sign of intelligent life anywhere else in the universe. Are our techniques 
for identifying the signs of intelligent life that bad? Is the emergence of life, and then 
intelligent life, really so unlikely that it has only happened once? Or do civilizations 
that achieve the sorts of technological capabilities that we seek to identify char-
acteristically destroy themselves very quickly? There may then have been many 
emergences of intelligent life, but it is unlikely that there will be multiple intelligent 
life- forms at any point in time (recall that all of human history is but a moment 
compared to the billions of years that the universe has existed). We had best hope 
that it is not the last of these.
BOX 5.2: THE PRIME DIRECTIVE
The television and movie franchise Star Trek imagined a future in which humans 
were among the most technologically advanced species in the universe. The 
popularity of this and other science fiction indicates that humans have a curi-
osity about a future of extraterrestrial contact.
Star Trek producers early on invented the “Prime Directive,” by which 
starships were absolutely prohibited from interfering with the independent 
cultural development of less technologically advanced species they might 
encounter. This directive was likely developed in response to some familiarity 
with the cultural dislocation suffered by indigenous groups on earth after 
encountering outsiders with modern technology for the first time. On at least 
one episode, it was wondered if the Prime Directive prevented the rescue of a 
species from an impending natural disaster. I never liked the Prime Directive. 
It struck me as both arrogant and stupid to decide what is best for others, 
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especially in situations where we could clearly help them. I think we need to 
approach such groups carefully – whether in the Amazon or in space – but 
should let them decide which of our technologies and customs they might 
want to borrow.
5.2.12 A plea for interdisciplinarity
There will surely be other surprises in our future. Indeed, we might reasonably be 
accused of having in this chapter identified the least surprising surprises. What can 
we do to take a stab at identifying more surprising surprises (what some would 
call “unknown unknowns,” the things we do not even know that we should worry 
about)? One key strategy here is to encourage interdisciplinary research. I found 
in Making Sense of World History that the major transformations in world history – 
which would have been big surprises at the time – involved interactions among 
phenomena generally studied by different disciplines (and there are dozens of 
flowcharts in that book that establish this point). The development of agriculture 
arguably reflected (at least) changes in population, environment, and technology 
(and in turn had dramatic effects on environment, population, economy, politics, 
and social structure). The expansion in the size of state bureaucracies over the 
last century reflects political, economic, and technological developments, and has 
impacts on phenomena studied across the human sciences.
Despite the historical importance of cross- disciplinary linkages, the vast majority 
of research in the contemporary academy occurs within disciplines. Moreover, dis-
ciplinary theories often posit some sort of stability in the system of phenomena 
that they study (economic stability, chemical stability, social stability). They recog-
nize theoretically that this stability can be shocked by influences from phenomena 
outside the system, but devote the bulk of their attention to the systems of stability. 
We thus know far more about the forces driving stability than the cross- disciplinary 
interactions that tend to drive instability. If we can encourage a greater emphasis on 
interdisciplinary research within the academy, we will surely identify other plaus-
ible surprises.
BOX 5.3: NARRATIVE
We have in box 4.6 and elsewhere urged student exercises that focus on 
drawing diagrams. Yet futurists understandably often stress the importance of 
“narrative” in imagining both plausible and desirable futures. Narrative is often 
defined broadly, so that it could mean careful causal argumentation in words, 
or the crafting of metaphors that capture some key element of the future. But 
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it is often used in the more narrow sense of “telling a story.” Such narratives 
can take several forms. They can describe life in some imagined future – in 
short story form or perhaps in the format of a newspaper or magazine art-
icle. They can tell a tale of how humans make good or bad decisions, and the 
effects these have: That is, they can tell us something about how we might 
get to certain futures. This is a good point in the book to suggest a narrative 
exercise: Students should draft a short story (or produce a short film that tells 
a story) or newspaper or magazine article from the future. Note that a compel-
ling narrative will likely address more than one of the trends of  chapter 4 and 
surprises of  chapter 5 (or policies advocated in  chapter 3). One point of this 
book is that humans live in a complex world, and thus life in the future will be 
different in many ways (but also recognizable in many ways).
Futurists, it should be noted, do not just draft narratives but carefully examine 
the narratives of others. How do people speak about the future: Are they opti-
mistic or fearful? Do they have confidence in other people, governments, 
businesses, or NGOs to make good decisions? Do they blame certain groups 
or individuals for life’s injustices? We have stressed at many points in this book 
that values and beliefs are important, and must then appreciate that the way 
humans imagine the future will influence if and how they try to shape that 
future. For example, a belief that “economic growth is good” likely underpins 
a host of human decisions. It has been argued that countries that tell stories of 
working together have dealt with the COVID- 19 pandemic better than coun-
tries that are either fatalistic or focused on blaming others.
It is important, then, that we reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of 
narrative. On the plus side, humans love stories and these can have a powerful 
effect on them. It is indeed an intriguing psychological observation that most 
humans prefer reading works of fiction to works of non- fiction: Why do we 
devote so much effort to reading made- up accounts rather than efforts at his-
tory or biography? One hypothesis is that works of fiction allow us to inhabit 
lives other than our own, learn other perspectives, and learn how humans 
make complex decisions. A well- crafted narrative has the potential to inspire 
humans to action. Stories can give meaning to people’s lives if we see a role 
for ourselves in a story that is bigger than us. And a narrative approach forces 
us to confront questions of detail – what do people eat and wear, where do 
they live, how do they work and travel – that we might otherwise omit in a 
study of the future. As noted above, a good narrative will be complex, cap-
turing how different trends and policies and surprises interact. It can help us 
appreciate key steps on the path to both better and worse futures. Last but 
not least, narratives are a format in which our subconscious thought processes 
speak to the world: We have stressed the importance of creatively grappling 
with our future in this book, and should appreciate that we may find ideas 
we were not consciously aware of in both our narratives and the narratives of 
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others. A narrative may also expose biases that we or others would consciously 
disdain.
On the down side, narrative may guide humans to negative acts. A narrative 
that blames other groups for life’s problems can inspire discrimination and vio-
lence. Note that humans have a tendency to personalize stories: We can tell 
students a complex historical process where various impersonal forces were at 
work, and they in retelling it will stress the role of human actors making delib-
erate decisions. Conspiracy theories are popular in part because they blame 
bad things on purposeful evil acts rather than a complex world that humans 
struggle to influence in desired directions. Humans also like stories that come 
to a clear end, but human history is a set of overlapping stories which may 
never come to resolution. Humans are thus tempted to simplify our views 
of both past and future, limiting our ability to grapple with complexity and 
surprises. Literary theorists are fond of noting that narratives are full of ambi-
guity: This may guide us to grapple with complexity, but means that it is easy 
to draw quite different lessons from the same narrative. We should be willing 
to carefully interrogate the lessons we draw from stories.
There is, we might note, a debate among futurists about the role that 
science fiction should play in the field. Do authors of science fiction have spe-
cial insights? Do works of science fiction give us useful glimpses of plausible 
or desirable futures? Some futurists worry that we may reify works of science 
fiction, treating them much as if they were histories of the future. There is (of 
course!) a possible student assignment here where students can analyse the 
plausibility of a science fiction story of their choice, and ask what if anything 
we might learn from the story that we can apply to shaping our collective 
future.
BOX 5.4: THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM GLOBAL 
RISKS REPORT
I had drafted most of this chapter before I came across the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) survey of risks facing the global economy. It is not surprising that 
our lists overlap a great deal. Many of what they call risks and I call surprises 
are easy to identify. Sadly, this need not mean that we are not both unaware 
of some risks/ surprises on our collective horizon. The WEF talks more about 
cyberattacks and data breaches than I do; this is a worthy subject for concern 
about which I know vanishingly little. The WEF has produced really complex 
diagrams that show how the various risks they have identified might interact. 
See www3.weforum.org/ docs/ WEF_ Global_ Risks_ Report_ 2019.pdf, pp. 6– 7.
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5.3 Interactions among surprises
Some of our surprises come from outside of human society: natural disasters, con-
tact with extraterrestrials. Yet in other cases, one surprise can result from other 
surprises: Wars and natural disasters can unleash floods of refugees, terrorism can 
lead to nuclear disasters, volcanoes and earthquakes can lead to local spikes in the 
price of food and water. Almost any surprise can cause civil strife if people are 
desperate or if governments seem unprepared or uncaring. Wars and refugee crises 
could likewise be triggered by several other surprises (see Figure 5.1).
Almost all surprises have economic and political repercussions. We will be more 
resilient in our response to any surprise, then, if we have managed in advance to 
create institutions that provide economic security and that provide confidence in 
our collective decision- making capabilities. While we cannot know which precise 
surprises will happen, we can be supremely confident that we will be surprised. We 
should prepare ourselves for these surprises by putting in place what are effectively 
insurance policies against both economic and political disruption.
Surprises are nevertheless unique. Even a well- prepared society will want to 
respond to particular surprises in particular ways. The challenge here is that societies 
must usually make decisions regarding responses very quickly. As the COVID- 19 
pandemic unfolded in 2020, governments spent unheard- of sums of money on 
programmes that were cobbled together in a matter of weeks. Such programmes 

















FIGURE 5.1 Interactions among surprises.
Note that we are only capturing links here between surprises, not all of the negative 
impacts that surprises may have. It is still useful to appreciate that surprises might 
cluster, magnifying the effects of the original surprise. Not all of these arrows were 
discussed in the text, but readers should not have difficulty understanding how, say, a 
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get out the door fast. There was, in fact, a big implicit argument regarding waste 
at work: Millions of families had lost employment overnight and it was judged 
worthwhile to aim money at them even if much of it might miss its target. There 
was huge scope for malfeasance, for special interests to lobby that some of these vast 
sums should flow through them.
The COVID- 19 pandemic was a special kind of surprise in which public 
works programmes would have been infeasible because they usually involve people 
working in groups. For other surprises, it would be useful to have a set of initiatives 
“on the shelf ” that might be put into play in an emergency situation. More gen-
erally, it is useful to develop strategies that may seem unlikely to garner public 
support soon, for these may suddenly seem worth a try in the aftermath of a sur-
prise. Societies will almost inevitably try something new to cope with a surprise, 
and should have ready recourse to good ideas when they do.
There is an old saying: “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” Crises are oppor-
tunities for change. We can be sure that the self- interested will mobilize quickly to 
turn a crisis to their advantage. People of goodwill can, by developing strategies for 
a better world, hope to see crises as opportunities for societal change in beneficial 
directions. If we need to stimulate economic activity, then let’s stimulate green 
energy or clean up our parks. Let’s also appreciate that the poorest people are most 
likely to spend their income rather than save it, and thus putting them to work 
ensures that their incomes benefit others. Stimulus programmes that target the poor 
are therefore more likely to achieve their goal.
BOX 5.5: SWOT ANALYSIS
Organizations are often encouraged to do a SWOT analysis, identifying the 
organization’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. We are 
now well placed to do a SWOT analysis for the world as a whole, and espe-
cially of developed country democracies. Our strengths were most obvious in 
 chapters 2 and 3, and our weaknesses in 3 and 4. Threats and opportunities 
were highlighted in  chapters 4 and 5. Note that the same phenomenon may 
appear in more than one place.
Strengths:
• Economic prosperity as never before seen in all of human history. We thus 
can afford to do lots of different things.
• Health and life expectancy never before seen in world history.
• Technological and scientific understandings far superior to any previous 
period in history.
• Increased respect for societal diversity.
• Institutions (in many countries) that protect individuals from abuse of power.
• Great personal freedom in many countries.
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Weaknesses:
• Widespread suspicion of government. This limits our capacity to collectively 
address our weaknesses and threats, and seize our opportunities.
• Limited and declining appreciation of the value of democratic governance 
and the protections of rights and freedoms.
• Widespread suspicion of experts, and misunderstanding of how science 
works. This limits our capacity to reach collective decisions about desirable 
strategies.
• Declining sense of community, and increasing disrespect for the views of 
others. Democracy depends on a shared sense of purpose.
• An ethical vacuum in which virtually nobody urges ethical behaviour.
Threats:
• Climate change.
• Increased inequality. This is bad for the economy but even worse for 
democracy.
• Possible severe economic contraction, perhaps due to climate change or 
resource constraints.
• New diseases.
• Social strife of any sort that can cause a backlash against both democracy 
and diversity.
• War resulting from either a failure to support international institutions, or 
the development of new military technology, or possibly the abuse of gen-
etic engineering.
• Note that every crisis presents an opportunity for bad policy decisions 
whether through desperation or self- interest of policy- makers.
Opportunities:
• Feasible strategies to not only address all of our threats and weaknesses but 
achieve desirable futures.
• Every crisis presents an opportunity for introducing positive change.
• Improved democratic decision- making can better address all other 
weaknesses and threats.
• We can reinvigorate an ethical core of values.





6.1 Guidelines for advocacy
Readers will hopefully have appreciated at least some of the strategies that we have 
outlined in preceding chapters for guiding society toward desirable futures. Ideally, 
readers will be motivated to support such strategies. The question then arises of 
how individuals can work toward the achievement of such strategies.
Strategies for advocating public policy or societal change are still strategies, and 
should follow guidelines for strategies such as those outlined in section 3.1. To avoid 
confusion with the strategies that we have outlined in preceding chapters, we will 
refer to “strategies for advocacy” as “approaches to advocacy” or just “approaches” 
in what follows. We will want to evaluate approaches to advocacy in terms of the 
five criteria for evaluation we applied in both  chapters 2 and 3. We will want to ask 
whether we can achieve broad support across people that rely on each of the five 
types of evaluation for both the strategies we recommend and the approaches we 
pursue to advocate for these.
We must in particular urge honesty in our acts of persuasion. Since honesty is 
one of our societal goals, we must pursue this goal while seeking broader societal 
change. In any case, we want public support that will last, and this is unlikely if we 
lie to people in order to gain their support.
This approach may strike some as hopelessly naïve. Politics is a cruel game filled 
with selfish and cunning operators (but not exclusively). It may seem that we have 
to roll in the mud in order to get anything accomplished. Yet are we really likely 
to create institutions that encourage honest government by exercising duplicity? 
Alternatively, is it better to create social pressure such that even scuzzy politicians 
see advantages in supporting enlightened policies? In deciding how to act we must 
be wary of the great human capacity for self- deception. It is easy to say “I’ll just tell 
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this one lie, or take that one bribe, or make one inappropriate promise, in order to 
get elected, and then I’ll do good work.” It is quite easy to then repeat this ration-
alization for temptation after temptation and never quite get around to doing heaps 
of good. The simple fact is that “The ends justify the means” arguments are dan-
gerous and invite a slippery slope where we slide ever further away from our goals.
We have suggested in earlier chapters an array of policies that would clean up 
our decision- making processes. We will want to push for these. We will also want to 
act in accord with these as we advocate: If we believe in citizens’ assemblies then we 
should encourage conversations among diverse people. If we believe in referenda 
then we should perform broad surveys.
We should also stress a couple of additional criteria that we mentioned in 
 chapter 3. When we speak of advocacy, we are speaking of urging society in par-
ticular directions. We should have our goals clearly in mind and take reasonable steps 
toward achieving them. We should be humble, and thus willing to take small steps 
or experiment if possible. However, we should be willing to build public support 
for bold initiatives where small steps are infeasible. We should appreciate that per-
fection is generally beyond our grasp, but that “much better” is often possible.
This chapter is organized topically rather than chronologically. That is, we do not 
describe a set of sequential steps in advocacy. Our customary integrative exercise 
at the end of this chapter will discuss how we can move between various advocacy 
tasks through time.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
Does an approach to advocacy have the potential for broad support? Does 
it accord with each of the five guidelines for evaluation? Is it honest? Can it 
proceed in small steps? Can it be pursued within institutions that encourage 
desired behaviour?
6.2 Gaining public support for strategies
Surveys consistently show that support for social programmes falls dramatically 
if the word “welfare” is used rather than “helping the poor.” This simple example 
shows that the way we frame a strategy can have a huge impact on public attitudes 
toward it.
We have urged approaches to advocacy that accord with each of the five types of 
evaluation outlined in  chapter 2. This will allow us to gain public support for these 
approaches from people who will evaluate our approaches in quite different ways. 
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It is particularly notable that different ideologies tend to be grounded in different 
types of evaluation:
• Conservatives are more open to strategies and approaches that show respect 
for society’s traditions.
• Libertarians and classical liberals are more open to strategies and approaches 
that respect certain rules (especially rights) that they hold dear.
• All are likely open to arguments about consequences, but especially those who 
self- describe as moderate, progressive, or liberal.
• Social democrats and those who self- describe as very progressive are often 
driven by values such as caring or social responsibility. Environmentalists are 
guided by a mix of arguments about consequences and appeals to the value 
of nature.
• Populists often appeal to people’s gut instincts. Though we may at times fear the 
success of populists in appealing to people’s worst instincts, we can applaud and 
recognize the fact that it is important for people to feel emotionally attached 
to strategies and approaches.
We should stress that public support is important not just in the process of 
pursuing a strategy, but later also after the strategy is implemented. We have 
emphasized many times in this book that we need institutions that accord with 
values. Institutions that are broadly supported before the fact are much more likely 
to work in practice. Institutions put in place by a slim majority (or minority) will 
fight to prove themselves and may never function as well as they might.
In framing our arguments we should emphasize that our strategies are both desir-
able and feasible. In doing so, we should be aware of both people’s dreams and fears. 
We need to appeal to their hopes for the future, without unnecessarily triggering 
anxiety. People want a healthy environment but also want jobs, and environmental 
policy needs to be framed in a way that allows for both.
In addition to our emphasis on “framing,” we would also stress that the act 
of persuasion is inherently a creative act. Even those who are most guided by 
arguments from consequences may be more persuaded by a telling anecdote than a 
dry theoretical discourse. Those guided by emotion or values are even more likely 
to be persuaded by real- life examples. Neuroscientists have indeed demonstrated 
that people react more powerfully to a narrative than to the logical presentation of 
the same argument.
We should stress that we can potentially tell stories both about how a cer-
tain strategy might make life better, and about how inaction may make life worse. 
We have in this book argued that various strategies can have a range of good 
consequences. We have also identified a set of troubling trends and worrisome 
surprises. We should not stoop to scaring people unduly but we should feel free 
to warn them of possible bad outcomes should we not act constructively. Sadly, 
people may be more easily motivated to avoid a bad future than inspired to create 
a better one.
Achieving desirable futures 157
We discussed creative processes in  chapter 3. We can prepare ourselves for cre-
ative persuasion by reflecting on how a particular strategy or approach might appeal 
to each of the five types of evaluation. We can then evaluate any creative inspiration 
we might have in terms of how different types of people are likely to perceive a 
particular act of persuasion. It is a good idea to try our ideas out on small groups 
first, for people will often surprise us with how they react to our ideas.
Creativity, we might stress, is no excuse for dishonesty. Our creative efforts at 
persuasion should not mislead. Our anecdotes should not be wildly atypical. Our 
stories should be plausible. If we use diagrams or pictures, these should be realistic.
An example of creative framing may be helpful here. We have argued in favour 
of carbon taxes in  chapter 3, but noted that one key objection to these is that many 
people simply do not like taxes. Savvy politicians thus often speak of a “carbon 
price” or “pollution price.” This is exactly the same thing as a carbon tax – and thus 
has exactly the same consequences in the real world – but it sounds far nicer. This 
is a very honest phrasing because in fact what a carbon tax sets out to do is put a 
price on carbon emissions. Emissions are what is known as an “externality” in eco-
nomics – a cost that is imposed but is not priced by markets. The general econo-
mist recommendation in such cases is to estimate the cost and impose a price. The 
idea of a “carbon price” reflects the simple fact that in imposing a carbon tax we 
are pursuing a market- based solution. The idea of a “carbon price” is thus more 
appealing than a “carbon tax” to those many citizens who believe that market 
outcomes are generally better than government intervention. There is a long trad-
ition across societies of people grumbling about taxes but accepting market prices 
(except when these rise suddenly), and thus the idea of a “carbon price” has a 
better intuitive feel for many than the idea of a “carbon tax.” Moreover, a “carbon 
price” also fits better with a societal value that individuals or firms should pay 
for the costs they impose on others. This point was brought home to me while 
door- knocking in a political campaign years ago when one citizen argued that 
it should not be a “carbon tax” but a “carbon fine.” That latter phrase may itself 
have some utility in certain circles, for it also communicates the idea that firms or 
individuals do something that society views negatively. In any case, I was struck 
immediately and powerfully by the recognition that a change in semantics could 
lead to a change in voter behaviour. [There is a useful class conversation here about 
whether a “carbon price” is more attractive than a “carbon tax,” even if you recog-
nize that they are the same thing.]
Note that the idea that a “carbon price” is the market solution for addressing 
climate change serves to signal the key point made in  chapter 3: that a carbon tax 
is the lowest- cost way of addressing climate change because it provides incentives 
for both firms and consumers to seek low- cost ways of reducing carbon emissions. 
The idea of a carbon price might then be supplemented by some narratives about 
how firms and consumers might respond, plus narratives of the alternative of the 
government forcing us all to act in the same way. I might respond to increases in 
fuel prices by walking to the store more often, but we do not want to tell others 
that they have to do the same.
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Let me provide another example with even wider applicability. A development 
economist once asked what you do in a situation where there is a child dying of 
thirst in a desert but you have only a leaky bucket with which to carry water to the 
child. What do you do? The answer depends, of course, on how leaky the bucket is. 
If there is still enough water in the bucket to save the child, then the fact that the 
bucket leaks should not dissuade you from saving the child. It is a simple tale with a 
powerful message. The unfortunate truth is that we live in a world of leaky buckets. 
We cannot encourage technological innovation without some money being wasted 
on things that firms would have done anyway and other money being spent on 
foolish investigations. We cannot create any programme to help the less fortunate 
that will not encourage some to be lazy and others to try to cheat the system. We 
cannot, indeed, create any government programme that does not contain within it 
opportunities for abuse or waste.
The “leaky bucket” story is a powerful antidote to those who would pounce on 
any example of abuse or waste as an excuse for shutting down the programme in 
question. We should, to be sure, evaluate every programme carefully to make sure 
that the benefits justify the costs: that enough water gets to the thirsty child to jus-
tify the trip. Moreover, we should try constantly to mend the bucket so that ever 
more water gets through to the thirsty child. Last but not least, we need to advertise 
the success stories of people given a helping hand that succeeded in rising out of 
poverty, or of subsidized research programmes that yielded important innovations. 
We need, that is, to highlight what happens when the water gets to the thirsty child.
We live in an imperfect world. We do not cast off our children when they fail a 
test or let in an easy goal – or even fail to do their chores as readily as they might. 
We do not toss away our cell phones at the first sign that service is somewhat less 
than perfect. We do not give up on automobiles at the first sign of an unexpected 
repair. We accept (sometimes grudgingly) imperfection in all aspects of our lives. 
We may strive to reduce the imperfections we face but we do not give up on life 
because of them. We should carry the same constructive attitude into evaluating 
government programmes. We should not abandon the thirsty child because of a 
small leak in the bucket.
The leaky bucket analogy can potentially gain intuitive support for necessarily 
imperfect government policies. It also signals the need to carefully balance values 
and beliefs around caring with those around financial prudence and responsibility. 
It reminds us that a programme will have diverse consequences – some good and 
some bad – that need to be evaluated comprehensively.
BOX 6.1: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2011) summarizes decades of research by him and many others on how humans 
make decisions. The key lesson is that we often make decisions impulsively but 
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like to believe that we make them rationally. We at times devote effort to 
rationalizing decisions that we have already made. Yet our impulsive decision- 
making is not rational, but relies heavily on associations that our mind can 
draw effortlessly. (Familiarity with Kahneman’s key points can aid in the pursuit 
of self- knowledge advocated in  chapters 2 and 3.) It is useful for those who 
wish to persuade to recognize how decisions are actually made:
• The more often we hear a message, the more likely we are to believe it, 
because it easy for our memories to access it. Repetition is thus critical.
• Communicating in simple language aids memory. Rhyming is also useful. 
Sadly, sources whose names are easy to pronounce are more likely to 
be remembered (call me Rick!) Simple things like font size and colour of 
messages can be important.
• Humans “anchor” decisions around any number that is handy. For example, 
if you want people to reflect on the appropriate level for a basic income, 
you will get higher answers if you first suggest a large number.
• Rather than thinking consciously about probabilities, we are guided by 
how readily we can access relevant memories. We thus are more likely to 
buy insurance after the experience of a disaster. (And if we do not know 
anyone with COVID- 19 we think we are safe?) Note that we only prepare 
for disasters that we are familiar with, and thus have to try hard to get 
our minds around novel threats like bioterrorism or climate change. It can 
at times be useful to encourage people to search for certain memories or 
ideas: If your instructor asks you to think of ways to improve the course, and 
you have trouble doing so, you are likely to rate the course more highly. 
Engaging people in conversations about how we might improve govern-
ment programmes may then improve their opinion of those programmes.
• Providing detailed scenarios will make those scenarios seem more likely 
because we are able to identify with different elements of the scenario. That 
is, we do not evaluate the likelihood of the scenario as a whole but evaluate 
whether any part of it resonates with us.
• People only rarely change their minds because of detailed statistical evi-
dence but are more likely to react to a surprising anecdote. (We may be 
able to change stereotypes about recipients of social assistance by sharing 
their stories.)
• Sadly, humans are persuaded by certainty in others. This complicates our 
task, for we have recognized that it is difficult to predict the future or the 
precise outcomes of any policy innovation. We need to encourage people 
to grapple with uncertainty.
• Humans seek to avoid feelings of regret, and thus avoid change even when 
there are sound arguments for change.
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• When faced with a question that is hard to answer (should I vote for X?) we 
will intuitively substitute an easier question (do I like the look of X?) which 
is easier to answer intuitively. It is useful then to focus our persuasive efforts 
on aspects of our policies that are easily addressed.
• We tend to fear losses more than we value gains, and are thus hesitant to 
change. (This is one reason that the potential losers from any policy change 
tend to lobby harder than the potential winners.) One key lesson for per-
suasion is that people will view a choice quite differently if framed in terms 
of gains rather than losses.
Perhaps the biggest lesson is that people don’t like having to think consciously 
about decisions that they have reached intuitively. We need thus to make the 
act of persuasion interesting to overcome the natural resistance to it.
Note that intuitive decision- making works fairly well in familiar situations: We 
will gradually learn in life how to cope with many circumstances that we face 
repeatedly. But intuition can be a poor guide in novel situations: We will seize 
on any elements of continuity and be more confident that we know how to act 
than we should be. Yet we live in a changing world and must thus try to guide 
our actions rationally as much as possible. Though it can be disheartening to 
recognize that rational decision- making plays less of a role in human affairs 
than we might wish, we should also recognize an opportunity: We are capable 
of much better decisions if we can somehow change our values and institutions 
to encourage rational decisions.
6.3 Taking a staged approach
In earlier chapters, we have often urged a gradual testing of the waters with new 
strategies. Humans are fallible, after all, and despite our best efforts to evaluate 
side effects beforehand, it is hard to accurately predict the effects of any policy in 
advance. Where possible, then, we should experiment first and carefully evaluate the 
results. If a policy seems like a good idea when it is first tried, we can expect to gain 
broader support for pushing ahead – especially from those guided by prudence or 
respect for traditions, but also from those who carefully consider consequences. At 
the same time, we can come to appreciate which aspects of the policy work best 
and which are problematic. By taking a staged approach we are also better able to 
tweak our policies to reflect changes in the world around us. We should not run in 
fear at the first sign of difficulty, but carefully evaluate whether and how difficulties 
can be overcome. We can then push ahead with a revised policy. This also we will 
want to evaluate carefully over time.
If we can reinvigorate society’s confidence in our ability to identify promising 
strategies through open discourse, then society should become more willing to 
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experiment. We will have to act to convince society that we are capable of dispas-
sionately evaluating the results of an experiment. In particular, we must commit to 
shutting down an initiative that seems more problematic than it is worth. This is no 
easy commitment to make, for even a failed experiment will likely generate some 
winners – and some bureaucrats with a personal investment in the programme – 
who may fight vociferously to see the experiment continued. There may then be 
some unavoidable bias toward continuing to build upon experiments. If so, then 
society may be understandably sceptical of new ideas. That would be a shame. If 
we are going to try a staged approach, we should devote some thought to how we 
might accept and act upon evidence that our entire strategy was a bad idea. (Recall 
here that we should ideally be guided by humility.) More positively, we should also 
be honest about how we would intend to build upon a successful experiment with 
further initiatives that would institutionalize our strategy.
We have urged the pursuit of broad public support. Yet we can appreciate that 
support can build once an idea is implemented. This is one great advantage of a 
gradualist approach. No idea is so wonderful that some people cannot reasonably 
doubt its feasibility or desirability. An effective experiment can sway many minds. 
The full- scale implementation of a strategy may convince almost everybody over 
time. Public education was once a topic of passionate political debate but is now 
almost universally taken for granted in developed countries.
There have been small basic income experiments in several countries. These are 
very useful in documenting how recipients respond to a basic income. They are less 
useful in telling us what other programmes we might be able to discontinue. Most 
of them have been brief experiments and thus have left questions unanswered about 
how people might respond over a longer time frame. At some point, some govern-
ment will need to pilot a much broader implementation.
6.4 Networking
We can only hope to gain broad public support for novel strategies by reaching out 
to people. There is, to be sure, the possibility of swaying a large audience with a per-
suasive speech or film or book. Yet social movements almost necessarily build slowly, 
one person at a time. People will often not be convinced the first time they hear an 
idea, and so it is necessary to engage them in a continued conversation. We should 
be particularly interested in reaching across social boundaries, and in reaching out 
to people who pursue different evaluative strategies. Broad public support can only 
be achieved by talking to people with quite different backgrounds and with quite 
different ways of thinking about the world.
These conversations will be useful beyond their role in building support. They 
will force us to clarify our ideas. It is very much true that one never understands an 
idea better than when one tries to explain it to another. The critiques or concerns 
of others then force us to further clarify our thinking. As we have said before, you 
only fully understand an idea when you understand opposing arguments. We will 
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likely have to tweak our original thinking in order to meet the concerns of others. 
This is all good.
We will tweak both our strategies and our approaches to advocating them. We 
will find that different communicative approaches work with different audiences. 
We want to develop a coherent communications approach with components that 
work for these different audiences. Coherence is critical lest we be accused of saying 
different things to different people. Yet diversity is likewise critical for achieving 
broad public support.
We can aspire to an ever- expanding network. Some of those we persuade will 
in turn wish to persuade others. A variety of skills is necessary here. Some people 
are good at fleshing out the details of a strategy. Some are good at organizing 
meetings. Some are good at persuasion. Some are good at listening. Some ooze the 
enthusiasm that fires others to press ahead. Some are good at empowering others to 
pursue the shared vision.
BOX 6.2: REFLECT ON YOUR STRENGTHS
The reader can usefully reflect on what their strengths are, and what they 
could contribute to the pursuit of some societal goal. One key point to stress 
here is that we can all contribute in some way. A second point to stress is that 
even if we work behind the scenes we need to be well aware of the arguments 
for and against the ideas we are pursuing. Otherwise, we might easily be 
led astray. Third, we should appreciate that humans become good at things 
through practice. You might shy away from the act of persuasion at first but 
find that you get good at this through time.
Note that networking has the added advantage of creating a sense of com-
munity, since we wish to draw people from various societal groups. Our shared 
interest in pursuing a particular societal goal forges a bond that transcends ethnic 
or religious or other sorts of difference. Network theorists often talk about “weak 
links”: people that serve to connect two groups that were previously unconnected. 
The link need not be strong in order to be important, for it allows ideas to flow 
between groups. In networking, it is critical to identify people who can carry ideas 
to new groups. Over time, we can strive for conversations that involve members 
of diverse groups.
6.5 Leadership
Networks are wonderful, but even the most collaborative network requires leader-
ship. The form of leadership that is called for may be obvious by now, but deserves to 
be clearly stated. We want a leader (or leaders) that is respectful of group members, 
open to dialogue with diverse interests and perspectives, and willing to pursue 
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collaborative decision- making and the pursuit of common ground. Yet we want a 
leader that knows how to get things done, who can identify necessary tasks, and 
encourage the right people to take on these tasks. It is quite possible to be both 
effective and collaborative, but it requires a leader who is a good communicator 
and earns the trust of participants. Humility may be a particularly valuable quality. 
There is evidence that the best decisions are made by people who appreciate that 
they might be wrong. Leaders must in particular be very clear in communicating 
how decisions are made and how tasks are undertaken.
It is important for us to have this full list of attributes in mind as we choose (or 
groom) leaders, or as we prepare ourselves for leadership positions. In practice we 
often judge others on the basis of one or two attributes (She is forceful, I’ll vote 
for her). There is then a “halo” effect such that we attribute all sorts of good qual-
ities to those we have chosen. But leaders who are determined but do not listen 
to others can be disastrous, as can leaders who are collaborative but indecisive. We 
must strive to evaluate each characteristic of potential or actual leaders. We are then 
better prepared to choose, and also better prepared to cope with flawed leaders 
when these are chosen.
The leader must articulate a vision that others can strive toward. This vision must 
be compelling enough to motivate others. It must seem both worthwhile and feas-
ible. It must be a vision that many can pursue together. The vision should reflect a 
clear understanding of both desirable and plausible futures. The vision must be both 
flexible and concrete: We want to be able to react to circumstances but we want 
to know what we are working for. Some may prefer a vague vision that fires the 
imagination but is weak on detail, but such an approach opens the door to dema-
goguery. A good leader is as clear as possible about what they are hoping to achieve. 
Yet they must recognize that persuasion is a creative act (see above) and communi-
cate the vision in a compelling manner.
The ideal leader has charisma but does not abuse the power that charisma 
carries. The ideal leader is a dreamer but capable of sensible action toward clear 
goals. They handle challenges but keep their eye on long- term goals rather than 
just stumbling between crises. The ideal leader is persuasive but listens to others 
and incorporates their ideas. The ideal leader wears power lightly: They inspire 
loyalty and thus need not inspire fear. The ideal leader avoids displays of arrogance, 
but exudes confidence. The ideal leader tries to keep group members happy and 
motivated, but recognizes that hard decisions need sometimes to be made that will 
discomfit some of them. This may seem like a lot to ask, but a leader that wants to 
be all these things can become very good at all of them. Those being led should 
insist on nothing less.
We have spoken here of the qualities we would like in the leader of an advocacy 
group or network. We would hope for similar qualities in politicians and senior 
bureaucrats. These should strive to listen to all sides, respect all points of view, and 
advocate policies that serve the broadest public interest. We need to reform our 
institutions, values, and perhaps especially our voting and hiring practices in order 
to encourage such a result.
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6.6 Strategic planning
Say you are part of an organization dedicated to one or more societal goals. That 
organization then needs to engage in what is called “strategic planning.” Individual 
activists should also engage in strategic planning of their own advocacy if they hope 
to succeed. The plan should, of course, be flexible, for we have seen that the world 
will change, and we must be ready to react to that change. Yet change is no excuse 
for a failure to plan. Indeed we have seen in  chapter 5 that we should be ready to 
respond to surprises with proposals for beneficial change. We thus need to plan how 
we will react to change.
Many organizations devote too little effort to strategic planning. The result is 
often that they later bemoan not having taken certain steps much earlier. They 
may particularly wish that they had attracted the talent, or made the connections, 
needed for later steps. Yet some organizations get too compulsive about planning 
and lose valuable energy in the process. It is important that an organization knows 
where it is going, but also that it goes. Planning may then best be seen as an organic 
activity in which the organization starts with a skeletal plan and fleshes this out as 
it is active in the world.
I should confess here that I have been forced to endure far too many strategic 
planning exercises in my life. I will not on my deathbed wish that I had done more 
planning. Yet I have nevertheless come to appreciate that a moderate amount of 
planning can be a very good thing. Moreover, I have come to appreciate – slowly 
but surely – that I am by nature a results- oriented person. I identify a goal and 
figure out how to get there. The world also possesses a lot of process- oriented 
people who focus on getting the right process in place, and let that process guide 
decisions. Those people have, I must confess, often really annoyed me – but their 
approach is as valuable as my own. A good strategic planning exercise articulates 
both the goals and the process, and does not exhaust too much of the organization’s 
time and energy.
One purpose of this book has been to suggest possible strategies for achieving 
a range of societal goals. Organizations should identify the strategies that they 
want to pursue (but remain open to new ideas), and the approaches to advocacy 
that support these. Organizations should explore a wide range of options before 
prioritizing certain approaches. They should within any approach identify a set 
of sub- goals and then seek to measure their success in achieving these. These 
should include measures of outreach (how many they have communicated with) 
and success in convincing others of the value of a particular strategy. The stra-
tegic plan should address how the organization will respond to both particular 
surprises and surprises in general. Though the time frame for social action is 
necessarily unpredictable, the strategic plan should at least speculate on when cer-
tain sub- goals should be reached: How fast can we expect to communicate ideas 
to the public, and how readily do we hope that these will gain some traction? The 
organization should be prepared to change approaches if they are not achieving 
sub- goals.
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The organization should also strive to identify the skills that are necessary to 
pursue its chosen approaches to advocacy. Who within the organization has par-
ticular skills? What skills do they need to hire or gain through collaboration with 
other organizations? What are the organization’s core competencies? (This is an old 
buzzword from the management literature, but one with some intellectual content.) 
For individuals it is useful to think about what they are good at, or might become 
good at, and thus how they might best contribute. I would make an important point 
here that neither organizations nor individuals should underestimate our capacity 
to learn: We can learn to be more creative, we can learn to be better public speakers, 
we can learn to schmooze, and we can learn many other things. Indeed, we can get 
better at almost anything by just practising it a lot. Yet that should not stop us from 
bringing in particular expertise when we need it.
It is useful to engage in a mapping exercise. We should identify how our sub- 
goals are related, who will pursue each goal, how these individuals will interact, and 
what key players outside the organization need to be involved. While the organ-
ization may focus on particular goals, it should map how its strategies might affect 
other goals and then seek to maximize positive or minimize negative effects on 
other goals. A good flowchart(s) can encapsulate much that is critical in a strategic 
plan. The exercise of drawing it will often expose connections that had not previ-
ously been contemplated.
6.7 Engage in and encourage scenario planning
Our strategic planning should, of course, be future- oriented. We need, that is, to 
recognize plausible futures and plan how to grapple with these. Futurists emphasize 
what they call “scenario planning,” exercises in which organizations gather diverse 
groups (ideally from both within and beyond the organization) to identify a set of 
plausible scenarios, and plot organizational strategies for dealing with these. Such 
efforts could be informed by (especially)  chapters 4 and 5 in this book, but will likely 
emphasize particular trends or surprises of particular salience to the organization in 
question. The national park service will imagine different scenarios than the post 
office, though neither should lose sight of the bigger picture outlined in this book.
We are at an interesting point in the history of scenario planning. A few decades 
ago, this was the province of “gurus,” a small number of management consultants 
who were very secretive about the methods they employed. There is now a much 
broader community of people who guide organizations through scenario planning 
exercises, and many published works that describe scenario planning. There is con-
sensus on some elements of scenario planning, but nevertheless still several distinct 
processes pursued by different groups of advisers. There has been almost no effort 
to develop objective standards by which different approaches might be evaluated. 
There has been some take- up by government departments but there is still a lot 
of bureaucratic resistance: Bureaucrats worry that they cede influence to outsiders 
when they engage in such an initiative. When government departments do engage 
in scenario planning, they only rarely include representatives of the public they serve.
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It is odd that scenario planning is not more common. For humans are nat-
ural scenario planners: What we commonly refer to as “daydreaming” involves us 
imagining detailed futures that follow from some decision or event. Daydreaming 
may seem a casual practice but actually involves a fair bit of mental activity. We 
would not spend so much time and effort daydreaming unless we found that it was 
useful to imagine plausible or desirable futures in some detail. We should thus see 
the potential advantage of harnessing our natural skills at imagining futures to a 
more formal and collaborative process.
Organizations that engage in scenario planning can be more nimble in adapting 
to our changing world. Scenario planning, if properly executed, exposes biases and 
limitations in the way the organization has framed certain issues, and forces the 
organization to think about challenges that it had previously ignored. Scenario 
planning will often bring concerns that are held by only some members of the 
organization to the attention of others. Organizations can be ready with policy 
proposals and other initiatives when the world changes in a direction they had 
collectively imagined. Organizations can prepare to not just survive but prosper 
in plausible futures. If organizations pull outsiders from government and business 
into their scenario planning exercises (or convince them to pursue their own such 
exercises), they prepare these agents also to build a better future. It is invaluable for 
policy- makers to contemplate how their policies will work in different scenarios. 
(A scenario planning exercise that involved people from different government 
departments might encourage greater policy collaboration.)
We mentioned the word “diverse” above. This may be the most common piece 
of advice in the scenario planning literature. We want, after all, to make sure that 
we do not omit important trends or surprises from our scenario planning. Inviting 
a group with different jobs, educations, and life experiences is our best assurance 
that we will capture (most) key elements of plausible futures. (There is, we might 
note, empirical evidence for the “wisdom of crowds”: Groups of diverse people 
give better predictions in many fields than individuals.) Diversity also aids us in 
imagining desirable futures that are broadly attractive. Having gathered this group 
together, it is then essential that they all feel comfortable expressing their views. 
This requires that those in leadership positions in the organization make it clear that 
they want the widest range of input. The scenario planning exercise should avoid 
“groupthink,” a tendency of groups to coalesce quickly around some key ideas and 
not subject these to sufficient scrutiny. It may be advisable to ask participants to 
write down their thoughts at the outset, before conformity of opinion is induced 
by group discourse. There is an unfortunate tendency for groups to focus on the 
information they all share rather than actively seeking out the insights that only 
some members of the group possess.
In our discussion of systems theory in  chapter 3, we recognized the importance 
of negative feedback loops that generate stability. Organizational stability may rest 
on certain beliefs that guide members of the organization to behave in a predictable 
fashion. Preparing for the future requires people to break free from such unexam-
ined beliefs. Individuals and groups need to grapple with their biases. They need to 
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ask who benefits from particular scenarios, and seek fairer outcomes. This is most 
likely to occur when diverse individuals feel free to express their concerns. People 
from outside the organization may prove invaluable in identifying biases in the 
organization’s pattern of thought.
A successful scenario planning exercise will explore unquestioned assumptions. It 
will bring concerns that are at present subconscious into the open. It will integrate 
concerns felt by different members of the group, showing how these might interact. 
It will consider a broader range of strategies and approaches than the organization 
currently countenances. It will likely involve concerns raised by outsiders that were 
previously unheard within the organization. Not surprisingly, both diagrams and 
narratives are crucial in fleshing out scenarios. Groups working together in a dia-
gramming exercise can clarify how different trends or surprises may interact.
Scenario planning, like any skill, improves with practice. Organizations should 
not be overwhelmed by the diversity of practices in the scenario planning literature. 
They can recognize that choosing the right group may be the most important step. 
They can then focus on making people feel comfortable. Collective diagramming 
is a practice that both generates ideas and encourages group interaction. A common 
though not universal practice is to develop one good scenario, one bad scenario, 
and one weird scenario.
6.8 Dealing with entrenched interests
We have sought to identify in this book a wide range of strategies that can poten-
tially appeal to a sizeable majority of the population. Yet we should not be naïve: Any 
change in policy will annoy some minority who may fight tenaciously against 
change. What do we do when the rich fight higher taxes, politicians refuse to give 
up power, and bureaucrats cling to unnecessary programmes?
We speak truth to power.
Nothing can stop a good argument. We need to carefully articulate arguments for 
change. We need to construct a simple but persuasive message for most voters, but 
provide greater detail on our favoured strategy for those who wish to dig deeper.
Good arguments may be unstoppable but can be delayed. We need, then, to:
• Restore faith in our collective ability to evaluate arguments and evidence. We 
must collectively appreciate that the powerful benefit most from an environ-
ment of uncritical followership, or in which we shower disdain on anyone we 
disagree with. In such an environment there is little to prevent the exercise of 
power for its own sake.
• Develop our ideas. We suggested earlier that we might want to fund polit-
ical advocacy. The argument here is simple: The rich and powerful can very 
easily get their self- interested message out. It is harder for the mass of voters to 
mobilize. However, if we could each devote a few dollars to political advocacy 
on our tax return, we could change the balance of power.
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• Vote. Get involved in candidate selection processes (primaries, nomination 
meetings). Run.
• Demonstrate peacefully. Make a party of it. Social change can be fun. Note, 
though, that demonstrations are most useful when the policy aims of the 
demonstrators are clearly articulated.
How do we get politicians to enact institutions that limit their own power? We 
need to have clear ideas of desirable institutions, for politicians can easily mislead 
us with vague commitments to pursue vaguely articulated goals. The task is not 
easy. Yet we can be heartened that such institutions have been put in place in the 
past. Indeed, one of the lessons of history is that the powerful often put in place 
institutions that have the unanticipated effect of decreasing their power over time. 
The trick is to convince politicians that it is in their own electoral interest to reduce 
their own power – or to catch a politician who is trying to leave a legacy before 
retirement.
We may pursue a slightly different strategy with those who hold economic 
power. History tells us that the rich do not usually abandon sources of wealth 
without a fight. Yet while slave owners and feudal lords sometimes lost their con-
trol over others through military action, in most countries (and some states in 
the United States) they gave up these rights in return for financial compensa-
tion. This result did not just happen one day but came after decades or more of 
global agitation. We can imagine a similar strategy with oil companies, where we 
combine international pressure to address climate change with a mix of carbon 
taxes and incentives for technological innovation that allow them to save the planet 
without going bankrupt overnight. President Eisenhower warned us decades ago of 
a military- industrial complex that has a powerful financial incentive against having 
global peace break out. We might find peace much easier to achieve if we can find 
civilian uses for their technologies. Those who earn undeserved income should 
be guided to apply their cleverness toward other more deserving pursuits. As Sun 
Tzu advised millennia ago, the best victory is that which is won without a fight. 
We should be prepared to fight special interests when necessary but also to recog-
nize when we can achieve our goals collaboratively. (Recall that this is one of the 
key insights of systems analysis: Try to get diverse agents pushing in the desired 
direction.)
We should recognize here that many NGOs pressure corporations to pursue 
policies that respect both workers and the environment. NGOs are willing to 
embarrass companies with bad records and congratulate those that meet certain 
targets. (One challenge at present is that different NGOs have different targets; 
this makes it hard for companies even to report outcomes for all, much less hit all 
targets.) There are also many investment funds that refuse to invest in firms that 
fail to meet certain standards. These efforts can only be successful if consumers or 
investors prove willing to punish companies with bad records. Companies suffer 
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with every consumer that turns away. Ethical investment creates a greater challenge, 
for unethical investors may simply replace ethical investors.
We need to know which battles to fight. I have mentioned previously that con-
spiracy theories are attractive in part because they provide a simple explanation for 
a complex reality. They are thus dangerous because they distract our attention from 
the need to carefully strategize our collective future. Yet while the idea of one giant 
global conspiracy is preposterous, the idea of innumerable small conspiracies is 
common sense. Businesses sometimes collude. Politicians do favours for supporters. 
Some politicians and bureaucrats take bribes. Some politicians exert pressure on 
courts and police. We need to not tilt at windmills but seek out real conspiracies 
and bring both legal penalties and public embarrassment to bear upon them.
6.9 Act locally
The tasks of launching or even participating in national or global movements for 
change may seem daunting. It is important to recognize that there is much that can 
be done at the local level. Every local natural environment is unique, and care must 
be taken to ensure that humans are living in harmony with nature. Urban envir-
onments require special care, and humans benefit from natural spaces, attractive 
cityscapes, and (likely) local food production. Local groups can monitor the behav-
iour of local companies and governments and pressure these to behave in socially 
desirable ways. Local mutual- aid societies cannot replace social programmes but 
can fill niches that large social programmes miss and investigate innovative ways 
in which we can help each other. Some social issues such as homelessness must be 
addressed by local commitments and initiatives. Local public works programmes 
need to be carefully managed to achieve important and visible societal goals; there 
is much scope for collaboration between local governments and community groups 
in identifying useful tasks for the unemployed to perform. Social entrepreneurs 
have considerable scope for producing valuable goods and services in a manner that 
treats consumers, workers, and nature with respect.
Technology may facilitate local initiatives. Some futurists are excited by the pos-
sibility that innovations such as 3D printing, open- source designs, and modular 
construction make it easier for community groups to design and build facilities and 
equipment. Others note the possibilities for local communities to develop renew-
able energy systems.
Recall that we want to be creative in building our future. Local pioneers can 
experiment with a range of practices that might then be borrowed by other com-
munities or scaled up into national or international programmes. As mentioned 
when we discussed urban planning in  chapter 3, it is critical that local communities 
be innovative, but also that they network and learn from each other. These networks 
can function simultaneously to share knowledge of local initiatives and to lobby 
nationally and internationally for changes in policy that would support and build 
upon local efforts.
 
170 Achieving desirable futures
BOX 6.3: A GROUP CHARTER OR ACTION PLAN
In our final exercise, students are asked to imagine a group/ organization that 
can pursue some societal goal. They can think local: a group to clean up a 
local park, perhaps. Or they can think global, but then they need to distinguish 
themselves in some way from existing groups or organizations. Students need 
to clearly articulate the group’s goals. They should specify how the group is 
organized and how it will attract members. They should posit a timeline, and 
identify how the group will measure success. Is training required, and if so. 
how will it be provided? What sort of challenges will the group face and how 
will these be addressed? How will imaginative solutions be developed and 
pursued? What resources are necessary for the group to succeed? What sort of 
tasks might be assigned to particular group members, and how would these 
be evaluated and monitored?
See https:// ctb.ku.edu/ en/ developing- strategic- and- action- plans for more 
detail.
6.10 Be prepared for failure
This book has argued at length that it is feasible to move toward desired futures. 
Nevertheless, we should not pretend that it is easy. Movements for social change 
do not usually succeed on the first attempt. There will be disappointments along 
the way as we combat ignorance, fear, and self- interest. These disappointments just 
make the quest more worthy and eventual successes sweeter.
It is a common mistake of the young to assume that successful people were always 
successful. However, paths to success are always littered with failure. Successful 
academics write some papers that are rejected or ignored. Successful entrepreneurs 
make some bad and costly business decisions along the way. Almost everyone 
butchers the occasional test, lets in an easy goal, and has bad dates. Successful people 
are those that bounce back from adversity. They learn from their failures and keep 
pursuing their goals.
The combination of good ideas and good people is unbeatable. The only 
question is the time frame. This book has striven, among other things, to guide 
good people toward good ideas. It has urged the careful development of such ideas, 
and the creative articulation of these. Failures will often signal some flaw in either 
the idea or its advocacy. Seen in this light, failures are just a milestone on the path 
to success.
In particular, do not mind if your efforts are decried by the self- interested. This 
just means they are paying attention. You should speak truth to their self- interested 
claims, and strive to see dispassionately if there is some kernel of truth in their 
arguments. You should in particular search their arguments for avenues through 
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which they may accept at least some of your ideas. It may well be that they are 
angered mostly by some part of your proposal that can be amended at little cost to 
your overall goal.
Here is another life lesson: You never get a better chance to make your case 
than when you are being criticized by others. You say “X!” Someone else says “Not 
X!” Now you need just to poke holes in “Not X!” and your case seems stronger. 
It is almost always easier to point to weaknesses in the arguments of others than to 
buttress your own. To be sure, it is psychologically challenging to hold your ground 
when under attack – especially in a world of polarization and narrowmindedness – 
but carefully responding to attacks can win you respect from those who disagree 
with you. This may not be obvious at first, but you can wear them down over 
time. So avoid the human tendency to shrink from attack and instead celebrate the 
opportunity that this provides. After all, the worse thing for social advocacy is to 
be ignored. If others will do you the favour of giving you some publicity, make the 
most of it. (And don’t be so focused on winning that you miss the opportunity to 
take on board the good parts of your detractors’ arguments.)
6.11 Believe in progress
Though we must prepare for failure, we must nevertheless believe in progress. We 
must believe that good things do happen, especially when people of goodwill strive 
selflessly and tirelessly toward valuable goals. If we do not believe in progress, we 
will lack the determination to fight for change. We will be unable to transcend the 
inevitable disappointments, and will give up too easily.
The best reason to believe such a thing is that there has been a lot of progress in 
human history. It is too easy to dwell on the negative. We raised real concerns about 
the future in  chapters 4 and 5. Yet we held out hope for a better future. Across the 
entire sweep of human history there have been many setbacks, but despite these, 
there has been a general process of improvement in many aspects of human life.
We have in preceding chapters worried that many treatments of the future 
emphasize just one change agent. We can raise a similar concern here about 
treatments of human progress in the past. It is all too easy to focus on changes in 
per capita incomes and decide that we are much better off than we were a century 
ago. It is likewise easy to focus on the health of our natural environment and con-
clude that we are worse off. We will gain a better appreciation of human progress 
if we extend our gaze widely across the different categories of phenomena that we 
have engaged in this book:
• Genes. Though human genes may not have changed much in historical time, 
there has been an improvement in our actualization of inherent human cap-
abilities through improvements in health and especially nutrition. Moreover, 
we now appreciate that maternal health shapes human capabilities in sig-
nificant ways. Our genes may have changed little, but hormones in healthy 
mothers activate these in better ways.
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• Psychology. Contemporary studies of happiness suggest that the satisfac-
tion of basic needs for food and shelter, health, and security are important 
contributors to happiness. It is not clear, though, that economic growth beyond 
fairly low levels has much effect on happiness. We can identify progress in 
happiness over the last millennia as average incomes slowly increased but per-
haps not in the most recent decades in rich countries.
• We can also identify progress regarding various individual- level phe-
nomena: psychological understanding, freedom of choice, respect for diversity, 
and perhaps decreased anxiety levels – but regress concerning occupational 
over- specialization and the incidence of depression. Average scores on intelli-
gence tests have risen in the last half- century by some 20 per cent in developed 
countries, reflecting improvements in nutrition, maternal health, and perhaps 
reduced lead levels in the environment.
• Politics. Though there has been backsliding in the most recent decade, there 
is in much of the world more freedom – religious, political, and occupational – 
than ever before. There is also more justice: limits on state power, courts that 
are independent, and so on. Most people would view democracy as superior 
to other forms of governance, albeit often frustrating in action. One can iden-
tify improvements in a range of more narrow institutions. There have certainly 
been dramatic improvements in both public infrastructure (such as sewers) and 
education in most countries. With respect to war, the record is mixed: The last 
century or so has witnessed the worst wars ever, but we may now be seeing 
a decline in the incidence and severity of war. Certainly, attitudes against war 
have hardened (perhaps too much in some instances).
• Economy. There has been dramatic growth in average incomes. Income dis-
tribution between countries worsened dramatically in the nineteenth century, 
but may now be improving. Income distributions within most countries have 
oscillated but have deteriorated in recent decades. The general tendency in his-
tory may be for income distributions to become more unequal, except during 
major shocks such as epidemics or the most severe wars. Leisure time has 
increased (though not recently). Work fulfilment has improved for some but 
not others. There have been improvements in some economic institutions, but 
evident weaknesses in others.
• Art. There has been increased artistic production, though this has become 
an increasingly specialized activity. It is not clear whether artistic quality has 
improved or declined. The total number of artistic inspirations has increased 
dramatically. Most people would view the contemporary diversity in artistic 
styles as a good thing. Nevertheless, we can worry that art has a less central role 
in modern society.
• Social structure. There is decreased gender stratification in most but not 
all countries. There has been a decrease in the importance of inherited status 
(though this trend is less visible in recent decades). It is harder to identify 
trends in ethnic or occupational stratification, though there are some signs of 
improvement.
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• Technology. We have developed technologies that allow both increased leisure 
and a more extensive range of goods and services. There is nevertheless cause 
to worry about the environmental, military, or social implications of many of 
these technologies. There have been dramatic advances in our understandings of 
natural (and social) processes, though further research may alter many of these.
• Population and health. The population has grown – though this is not 
entirely a good thing. Life expectancy is much higher in most parts of the 
world than a century or two ago. Rates of child mortality, in particular, have 
fallen dramatically. Nutrition is better and diseases less virulent – though there 
is always the possibility of a new epidemic.
• Culture. Individuals can increasingly choose their cultural identity. However, 
sense of community (and shared stories) may be declining (though this may have 
a beneficial impact of reducing hostility between groups). Most people might 
applaud various cultural changes such as increased sexual freedom, support for 
ambition, curiosity, valuing romantic love, and religious freedom, but could rea-
sonably worry that values such as honesty and responsibility are waning. Linguistic 
diversity is decreasing (though people disagree about the effects of this).
• Environment. Transport infrastructure has improved, as has the human ability 
to predict and cope with natural disasters (though increased population dens-
ities work against this). Climate change and biodiversity are definite areas of 
regress. More local types of pollution have fallen in many countries. Human 
experience of nature has declined.
The results are mixed, to be sure, with many examples of both progress and regress. 
Yet most people if given a choice would likely opt for life in the twenty- first cen-
tury over life a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand years ago. Some of the instances 
of progress recorded above may have just happened without much conscious effort. 
Most, though, have resulted from the deliberate efforts of humans to fashion a better 
world. We are then, beneficiaries of thousands of years of efforts to achieve progress, 
and should not doubt the human capacity to fashion an even better future.
6.12 Research that is needed
It is best to have as clear an idea as possible of the effects that a policy will have 
before it is introduced. It is also best to have a clear idea of the detailed form a policy 
should take before politicians and bureaucrats take charge of implementation. We 
will never achieve perfection in either regard and must be ready to evaluate, revise, 
and occasionally erase policies after implementation.
There is a role here for academics and NGOs to perform a great deal of practic-
ally oriented research. This will mean in many fields that more effort is focused in 
future on studying processes of change rather than forces of stability. There is a role 
for non- governmental agencies to develop clear policy proposals and assess their 
likely impact. Both academics and NGOs should interact with bureaucrats as they 
do so to get an appreciation of the challenges the latter face.
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We also need research to identify future trends and surprises. Mathematical 
predictions are feasible in economics, demography, and a couple of other fields. 
Even in these fields, predictions decrease in reliability as we forecast farther into the 
future. In other areas, our best guide to the future is often interviews and surveys. 
The futurist needs also to read widely in the hopes of identifying emerging trends 
or novel types of surprises (this is called “scanning”). These various types of research 
need then to be integrated, for our best guide to the future will come from com-
bining the insights of different disciplines, methods, and people.
We should appreciate that it is hard to evaluate the likely effect of novel policies. 
The Future Studies literature thus stresses some approaches that may allow us to 
better peer into the future. As we noted in box 3.7, the literature urges mathemat-
ical simulations whenever possible. These can be extremely useful, but care must be 
taken that the results produced are not driven by the assumptions incorporated by 
the modeller. An alternative approach is to structure an experiment or game that 
tries to mimic a proposed policy. The challenge here is that people may not take 
the game as seriously as they would the policy itself (economists sometimes test 
hypotheses with experiments in poor countries where participants will take small 
monetary payouts more seriously than the usual test subjects in rich countries do).
The Delphi technique relies on experts, and hopes that the collective wisdom 
of experts can guide policy evaluation. The challenge here is that experts may be 
biased. We can address this challenge by consulting experts from different disciplines 
and walks of life. There may still be a concern that the highly educated have a more 
general bias. We can counteract this bias too by including in the discussion those 
who might be affected by a policy.
We might make special note of historical research. Historians can aid in iden-
tifying trends that may extend into the future. Even more importantly, they can 
remind us of past historical transformations. We are less likely, then, to mindlessly 
extend trends into the future, but should instead appreciate that trends will interact 
and be transformed through time. Historians can remind us that history sometimes 
exhibits stability and at other times exhibits dramatic change, and that we should 
prepare for both. This book, I might recall, has been much informed by my Making 
Sense of World History.
We could know much more than we do about how people make political 
decisions. How can citizens be encouraged to actively participate in public dis-
course? How can we encourage citizens to carefully evaluate arguments and evi-
dence? How can we reduce the appeal of demagogues and charlatans? How can we 
encourage mutual respect?
I might close with some personal observations on the present state of the human 
sciences. There is, I should first stress, a lot of great research that can usefully inform 
each of the strategies outlined in this book. Yet there is unfortunately also much 
work that is not well done, and where questionable assumptions drive simplistic 
results. Worse yet, there is research where the author clearly had their conclusion in 
mind at the outset, and picked their “data” to support their conclusions. There are 
some academics who doubt our very ability to do reasonable research, and urge us 
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to blatantly argue for congenial outcomes without worrying about the validity of 
argument or evidence (or to do research for the fun of it that is of no interest beyond 
some narrow academic clique). There is value in having some sceptics around who 
can warn us not to be too confident of our abilities, but we have noted previously 
in this book that we have no answer to autocrats if we collectively abandon the 
hope of identifying superior policies by carefully amassing argument and evidence. 
How, then, can we better encourage academics to do practical research that care-
fully amasses good arguments and evidence and thus usefully informs public policy? 
Increased interactions with bureaucrats and other policy- makers may be critical 
here in guiding academics away from game- playing and toward useful research. 
Interdisciplinarity is also quite useful in guiding academics away from reifying par-
ticular theories or methods and focusing instead on providing the most reliable 
possible answer to complex public policy questions. The recognition urged by this 
book that we can and should seek to identify strategies and policies with broad 
appeal should discourage ideological posturing.
BOX 6.4: THEORIZING THE FUTURE
We have suggested in this book an approach to the future grounded in a 
recognition of the complexity of the world we inhabit. We can thus be scep-
tical of many simplistic efforts to theorize about the future. Many theories 
of the future make core assumptions that drive their results: that progress 
is inevitable; that increased complexity is inevitable; that technology – or 
culture, or markets, or social conflict, or some other phenomenon or inter-
action – is the driving force in history; or that history is inevitably cyclic. 
Such theories may be of some use in identifying plausible futures, but even 
there they are best employed in concert with alternative theories. We might 
be more kindly disposed toward “power theory,” which argues that change 
is driven by conscious efforts, for the project of this book is to guide us 
collectively toward desirable futures. Yet even we must spend much of the 
book addressing how we should deal with trends and surprises that we have 
not purposely set in motion. We might also embrace the core idea of emer-
gence theory: that new properties emerge unpredictably within systems 
that are hard to understand in terms of the individual components of the 
system (as scientists have a hard time understanding “life” in terms of the 
individual components of biological systems). But we have seen that we can 
get very far by examining individual phenomena, and particular interactions 
among phenomena, without having to engage the inherent unpredictability 
of emergence.
We must be humbler in our theorizing, and anticipate that any one theory 
will only illuminate some part of our collective future. We must then be 
prepared to engage in the interdisciplinary act of integrating across theories.
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6.13 Integrating strategies for advocacy
Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, an ancient treatise still studied in both military colleges 
and business schools, writes that “Tactics without strategy are the noise before 
defeat.” This book has sought to allow individuals to place their actions within a 
broader understanding of the world around them. Individuals are urged to have 
a life strategy rather than unthinkingly pursuing day- to- day tactics. This should, 
however, be a multifaceted strategy with multiple goals and a capacity to react 
to life’s surprises. In the realm of policy advocacy, it is particularly important that 
organizations harness diverse activities into a coherent strategy. It is not easy to 
change the world, and we should be wary of dissipating our energies by not coord-
inating our activities or doing these in a sensible temporal order.
How can we best draw connections across the separate pieces of advice offered 
in this chapter? It is helpful to recall here that we are trying to generate successful 
social movements that can achieve desirable social change. Reporters in covering 
any story are guided to answer the 5W questions: Who, What, Where, When, 
and Why (and sometimes How). We can follow that strategy here in integrating 
the above analysis. When we get to “When?” we can do as we suggested at the 
start of the chapter and outline how the various activities outlined above interact 
through time.
Who? The point to be stressed here is that there is a role for everyone. Some 
may seek elected office. Others may be chosen by lottery for a position 
of authority. Others may write blogs, organize demonstrations, organize 
networks of action (locally or globally), lobby people in positions of authority, 
lead scenario planning exercises, or perform research that fleshes out par-
ticular strategies. Everyone should be able to find some place in this chapter 
where they think “I could do that.” And recall that we are seeking broad 
public support: Engaging in honest reasoned advocacy with acquaintances 
is also critical in creating a better world. Societal change means changing 
many minds: Every changed mind is a victory on the way.
Where? Likewise, there is scope for action in many places. We have referred in 
“Who” to elected offices, blogs, demonstrations, and everyday conversations. 
There is clearly a role for university research and independent think tanks 
(if these can be guided toward objectivity). There is a place for both trad-
itional and new media. There are at present few places where individuals can 
go for careful and unbiased analysis of the key issues of the day; we desper-
ately need people who are willing to do this – and to debunk ideologically 
motivated proposals. And we need to work locally and experimentally, but 
within global conversations.
What? We need many mutually interdependent things:
• Carefully designed policies
• Experiments where feasible
• Flowcharts. Lots of flowcharts
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• Creative efforts to build public support
• Collaboration
• Open- minded dialogue
• Exhortations to ethical behaviour
• The creation of political institutions that improve our decision- making
• Better institutions in all realms of human activity
• Careful and transparent evaluation of all policies
Why? This whole book has been based on the premise that we can achieve 
(movement toward) desired futures. It is worth recalling that failure to push 
for desired futures risks ending up with plausible but far less desirable futures.
When? One might imagine a fairly logical process in which we first carefully 
research an issue, developing detailed policy proposals. We then explain these 
to others, gaining public support. This transforms into political action, which 
results in the policies being implemented. This would be a very misguided 
understanding of how social change occurs. What is necessary is a much 
more integrated and iterative process in which different activities occur sim-
ultaneously and reinforce each other.
We should, to be sure, have a good idea of what we are advocating before 
we advocate it. Yet who will develop detailed policy proposals for an idea 
that lacks popular support? Moreover, don’t we want policy to reflect the 
advice of diverse people? Detailed policy, then, will be fleshed out as public 
support builds, and will be reflective of networking and the diverse insights 
this provides. It is particularly important to have interactions with politicians 
and bureaucrats early in the process, for these will have useful advice, and 
are much more likely to support an initiative that reflects their advice rather 
than some plan dreamed up by some academic alone in their office. Drawing 
government officials into scenario planning can be invaluable. We can often 
only fully evaluate a policy once it is implemented, and thus need political 
support for policy experiments that then inform further clarification of the 
policy. Further evaluation and clarification are called for even after a policy 
is broadly implemented.
The big challenge here is that we must necessarily build support for pol-
icies before we know all the details and have fully evaluated the effects. 
We must, that is, support ideas simply because they appear good in prin-
ciple. The difficult- to- accept corollary is that we must be ready to abandon 
initiatives that we have worked for if they turn out to be impractical or do 
more harm than good. It should be clear by now that I quite like the idea of 
a basic income, and want to see more experiments, but I must stand ready to 
be shown that it has far worse incentive effects than I hope for or replaces 
far fewer existing programmes than I might like. Note that those who are 
sceptical of a basic income will be more willing to support an experiment if 
they are convinced that the advocates of such a programme are prepared to 




The world can too easily seem complex and incomprehensible. Worse, it can easily 
seem corrupt and irreparable. This book has essayed to render it (more) compre-
hensible. Hopefully, individuals can gain agency from this book. They can identify 
strategies that they wish to support. They can see paths toward a better world. They 
can see ways of better grappling with big surprises. We can indeed fashion a better 
world if we will but have the good sense and dedication to do so. Moreover, we can 
be happy while doing so: Fashioning a better world does not require a life of limit-
less sacrifice. Though it has not been our primary purpose, I hope that this book 
encourages readers to reflect on what sort of person they want to be and what sort 
of life they want to live: Do you want to help shape a better future?
The book has provided a structure for thinking about the future. It has been 
designed to be easy to read and remember. It is provocative but nevertheless 
dedicated to plotting a future that would be widely appreciated. It is intended to 
spark both respectful conversation and efforts to build a better future.
It is worth recapping the key points made in each chapter:
• There is a coherent structure for careful contemplation of our future. ( chapter 1)
• Society can potentially agree on a set of mutually compatible goals. A set of 
such goals is outlined. ( chapter 2)
• There is a set of strategies that can achieve these goals with broad public 
support. We have outlined many such strategies. ( chapter 3)
• We can identify several trends that are likely to extend into the future, and the 
likely effects they will have. Though we cannot predict the future precisely, we 
can identify a set of plausible futures. We can and did then identify strategies – 
some new, others developed in  chapter 3 – for translating plausible futures into 
desired futures. ( chapter 4)
 
Concluding remarks 179
• We can also foresee at least some of the surprises that we may confront in 
future. We can try to limit these surprises, and we can prepare to react to them. 
Numerous strategies were outlined for doing so. ( chapter 5)
• We can work collectively toward the implementation of the strategies identi-
fied in previous chapters. Several approaches to policy advocacy were described. 
( chapter 6)
We will not review the myriad goals and strategies identified across these 
chapters. We can briefly note, though, the central importance of improving the 
institutions of democratic decision- making on the one hand and encouraging both 
core values and a respect for diversity on the other.
A better future is possible. A worse future is plausible. I hope that you choose 
the former.
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and Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory). These had both emphasized the 
importance of visually diagramming the interactions among phenomena. In 
“Interdisciplinarity versus Anti- Intellectual and Anti- Democratic Impulses” (Issues 
in Interdisciplinary Studies 36(2): 167– 92, 2018; https:// interdisciplinarystudies.org/ 
docs/ Vol36No22018/ 07_ 167- 192.pdf), I had discussed how interdisciplinary 
analysis implied some important strategies for reforming democratic discourse. 
I had recently completed Making Sense of World History (Routledge, 2020; www.
taylorfrancis.com/ books/ 9781003013518), a book that could serve as a source 
of trends that might be projected into the future, and guidance on how to pre-
dict surprises. My “Stability, Instability, and Interdisciplinarity” (also in Issues in 
Interdisciplinary Studies 35: 65– 87, 2017; http:// interdisciplinarystudies.org/ docs/ 
Vol35_ 2017/ 05_ 65- 87.pdf) had argued that surprises were most likely when phe-
nomena studied in different disciplines interacted. More generally, I had published 
articles and books across over a dozen different fields, and thus possessed the 
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dangerously small understanding of lots of different fields that such a book pro-
ject demanded. [I made a blog post on the ideas on January 5, 2021, at https:// 
i2insights.org/ 2021/ 01/ 05/ cross- disciplinarity- illuminates- unknown- unknowns/ 
and received some very positive feedback. While writing this book I also drafted 
“World History and Future Studies” for World History Connected: https:// world 
historyconnected.press.uillinois.edu/ ]
Jerome C. Glenn, Elizabeth Florescu, and the Millennium Project Team, State of 
the Future (2017), report on what an international network of experts think about 
many of the topics addressed in this book. Readers may find much useful infor-
mation in its detailed analyses. The report argues that we have made progress on 
some fronts but not others, but could tackle all of our challenges with a concerted 
international effort to implement sensible strategies. The same international col-
laboration of futurists operates a website at www.millennium- project.org/ . This 
website has lots of information, including overviews of (how to address) 15 global 
challenges.
The Global Sustainable Development Report also addresses many of the issues 
addressed in this book. It is a pretty dry read, though, befitting a committee report. 
It stresses the importance of linkages among diverse goals. It wants us to change 
educational systems in order to encourage creativity, systems thinking, and empathy. 
It seeks both to make scientific understanding accessible and to encourage diverse 
agents to pursue sustainable development.
Jennifer Gidley’s The Future: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
2017) surveys the history of the idea of the future, and the field of Future Studies, 
before addressing a couple of the topics covered in this book. It is a good read.
Realistic Hope: Facing Global Challenges, edited by Angela Wilkinson and Betty Sue 
Flowers (Amsterdam University Press, 2018) addresses a dozen pressing challenges 
and argues that there are strategies for coping with each and building a better future. 
The chapters are a bit uneven in quality but the book has many interesting ideas. 
In their summary the editors stress that transformative change involves extensive 
dialogue among diverse interests, experimentation, systems thinking, and futures 
scenarios.
Martin James, The Meaning of the Twenty- First Century: A Vital Blueprint for 
Ensuring Our Future (Riverhead Books (Penguin), 2006) is particularly good at 
discussing trends in technology. We could not in this book cover all of the tech-
nologies he embraces.
The field of anticipation studies addresses how our views of the future shape 
our behaviour in the present. Researchers often strive to change the views and 
then the behaviours. A good introduction to the field is Roberto Poli’s Introduction 
to Anticipation Studies (Springer, 2017), while Riel Miller’s Transforming the Future 
(Routledge, 2018) surveys research in the field.
There is naturally a strong overlap between the goals pursued in this book 
and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (www.un.org/ 
sustainabledevelopment/ development- agenda/ ). Some of these differences reflect a 
UN focus on the needs of the global south. Yet the biggest difference lies in the fact 
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that we have laid stress throughout this book on core values. We have also, of course, 
made an effort to develop a framework for identifying societal goals.
The World Future Studies Federation provides a list of recommended readings 
on its website at https:// wfsf.org/ , though some of the books it lists are extremely 
speculative. There are a handful of journals in the field, of which the most venerable 
is Futures. I have also found much of interest in World Futures Review, World Futures, 
European Journal of Futures Research, Foresight, and Journal of Future Studies.
The backcasting wheel exercise suggested in box 3.7 is described in detail in 
David Bengston, Lynne Westphal, and Michael Dockry’s “Back from the Future: The 
Backcasting Wheel for Mapping a Pathway to a Preferred Future” (World Futures 
Review 12(3): 270– 8, 2020).
Phillip Daffara’s “Applying the Futures Wheel and Macrohistory to the Covid19 
Global Pandemic” (Journal of Future Studies 25(2): 35– 48, 2020) provides a futures 
wheel for the COVID- 19 pandemic, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses 
of the futures wheel approach. He wonders if societies will appreciate the return 
to nature that the pandemic has generated, and encourage more environmentally 
friendly policies going forward.
Roy Bendor, Elina Eriksson, and Daniel Pargman’s, “Looking Backward to the 
Future: On Past- Facing Approaches to Futuring” (Futures, January 2021) discusses 
how historical research could better inform Future Studies. In the same issue, 
Jonathan Boston surveys strategies for combating short- termism in political 
decision- making in “Assessing the Options for Combatting Democratic Myopia 
and Safeguarding Long- Term Interests.”
There was a special issue on artificial intelligence in World Futures Review in June 
2020. A special issue in 2019 tackled issues of policy evaluation, noting that we do 
not do this often enough to have developed a good sense of how best to do it. The 
last two issues in 2018 focused on how to teach about the future.
Alessandro Fergnani’s “Mapping Futures Studies Scholarship from 1968 to 
Present: A Bibliometric Review of Thematic Clusters, Research Trends, and 
Research Gaps” (Futures, January 2019) provides an extremely useful overview 
of the field. He notes that the field is very fragmented and authors do not often 
cite previous work. There is a wide array of strategic foresight methods, and no 
consensus around which to prefer. There is a recognition that multiple methods 
should be employed. The article identifies six research clusters: one focused 
on corporate/ organizational futures (with an emphasis on the development of 
methods for strategizing organizational futures); a second that exhibits concerns 
about the need for a dramatic societal transition; a third that emphasizes the 
environment; a fourth that stresses technological trends; a fifth that reflects on 
our ability to draw on the past to predict futures; and a sixth that stresses the 
“postnormal” and the need for interdisciplinarity. These six clusters are not well 
integrated and do not revolve around a shared core. I would note that I have 
drawn on all six clusters in this book and have provided an overarching structure 
in which they can be integrated. Fergnani stresses that the organizational fore-
sight cluster is not well integrated with the five clusters focused at the societal 
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level. I have tried in this book to “scale up” analyses and methods developed for 
organizations to the societal level.
Roberto Poli, in “A Note on the Classification of Future- Related Methods” 
(European Journal of Futures Research, September 2018, 1– 7), identifies about a dozen 
methods unique to the field of Future Studies (including three kinds of scenario 
planning). I have not mentioned each by name in this book (recall that we have 
avoided jargon as much as possible) but have drawn on each.
Strategic Foresight: Learning from the Future, by Patricia Lustig (Triarchy, 
2015) provides a very accessible overview. Strategic Reframing: The Oxford Scenario 
Planning Approach, by Rafael Ramírez and Angela Wilkinson (Oxford University 
Press, 2016), provides both an overview of scenario planning in general and details 
on the particular approach they have pursued. There are several books that describe 
alternative processes. “An Analysis and Categorization of Scenario Planning 
Scholarship from 1995– 2016” by Thomas J. Chermack (Journal of Future Studies 
June 2018) surveys the field. There was also a special issue of World Futures Review 
in 2019 on “turning theory into practice” that provides much detail on scenario 
planning practices.
I mentioned in  chapter 1 that some futurists predict an imminent civilizational 
collapse or transformation (this is one of the six clusters identified by Fergnani). 
Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide by Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
(Routledge, 2015) urges the end of capitalism (providing no alternative, but prom-
ising to do so in a future book), but also wonders about democracy and human 
rights: Since these principles are so regularly violated, we should question not just 
the practices but the principles. Ziauddin Sardar, who edited Futures for 15 years, has 
articulated the idea of “Postnormal Times” in a variety of publications. He foresees 
a period of dramatic change and a “paradigm shift” in human affairs: He worries 
about the collapse of capitalism, decreased privacy due to new technologies, online 
pornography, and genetic engineering. He urges us to shape the new paradigm. 
Graeme Taylor’s Evolution’s Edge: The Coming Collapse and Transformation of Our World 
(New Society Publishers, 2008), despite the scary title, urges a fairly smooth tran-
sition to a world of self- sufficient communities consuming fewer resources and 
engaging in communal decision- making.
I mentioned in  chapter 5 that many futurists believe that surprises are far 
more important than trends. Ziauddin Sardar is one notable advocate of this view. 
Eelco Runia, in Moved by the Past: Discontinuity and Historical Mutation (Columbia 
University Press, 2014) argues that individual humans are driven to do surprising 
things simply to cause change (perhaps because they fear they are coming to know 
themselves too well); other humans then struggle to respond. I am sceptical of 
such a view of history, but note that it does credit human agency with the ability 
to change our future. I would urge people to try to change the world in desirable 
directions and avoid the dangerous temptation to pursue change for its own sake.
Bishop and Hines spoke highly of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s 2007 bestseller The 
Black Swan (Random House). I found the book both simplistic and impenetrable. 
It struck me as simplistic because it argues that history is all about surprises, and 
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that we fool ourselves when we try to explain them after the fact, much less strive 
to predict them in advance. This is not a message that someone who has just spent 
years writing a world history textbook can readily appreciate. I have tried in this 
book to give surprises their due. Some readers may really like the idea of unpredict-
able surprises. If so, they will find that The Black Swan is filled with engaging stories, 
if not a clear line of argument.
Many futurists try to improve the quality of our predictions of plausible futures 
(note that many businesses and governments rely heavily on quantitative predictions 
of especially economic variables in making long- term plans). Paul Goodwin’s 
Forewarned: A Sceptic’s Guide to Prediction (Biteback, 2017) examines the strengths 
and limitations of predictions made by humans, as well as by machines and their 
interpreters.
Steven Johnson’s Farsighted: How We Make the Decisions That Matter the Most 
(Riverhead, 2018) is a good read that has plenty of practical advice on both 
predicting the future and making decisions. I have drawn on his advice in sev-
eral places. He advises us to list the pros and cons associated with diverse options 
before any major decision, and reflect on plausible scenarios (attempting to attach 
probabilities to different outcomes). He builds on the work of Kahneman that we 
discussed in  chapter 6, but is more optimistic that we do think rationally about the 
big decisions in life. Still, he recommends an interdisciplinary course in both high 
school and university on how humans should best make complex decisions. On 
prediction, he cites Philip E. Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How 
Can We Know? (Princeton University Press, 2005): Tetlock had asked hundreds of 
experts to make predictions and evaluated their success a decade later. He found 
that experts who were guided by one narrow ideology or belief performed worse 
than random, whereas experts with a flexible world view performed slightly better. 
These latter people tended to be curious by nature.
Jenny Anderson, in The Future of the World (Oxford University Press, 
2018) describes the history of futurism in terms of ideological conflict (but notes 
that others would instead stress a move away from a stress on progress before 
the 1970s to increasing pessimism thereafter). She feels that the field as a whole 
managed its ideological disagreement by coming to stress a set of techniques such 
as Delphi, scenario planning, and mathematical modelling. She argues that the 
emphasis on multiple plausible futures was itself a reaction to the certainty with 
which some ideologies viewed the future. Since futurism can be a site both of 
control and of dissent, it can potentially appeal across the ideological spectrum. 
She worries, though, that futurism as practised may guide us away from making 
dramatic changes that our societies need. The book is polemic, and not an easy 
read, but it is thought- provoking.
We have often spoken in this book of scenarios. Theodore J. Gordon and Mariana 
Todorova, in Future Studies and Counterfactual Analysis: Seeds of the Future (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019), identify two broad types of scenario: One follows a cause/ effect 
chain forward; the other describes life in a plausible future. The book then describes 
a set of (brief) scenarios engaging issues such as truth (special attention is paid to 
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our ability to fake videos and pictures), nuclear proliferation, population growth, 
religion (a very open- ended discussion), immortality (real and avatar), human 
decision- making capabilities, bioterrorism (with hundreds of thousands or millions 
of deaths), supercomputers as human masters, the nature of progress, our need to 
identify with groups, and genetic engineering. In each case, they start with a bit of 
history of how the issue has developed to this point. They recognize that many of 
their scenarios are very unlikely. In discussing progress, the authors recognize, as we 
have, that it is essential to first identify our goals.
We discussed narrative in box 5.3 and elsewhere. Genevieve Liveley, Will 
Slocombe, and Emily Spiers, “Futures Literacy Through Narrative” (Futures, January 
2021) is a good place to start for those interested in narrative approaches. The first 
section urges us to apply literary analysis to the stories people tell about the future. 
The second urges us to collectively create a play about the future (an idea that was 
mentioned in box 5.3). The third argues that science fiction can contextualize the 
future, and urges us to examine where science fiction authors are coming from.
This book has cast a wide gaze and has drawn on decades of reading by me. I will 
not attempt to guide readers to works on each issue addressed (I will, though salute 
my friend Roderick J. Lawrence’s Creating Built Environments: Bridging Knowledge 
and Practice Divides (Routledge, 2020), which I relied heavily upon in my discussion 
of urban planning). Our libraries and online resources are not classified as well as 
they might be (this is another issue that has attracted my attention; my co- authored 
Interdisciplinary Knowledge Organization discusses how we could improve our access 
to collective human understanding), it should still be possible for readers to readily 
identify works on any subject addressed here. The trick is to seek out multiple 
works on any subject from different points of view, and use your judgement in inte-
grating across their insights. (Yes, I have a couple of textbooks on interdisciplinary 
analysis that can be helpful here; see above.)
I mentioned Donella H. Meadows and Diana Wright’s Thinking in Systems: A 
Primer (London: EarthScan, 2009) in section 3.1. It is a very good read, and filled 
with practical advice on the performance of systems analysis. You don’t have to 
agree with every bit of policy advice they provide in order to appreciate their ana-
lytical approach. The book is available online at https:// wtf.tw/ ref/ meadows.pdf. 
M. Ramage and K. Shipp, Systems Thinkers (2nd ed. London, UK: Springer, 2020), 
describes several different types of systems thinking, and several important thinkers 
in the evolution of systems thinking.
Bernadette Wright and Steven E. Wallis, Practical Mapping for Applied Research and 
Program Evaluation (Sage, 2020), provides lots of detailed advice on how and why 
to map the interactions among phenomena. It stress the importance of nodes with 
multiple connections: These can be the best places to intervene in order to achieve 
desirable ends.
Garett Jones, 10% Less Democracy: Why You Should Trust Elites a Little More and the 
Masses a Little Less (Stanford University Press, 2020), despite the awful title, discusses 
the value of better channelling expert advice into governance. He may underesti-
mate the challenges of limiting expert bias.
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Amitai Etzioni’s Reclaiming Patriotism (University of  Virginia Press, 2019) also 
has an awful title. He celebrates the ability of social movements to achieve societal 
goals that would have seemed unlikely a generation earlier.
Charles Eisenstein’s Climate: A New Story (North Atlantic Books, 2018) places 
discussions around climate in a broader context. I don’t agree with everything he 
says (the rant against quantification struck me as misguided, though I get where he 
is coming from), but I did like the attempt at context. He inspired me to worry that 
the climate debate distracts us from other environmental issues. And I concur with 
him that we need to change our world view away from excessive individualism and 
see ourselves as embedded in both communities and nature.
Patrick Moriarty and Damon Honnery, “The risk of catastrophic climate 
change: Future energy implications” Futures 128, April 2021 provides a brief over-
view of the literature on climate catastrophe and the steps that could be taken to 
avert it.
George Lakoff has written multiple works on the general subject of “framing.” 
These show that how an idea is expressed has a major impact on how people inter-
pret the idea. He argues that we need to express policies in a way that people can 
incorporate into their pre- existing ways of seeing the world.
Catherine Sanderson, in Why We Act: Turning Bystanders into Moral Rebels 
(Belknap Press, 2020), urges us to speak up about the ethical lapses of others, and 
discusses why we don’t.
Paul Goodwin’s book Forewarned: A Sceptic’s Guide to Prediction (Biteback, 
2017) looks at the challenges and biases in forecasting by humans and machines. 
Nate Silver’s The Signal and the Noise (new edition, Penguin, 2020) provides a very 
detailed and readable review of the potential and challenges of prediction in many 
realms, and much advice on how to do it better.
On a more practical note, Calling Bullshit: The Art of Scepticism in a Data- Driven 
World by Carl Bergstrom and Jevin West (Random House, 2020) provides advice on 
how to spot dodgy statistical reasoning. In a world awash in purposeful disinforma-
tion, we all need to develop skills at spotting this.
Hello World: How to Be Human in the Age of the Machine by Hannah Fry (W.W. 
Norton, 2019) provides a great overview of the promises and challenges of artificial 
intelligence – including its ability to guide our future.
In How Democracies Die (Viking, 2018), Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt 
describe a slippery slope that starts with a trampling of democratic norms – thereby 
ending the degree of mutual trust between rivals that democracy requires – and 
proceeds through damage to institutions, especially those related to elections, to 
lawlessness and extremism. Sadly, many of the steps they outline have actually been 
taken in the years since they wrote.
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